Grubbs v. Butz, 73-1955
| Decision Date | 23 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-1955,73-1955 |
| Citation | 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82,514 F.2d 1323 |
| Parties | 10 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1215, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,208, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82 Violet Davis GRUBBS, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Appellant, v. Earl L. BUTZ, Individually and as Secretary of Agriculture, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Joseph B. Valder, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and ROBINSON and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 1 (EEOA), which amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2, extends procedural protections to federal employees complaining of employment discrimination. Under § 717(c) of the EEOA 3 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) a federal employee may file a civil action in United States District Court within 30 days of receiving notice that final action has been taken on his discrimination complaint by his agency or by the Civil Service Commission to which he can appeal. The right to file an action arises as well if within 180 days the agency has not taken final action on his complaint or the Civil Service Commission has not taken final action on his appeal.
The instant case presents several problems in the allocation of responsibilities between executive agencies and the federal district courts in the application of the EEOA. Before analyzing the problems, it is necessary to present the factual background against which they should be viewed.
Appellant Grubbs, an employee of the Food and Nutrition Service S of the Department of Agriculture, filed informal charges of sex discrimination within the FNS on February 17, 1971. 4 Failing to secure relief through informal channels, she filed a formal complaint on June 14, 1971. On January 21, 1972, after the complaint had been investigated by the Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG), Mr. Edward J. Hekman, Administrator of the FNS, found that "discrimination because of sex had not been established." On January 27, 1972 Ms. Grubbs indicated her intention to seek a hearing within the Department on her charges. 5
While the action before the FNS was pending, Ms. Grubbs claims that she was subjected to acts of reprisal by her superiors. These acts culminated, she alleges, in a reorganization of her office in January, 1972 which resulted in her transfer from a supervisory to a non-supervisory position. Therefore, at the same time that she indicated her intention to proceed to hearing on her initial charges, she also extended her complaint to cover the alleged reduction in rank and acts of reprisal.
Rather than proceed with her reduction in rank charges within the Department, Ms. Grubbs, as provided for in 5 C.F.R. 752.203, appealed the alleged reduction in rank directly to the Civil Service Commission. With that appeal she joined a claim that the reorganization and transfer were acts of reprisal. Thus, as of November, 1972 Ms. Grubbs was proceeding on two fronts. Her charges relating to the 1971 acts of alleged discrimination were before the Department awaiting a hearing, while the reduction in rank and reprisal charges were before the Civil Service Commission.
At a November 7, 1972 prehearing conference on the 1971 charges, an oral agreement as to a settlement was reached. However, when reduced to writing it did not meet with Ms. Grubbs' approval. She indicated this in a letter to the Department on January 11, 1973. On March 22, 1973, she notified the Department of her continued intention to seek a hearing within the Department both on the 1971 charges and the reprisal charges. The Department agreed to hold a hearing on the 1971 charges but, citing the fact that the reprisal issue had been appealed directly to the Civil Service Commission, indicated that its hearing would not cover that issue.
On April 12, 1973, the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision on the reprisal and reduction-in-rank issues. It found that Ms. Grubbs' reassignment was not a reduction-in-rank 6 and was therefore not properly before the Commission at that time. Moreover, since Commission regulations "permit the joining of a discrimination or reprisal charge with (reduction-in-rank charges) only when (the latter are) properly before the Commission," the Commission found that the reprisal charges as well "fall outside of the scope of the Commission's review." 7
On May 4, 1973, Ms. Grubbs filed an action pursuant to § 717(c) of the EEOA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia claiming that the Department's actions in 1971 and its alleged acts of reprisal had violated the antidiscrimination provisions of the EEOA. 8 One month later, on June 5, 1973, the Department informed Ms. Grubbs that it intended to continue separate administrative proceedings on her 1971 charges either on the record of the investigation that had been conducted or, if she requested, with a hearing. While claiming that the District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, Ms. Grubbs nevertheless did notify the Department that she would participate in the hearing. The hearing was scheduled for August 14, 1973. A request to postpone the hearing was denied by the Complaints Examiner appointed to hear the case.
