Grubb's Appeal

• Citation: 90 Pa. 228
• Parties: Grubb's Appeal.
• Decision Date: 23 June 1879
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

90 Pa. 228

Grubb's Appeal.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 9, 1879.

June 23, 1879.

May 9th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.

Appeal from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county: Of May Term 1878, No. 132. In Equity.

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S. H. Reynolds, Wayne McVeagh and A. Slaymaker, for appellant.—The opinion of the learned court below entirely ignores the well settled distinctions between the powers and jurisdiction of courts of equity and those of the common-law courts, and is founded upon what seems to us a misconception of the scope and effect of the authorities upon the subject. The jurisdiction of courts of equity in trespass, waste, &c., to which it refers, attaches only where the acts complained of affect rights of property already clearly established by admission or otherwise, and does not warrant those courts in proceeding in the first instance to determine as to such rights when in dispute.

The Acts of Assembly conferring equity powers on the courts of common pleas do not and could not, under the Constitution of the state, interfere with the rights of parties to have their controversies determined by the usual common-law methods in any other than that class of cases of which courts of chancery — where there were such courts — had previously had jurisdiction: North Penna. Railroad Co. v. Snowden, 6 Wright 488; Norris's Appeal, 14 P. F. Smith 275; Tillmes v. Marsh, 17 Id. 507.

The right of the plaintiff must be acknowledged or established at law before he can resort to a chancellor: Rhea v. Forsyth, 1 Wright 503; Norris's Appeal, supra; City of Philadelphia's Appeal, 28 P. F. Smith 33; Brown's Appeal, 12 Id. 17; Haines's Appeal, 23 Id. 169; Minnig's Appeal, 1 Norris 373.

Though the bill contains a prayer for an account it lays no foundation for one, and seeks it only as a consequence of the other relief which it prays, and where the accounts are all "on one side, and no discovery is sought or required, courts of equity will decline to take jurisdiction:" Gloninger v. Hazard, 6 Wright 389; Passyunk Building Assoc. Appeal, 2 Norris 441.

But again, no case can be cognisable in equity, for which there is a complete remedy at law: Clark's Appeal, 12 P. F. Smith 447; Brown's Appeal, Id. 17; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; Strasburg Railroad Co. v. Echternacht, 9 Harris 220; Gallagher v. Fayette County Railroad Co., 2 Wright 102; Minnig's Appeal, supra.

Thomas E. Franklin, George M. Kline, H. M. North and D. W. Sellers, for appellee.—To stay waste courts of equity will interfere by injunction: 1 Story's Eq. Jurisprudence 515-518; Jesus College v. Bloom, Ambler's Rep. 54; Bispham's Equity, sects. 434, 435, 436; Bishop of Winchester v. Knight, 1 Peere Wms. 407; L. Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 1 Madd. Ch. Rep. 116; Thomas v. Oakley, 18 Ves. 184; Gibson v. Smith, 2 Atk. 182. It is not necessary to wait till waste is actually committed, where the intention appears and the person insists on his right to do it: Perrot v. Perrot, 3 Atk. 94; Packington's Case, Id. 215; Coppinger v. Gubbins, 9 Irish Eq. 310; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 6 Sim. 497; Duke of Leeds v. P. Amherst, 14 Id. 357; Morris v. Morris, 15 Id. 509; and see 1 Add. on Torts 316, and authorities there cited.

And waste, as an act contrary to law, is within the purview of our legislation on the equitable powers of our courts, and the jurisdiction conferred expressly extends to its prevention or restraint: Denny v. Brunson, 5 Casey 385.

So, in regard to repeated acts of trespass upon the legal rights of complainant, in obstructing a stream of water flowing to his mill: Scheetz's Appeal, 11 Casey 88. And to the violation by a railroad company of the condition on which a concession to enter was granted: Unangst's Appeal, 5 P. F. Smith 128; Carty v. Shields, 5 W. N. C. 241; Gass's Appeal, 23 P. F. Smith 47. The equitable jurisdiction conferred by the Acts of Assembly is a valuable, indeed indispensable one, and ought to be extended by every interpretation of which the words are susceptible: Wesley Church v. Moore, 10 Barr 280; Kirkpatrick v. McDonald, 1 Jones 393; Yard v. Patton, 1 Harris 282.

The case being properly cognisable in equity, the court, sitting in equity, having acquired jurisdiction, will inquire into and determine all matters necessary to decide the rights of the parties to the subject in controversy: McGowin v. Remington, 2 Jones 56; McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 4 P. F. Smith 40; Allison and Evans's Appeal, 27 Id. 221.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, June 23d 1879.

The appellant denies the jurisdiction. As this point, if well taken, disposes of the present proceeding, we will consider it first.

The bill stripped of all unnecessary matter, is a proceeding to compel the appellant to pay for one-half the ore hauled from the Cornwall ore-banks to the Mount Hope Furnace. Whether he ought to pay for it depends upon the construction of the deed of 1845 of Clement B. Grubb and wife to Alfred Bates Grubb. These are both legal questions properly belonging to a court of law. If this were all, we would at once dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction. But as some other matters have been introduced into it, evidently with the view of bringing the case within the cognisance of a court of equity, we will consider them briefly. They are first — That the claim of a full supply, instead of a moiety, is contrary to the agreement of purchase, to the construction of the deed, and to the continuous and uninterrupted usage thereunder, and that if the terms of the license are vague the deed should be reformed. In support of this averment there is the prayer, "that if the words of the deed of 1845 do not clearly confine the defendant's right to a half supply, the deed should be reformed." It is sufficient to say in regard to this that the proper construction of the deed is not a subject of equity jurisdiction, and that as to its reformation, there is neither averment nor proof of fraud, accident or mistake.

The second averment is, "That the wrong of taking all the ore is one continuous and recurring, would cause a multiplicity of suits against which relief could be had in equity only." It was strongly urged that this averment gave the court jurisdiction under that provision of the Act of 16th June 1836, conferring equity powers upon the Courts...