Groves v. Board of Trustees of Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana

• Decision Date: 24 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 10491,10491
• Citation: 324 So.2d 587
• Parties: W. E. GROVES v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 587

324 So.2d 587

W. E. GROVES v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA.

No. 10491.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Nov. 24, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1976.

Writ Refused Feb. 17, 1976.

Eugene R. Groves, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

William T. Reeves, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Teachers' Retirement System of La.

David L. Dawson, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Retired La. Teachers' Assn., Inc. Stephen M. Cohen, New Orleans, for Intervenor La. Federation of teachers.

Before LANDRY, COVINGTON and BARNETTE, JJ.

LANDRY, Judge.

Plaintiff W. E. Groves (Appellant) appeals from judgment allowing intervention herein by Louisiana Retired Teachers' Association, Inc. and Louisiana Federation of Teachers (Intervenors), and dismissing Appellant's suit for mandamus to compel defendant, Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana (Appellee Board), to pay Appellant retirement benefits allegedly due as a retired member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana (State System). We affirm in part, reverse in part and award Appellant certain retirement benefits.

The facts involved herein are virtually undisputed; the primary issues presented on this appeal are questions of law. Appellant was initially engaged by the former Orleans Parish Teachers' Retirement System (Orleans System) as an actuary in 1948. At that time, and continuously since, Appellant also served as actuary to several other state and local retirement systems. In 1950, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Orleans System, who was also Secretary of the Orleans Parish School Board (School Board), retired and left vacant the position of Secretary-Treasurer of the Orleans System. Appellant was appointed temporary Secretary-Treasurer of the Orleans System to replace the retired Secretary. Because the retired Orleans System Secretary also served as Secretary of the School Board, she was not paid by the Orleans System for her services as Secretary-Treasurer to that organization. Rather the Orleans System paid the School Board a fee for keeping its books, and the School Board in turn paid the former secretary for services rendered to both the Orleans System and the School Board.

When Appellant became Secretary-Treasurer of the Orleans System in 1950, it was agreed that, in addition to Appellant's retainer as actuary, the Orleans System would pay Appellant as its Secretary the same amount formerly paid the School Board to keep the Orleans System's books. Pursuant to this arrangement Appellant was issued two checks monthly, one for his fee as retained actuary, and the other for his agreed salary as Secretary. Appellant continued to serve in both capacities and under the same payment procedure until 1971 when the Orleans System was merged with the State System pursuant to Act 3 of 1971.

From 1950 to 1971, Appellant's duties as actuary and Secretary-Treasurer were for all practical purposes completely merged. Mr. Groves maintained his own office from which he provided not only actuarial counsel and guidance to the Orleans System, but also retirement counsel to the numerous teacher members of the system. It is undisputed that Appellant often exceeded the normal working day in his office to accommodate teachers requesting advice concerning retirement benefits. As actuary Mr. Groves assisted in preparing legislation required by the system, attended legislative sessions on behalf of the system, and kept the system's Board of Trustees fully advised concerning the status of its assets. As Secretary-Treasurer, Appellant attended Board meetings, advised prospective retirees concerning their benefits, calculated benefits for retirees, and received and accounted for contributions from the School Board. Appellant concedes that during the period 1950--1971, he continued to render actuarial and investment counseling service to several other retirement systems. He contends he did so on an overtime basis by utilizing his evenings and week ends.

No deductions were ever made for retirement benefits, social security payments or income tax withholding from any payments made to Appellant, either as actuary or Secretary-Treasurer of the Orleans System. Admittedly, Appellant never became a member of the Orleans System, and made no contributions thereto because the law provided that only employees of the Orleans School Board could become members of the Orleans System, and Appellant was never employed by that Board.

On May 1, 1971, Appellant was employed by the Board of Trustees of the Orleans System as Secretary-Treasurer of that system. Claiming credit for 22.92 years service to the Orleans System, Appellant retired from the State System effective October 1, 1971, the merger of the two systems having become effective July 1, 1971. Appellant was paid retirement benefits monthly until May 1, 1974, on which date Appellee Board discontinued payment.

