Groves v. Clark
| Decision Date | 26 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-040,96-040 |
| Citation | 277 Mont. 179,920 P.2d 981 |
| Parties | Debbie GROVES, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Lonn CLARK and Loralee Clark, Respondents and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
James D. Elshoff, Great Falls, for Respondents.
On July 24, 1995, Debbie Groves petitioned the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County for specific performance of a visitation agreement that she had entered into with Lonn and Loralee Clark. The Clarks filed an objection to Groves' petition and a brief opposing Groves' request for open adoption. On December 21, 1995, the District Court, by agreement of the parties, deemed the Clarks' objection a motion for summary judgment, concluded that the visitation agreement was void from its inception, and denied Groves' petition for specific performance. Groves appeals the District Court's order. We reverse the order of the District Court and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it concluded that the visitation agreement executed between the birth mother and the adoptive parents prior to adoption was void as a matter of law.
Debbie Groves is the natural mother of Laci Lee Groves Clark. Laci lived with Groves from June 5, 1990, the date of Laci's birth, until approximately January 28, 1994, when Groves signed a document relinquishing custody of Laci to Lutheran Social Services (LSS) and consenting to adoption.
Prior to her relinquishment of Laci, Groves had become acquainted with Lonn and Loralee Clark, who had encouraged Groves to permit them to adopt Laci through LSS. At one of their meetings, the Clarks told Groves that they would agree to an "open adoption" so that Groves could have visitation rights with Laci after the adoption. Groves was adamant that she would not consent to adoption until the Clarks signed a visitation agreement.
On January 11, 1994, the Clarks signed a post-adoption visitation agreement, and on January 14 Groves signed a separate but identical agreement. The agreement provided:
This agreement pertains to Debbie's desire to have visitation time with Laci Lee Groves (DOB 6-5-90) after Laci is adopted by Lonn and Loralee Clark.
Debbie desires the following:
1. I hope to be able to give a 2-day notice whenever I'd like have Laci go with me or whenever I'd like to come visit at the Clark home.
2. I would like to have telephone contact with Laci and the Clark's [sic] as often as I feel it is necessary.
3. I don't intend to take Laci out of school unless I have to go to Butte for some emergency. If that happens I do need to take Lacy [sic] with me.
The Clarks signed the agreement in the presence of a notary public. Their signatures followed a provision that read: "We, Lonn and Loralee Clark, are willing to honor Debbie Groves' wishes regarding her requests for contact with Laci Lee Groves." Groves signed an identical notarized agreement three days later.
On January 28, 1994, Groves executed a document entitled "Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption." In that document, Groves relinquished Laci to LSS and granted LSS the right to place Laci for adoption. In addition, Groves expressly waived service of any notice of the proceedings for termination of her parental rights and placement of Laci for adoption, and agreed that LSS' executive director would appear at those proceedings as her attorney-in-fact to execute any documents that may have been required and to complete the placement of Laci in a suitable adoptive home. On February 2, 1994, the Eighth Judicial District Court entered an order awarding custody of Laci to LSS and terminating Groves' custodial and parental rights. After the Clarks filed a petition for adoption on September 23, 1994, that court entered a summary decree of adoption. At no time during the adoption proceedings did the Clarks mention their visitation agreement with Groves. As set forth in the "Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption," Groves did not participate in those proceedings.
Groves and the Clarks abided by the terms of the executed visitation agreement until June 5, 1995. On that date, when Groves On July 24, 1995, Groves filed a petition requesting specific performance of her visitation agreement with the Clarks. In response, the Clarks filed an objection to Groves' petition and a brief in opposition to Groves' request for open adoption. The parties agreed that the Clarks' objection could be treated as a motion for summary judgment. The District Court denied Groves' motion for specific performance on December 21, 1995. In its order, the court held that the "Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption" constituted the final, controlling agreement by Groves relating to Laci. Because that document did not reserve any visitation and because that document purported to "terminate all [Groves'] parental rights to [Laci], now and forever," the court concluded that Groves had given up all of her parental rights and had no claim for post-adoption visitation. Based on that conclusion, the court held that the parties' visitation agreement was void and unenforceable.
telephoned the Clarks to make arrangements to visit Laci on her birthday, the Clarks refused and told Groves she could no longer visit her daughter. Prior to that time, the Clarks had allowed Groves to visit Laci on major holidays and on other occasions.
Did the District Court err when it held that the visitation agreement executed between Groves and the Clarks prior to adoption was void as a matter of law?
In this case, the District Court treated the matter as appropriate for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. We review a district court's order for summary judgment de novo and apply the same evaluation as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The District Court denied Groves' petition for specific performance on the basis of its determination that Groves had voluntarily given up all of her parental rights to Laci in the "Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption" which she signed on January 28, 1994. The court determined that that document constituted "the final agreement by Groves relating to the child," and concluded that its failure to reserve any visitation within its terms accomplished full termination of the relationship between Groves and Laci. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on § 40-8-125, MCA, and In re C.P. (1986), 221 Mont. 180, 717 P.2d 1093.
Section 40-8-125, MCA, provides in relevant part:
(1) After the final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and child and all the rights, duties, and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted child and the adoptive parents adopting such child and the kindred of the adoptive parents.
(2) After the final decree of adoption is entered, the natural parents and the kindred of the natural parents of the adopted child, unless they are the adoptive parents or the spouse of an adoptive parent, shall be relieved of all parental responsibilities for said child and have no rights over such adopted child.
In In re C.P., 221 Mont. at 181, 717 P.2d at 1093, this Court interpreted § 40-8-125, MCA, to preclude visitation rights for the natural parents once a trial court has entered its final decree of adoption. Specifically, we stated:
This language [of § 40-8-125, MCA] is clear. When parental rights are terminated, the natural parent no longer has any rights over the child. This includes visitation rights.
In re C.P., 221 Mont. at 183, 717 P.2d at 1095 (underlining added).
In re C.P. is distinguishable from this case, however. First, in In re C.P., although the parties discussed including visitation rights in the final order, there was no indication in the record that the parties reached any agreement on the issue. In re C.P., 221 Mont. at 182, 717 P.2d at 1094. In contrast, in this case both parties voluntarily signed a notarized agreement which provided the terms of the visitation arrangement. In addition, the Court recognized in In re C.P. that the outcome of that case might have been different had there been a statute that provided for visitation after a final adoption decree and had the parties bargained for the right of visitation. In that case, we noted:
Even if the statutes provided for such a retention of visitation rights, the record in this case contains no evidence to support such a finding.... There is no question that appellant disputed SRS obtaining permanent custody. Thus, there is no question of whether she agreed to their custody in exchange for visitation rights.
In re C.P., 221 Mont. at 183, 717 P.2d at 1095. In this case, the parties did bargain for the right of visitation. In fact, Groves alleges that she agreed to termination of her parental rights and consented to place Laci for adoption only after the Clarks agreed to sign the visitation agreement. Furthermore, since our decision in In re C.P., the Montana Legislature has enacted a statutory provision which recognizes agreements entered into between...
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Groves v. Clark
...visitation between Groves and L.C. A more detailed account of the facts of this case can be found in Groves v. Clark (1996), 277 Mont. 179, 920 P.2d 981 (hereinafter Groves I). To summarize, in January 1994, when L.C. was three years old, Groves signed a document terminating her parental ri......