At that point, Ms. Grubbs sought and obtained a temporary restraining order in the District Court prohibiting the Department from proceeding with the hearing. However, several days later, on August 21, 1973, Ms. Grubbs' request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting further administrative processing of her claim by the Department was refused by the trial judge. At the same time the trial judge indicated that "plaintiff will be required to exhaust her administrative remedies within the (Department)." These rulings are the subject of this appeal. On September 14, 1973, a division of this court enjoined the Department from proceeding any further pending disposition of this case.
II
As a threshold matter, we address appellee's assertion that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. Appellee argues that the EEOA should not be applied to acts of discrimination which occurred prior to March 24, 1972, the act's effective date.
This argument, however, is conclusively precluded by our recent decision in Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There we held that since the right to sue embodied in § 717(c) of the EEOA is merely an additional means to enforce an already existing right to be free from employment discrimination, the statute would apply retroactively to any cases in which proceedings were pending on its effective date. With Ms. Grubbs already having instituted proceedings in the Department of Agriculture by March 24, 1972, the EEOA is therefore applicable to her case. 9
We turn now to the District Court's ruling that Ms. Grubbs "will be required to exhaust her administrative remedies within the (Department)." We agree with Ms. Grubbs that since her original discrimination complaint had been pending before the Department of Agriculture for over two years further exhaustion should not have been required. 10
As noted, supra, slip page ---, --- U.S.App.D.C. page ---, --- F.2d page ---, § 717(c) of the EEOA provides that a civil action may be filed when 180 days have passed without final administrative action having been taken on a complainant's initial charge. 11 The 180 day provision represents a Congressional determination that providing prompt access to the courts in discrimination disputes is so important that the administrative process will be given only a finite time to deal alone with a given dispute. Indeed, the Act is in part a response to Congressional realization that "the doctrines of exhaustion of remedies . . . had become (a) barrier(s) to meaningful court review." 12 Requiring a complainant to further pursue administrative remedies after fulfilling all the prerequisites to suit specified by the EEOA and, most importantly, after 180 days have elapsed without final administrative action, would frustrate that response.
No appellate court has yet superimposed an exhaustion requirement on the statutory prerequisites to suit as set out in § 717(c). And, recently, our District Court in Williams v. Mumford, 5 FEP Cases 1042 (D.D.C.1973), held that, regardless of the availability of any further administrative remedy, a federal employee has a right to file a civil action under § 717(c) if final agency action has not been taken within the 180 day period.
Nor does the addition of a further exhaustion requirement to § 717(c) find support in the cases interpreting the analogous part of Title VII dealing with private employees' rights of action in discrimination cases. 13 In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court noted that the prerequisites to suit set out in the statute were the only ones that Congress meant to apply: "We will not engraft on the statute a requirement which may inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination in the federal courts." Id. at 1822. Even before McDonnell Douglas, Courts of Appeals were unwilling to supplement the statutory scheme with any additional prerequisites that might delay or dilute a private complainant's full access into District Court. 14
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) provides that "it shall be the duty of the trial judge to assign the (discrimination) case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited." 15 This explicit Congressional desire for expedition might be thwarted if trial judges were free to impose an exhaustion requirement over and above the 180 day provision for federal employment discrimination cases. 16
...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Parker v. Califano
...enforcement powers. * * * 425 U.S. at 829-833, 96 S.Ct. at 1966 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). See also Grubbs v. Butz, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 514 F.2d 1323, 1329 (1975); Hackley v. Roudebush, supra, 520 F.2d at 156-159. The expansive reference to "any action or proceeding under (Title ......
-
Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.
...authority. As a rule, administrative regulations properly promulgated under statutory authority are presumed valid, Grubbs v. Butz,169 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 514 F.2d 1323 (1975); United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1973). An administrative officer exercising rule making powers delegat......
-
Curto v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 82 C 1576.
...Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 562 F.2d 6, 7-8 (7th Cir.1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1976); Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C.Cir.1975); Harris v. Ericson, 457 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1972); Crosslin v. Mountain States & Telegraph Co., 422 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th......
-
Bethel v. Jefferson
...F.2d 595, 596 (9th Cir. 1973).74 Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976).75 Grubbs v. Butz, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 87, 514 F.2d 1323, 1328 (1975), citing H.R.Rep.No.238, Supra note 34, at 22-26; S.Rep.No.415, Supra note 35, at 16.76 Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 4......