Appellant's claim is predicated upon Act 3 of 1971, Section 2, which pertinently provides:

'. . . All persons employed or retained by the Board of Trustees of the New Orleans Teachers Retirement Fund as of May 1, 1971, shall become members of the Louisiana State Teachers Retirement System on the effective date of the merger, with full credit for all previous service as an employee of the Board of Trustees, Teachers Retirement Fund of New Orleans.'

Appellant contends Act 3 of 1971 was intended to benefit those employees of the Board of Trustees of the Orleans System who lost their jobs because of the merger. Appellant points out that these employees consist of two clerical employees and Appellant himself. It is urged that Act 3 of 1971 is self-explanatory, clear and unambiguous in that it expressly states that all persons 'employed or retained' by the Board of Trustees of the Orleans System as of May 1, 1971, shall become members of the State System.

Appellees question Appellant's right to proceed by mandamus to enforce the claimed right to retirement benefits on the ground that determination of Appellant's rights involves a matter of discretion, not a mere ministerial function on the part of Appellee Board.

On the merits, Appellees contend Appellant is not entitled to retirement benefits because Appellant was never employed by the Orleans System and made no contribution to its retirement fund. It is Appellees' position that the legislature never intended that Act 3 of 1971 apply to persons who made no contribution to either the Orleans or State System. Finally, Appellees contend that to grant Appellant retirement benefits without Appellant having made contribution would erode the rights of retirees of the State System and would violate state constitutional provisions which prohibit donation of public funds to private persons.

The trial court rejected Appellant's claim upon finding that mandamus was not the proper procedure in a matter of this nature, and also because Appellant was never an employee of the Orleans System. Appellant applied for a new trial which the lower court granted limited to argument only. On conclusion of the new trial, the lower court rendered judgment upholding Intervenors' right of intervention, and again rejecting Appellant's claim for benefits on the ground that although Appellant was employed as Secretary-Treasurer of the Orleans System, Appellant was not entitled to retirement benefits because Appellant made no contribution to the retirement fund. In essence the trial court held it was unreasonable to interpret Act 3 of 1971 to apply to employees who made no contribution to either the Orleans or State System.

IS MANDAMUS A PROPER REMEDY?

Invoking LSA-C.C.P. art. 3863, Appellees contend that determination of Appellant's retirement eligibility is a discretionary rather than ministerial function, and consequently, that mandamus is not a proper vehicle for relief in this instance.

Our jurisprudence is well settled to the effect that a mandatory duty of a public official or employee to perform some official act does not become less mandatory or ministerial merely because the statute creating the duty may require, to some degree or extent, construction of the statutory language. Cook v. City of Shreveport, 163 La. 518, 112 So. 402; Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Pension and Relief Fund of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, La.App., 207 So.2d 168; State ex rel. Saint v. Toups, La.App., 95 So.2d 55; State ex rel. Nunez v. Baynard, La.App., 15 So.2d 649; Dupuy v. Jones, La.App., 15 So.2d 528. See also, White v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, La.App., 276 So.2d 714.

The hereinabove quoted portion of Section 2 of Act 3 of 1971 specifically declares that persons retained or employed by the Orleans Board on May 1, 1971, shall become members of the State System on the effective date of the merger with full credit for all prior service rendered the Board of Trustees of the Orleans System. If Appellant was retained or employed by the Orleans Board of Trustees on May 1, 1971, by the express terms of the statute, Appellant became a member of the State System on the effective date of the merger, and Appellee Board has no discretion whatsoever in the matter. Appellee Board's only duty is to pay Appellant retirement benefits if Appellant is entitled thereto pursuant to the statute. Consequently, the issue is basically a matter of statutory construction concerning which Appellee Board has no discretion whatsoever. While Appellee may properly question Appellant's asserted construction of the statute, it does not follow that Appellant may not resort to mandamus to determine the scope of the statute involved. We conclude, on the basis of the authorities cited above, mandamus is available to Appellant in this instance.

WAS INTERVENTION PROPERLY ALLOWED?

Appellant contends that intervention was erroneously allowed herein because: (1) intervention is not permissible in a mandamus proceeding; and (2) Intervenors lack sufficient...