Grubbs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-02229-JMC |
| Citation | 514 F.Supp.3d 820 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Jamie GRUBBS, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, and Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., Defendant. |
Brady Ryan Thomas, Thomas and Haltiwanger LLC, Columbia, SC, James David Butler, Richardson Patrick Westbrook and Brickman, Barnwell, SC, Mark B. Tinsley, Gooding and Gooding, Allendale, SC, for Plaintiff.
Ronald K. Wray, II, Gallivan White and Boyd, Greenville, SC, John E. Schiltz, Pro Hac Vice, Susman Godfrey LLP, Seattle, WA, Mary Kathryn Sammons, Pro Hac Vice, Weston L. O'Black, Pro Hac Vice, Susman Godfrey LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.
J. Michelle Childs, United States District Judge This matter is before the court on Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP's, and Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc.’s (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Id. ).
This is a products liability action concerning an allegedly defective gas can. Plaintiff Jamie Grubbs ("Plaintiff") maintains that he purchased a portable plastic gas can manufactured by Blitz U.S.A., Inc. at the Wal-Mart location in Barnwell, South Carolina in 2004 or shortly thereafter. (ECF No. 26 at 4 ¶¶ 12, 13.) He claims that on or about February 15, 2015, he attempted to use fuel as an accelerant to build a fire in his backyard, his burn barrel ignited the fumes from the gasoline, and a flashback explosion of the gas can occurred, causing him to suffer "severe burns." (Id. ¶ 14, at 6 ¶ 27.)
Plaintiff asserts that the gas can was defective because it was not equipped with a "flame arrestor." (Id. at 5-6 ¶ 25.) A flame arrestor is "a small metal device that is placed in a container's openings and allows liquids to flow out of the container but prevents the flashback of flames back into the container." (Id. at 7 ¶ 35.) Plaintiff contends that a "flash back explosion of a gas can occurs when gasoline vapors outside the gas can ignite and the flame flashes back into the vapor trail inside the container, causing an internal, combustion of the gasoline, a rupture of the can and the spraying of ignited gasoline on the victim." (Id. at 4 ¶ 17.)
On August 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint, alleging a single cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-314 (2020) against Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) After Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) on September 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) on September 17, 2019.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on September 30, 2019. They argued that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it is "devoid of any factual detail regarding when the gas can at issue was allegedly sold by Walmart" and "does not allege the gas can was unfit for its ordinary purpose[.]" (ECF No. 14 at 1.) The court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with leave to amend on July 8, 2020, finding that the First Amended Complaint failed to sufficiently allege when the gas can was sold and whether Defendants knew of the defect at the time of sale. (ECF No. 23 at 4-6.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26) on July 22, 2020. In response, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on August 19, 2020.
Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 32) on September 2, 2020 and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 33) on September 9, 2020. Plaintiff then filed a Sur Reply (ECF No. 34) on October 15, 2020 to which Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 35).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Francis v. Giacomelli , 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). "In considering a 12(b)(6) challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint, this Rule must be applied in conjunction with the liberal pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)." Jenkins v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , C/A No. 3:10-1968-CMC-JRM, 2011 WL 4482074, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2011). Under Rule 8(a), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should accept all well-pled allegations as true and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See e.g. , Ostrzenski v. Seigel , 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) ; Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari , 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
To state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must show that (1) a merchant sold goods; (2) the goods were not "merchantable" at the time of sale; (3) the plaintiff or his property were injured by such goods; (4) the defect or other condition amounting to a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability proximately caused the injury; and (5) the plaintiff so injured gave timely notice to the seller. Brunson v. La.-Pac. Corp. , 266 F.R.D. 112, 119 (D.S.C. 2010).
Defendants claim that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint has three defects. (ECF No. 30.) First, Defendants contend that the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege that the gas can was unfit for its ordinary purpose. (Id. at 1.) Second, they maintain that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under South Carolina law because "Walmart could not have impliedly warranted that the gas can was safe to pour gasoline to accelerate a fire when the gas can itself expressly warned that the gas can was not safe for that use[.]" (Id. ) Third, Defendants assert that they could not have impliedly warranted that the gas can was safe to pour gasoline to accelerate a fire when it is "common knowledge" that such a use is dangerous. (Id. at 2.)
Section 36-2-314 provides that goods are "merchantable" if they are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used[.]" Defendants maintain that the ordinary purpose of a gas can is the storage of gasoline and contend that Plaintiff has not alleged that the gas can was unfit for such purpose. (ECF No. 30-1 at 10.) Plaintiff counters that a product can have multiple ordinary purposes under § 36-2-314 because the statute refers to "ordinary purposes." (ECF No. 32 at 7.) He asserts that the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently suggests that pouring gasoline to start a fire is another ordinary purpose of a gas can and that the gas can at issue was not suited for such purpose. (Id. at 9.)
Section 36-2-314 explicitly contemplates that goods may have multiple "ordinary purposes." Comment 2 to S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-315 (2020) provides that "the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question." As a result, ascertaining the ordinary purposes of a product is a factual inquiry unsuited for determination on the pleadings. See Gomez v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc. , 383 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 2019) (); Thomas v. Ford Motor Co. , No. 5:13-01417-JM, 2014 WL 1315014, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2014) ().
Here, it is possible that Defendants’ proposed ordinary purpose may ultimately prove correct and that Plaintiff's proposed ordinary purpose may prove incorrect. However, after accepting all well-pled allegations in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in Plaintiff's favor, the court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the gas can was not "merchantable" at the time of sale. The Second Amended Complaint suggests that pouring gasoline to start a fire is an ordinary purpose of a gas can by alleging that customers routinely use gas cans to pour gasoline to start fires. (ECF No. 26 at 5.) It cites market research from the prior year showing that 19% of customers surveyed reported using gasoline to start or accelerate a fire as well as focus groups where "[n]early all men, and many of the women, said they use gasoline to start fires." (Id. ) In addition, it alleges that "Wal-Mart knows that gas cans are ordinarily used to store and pour gasoline including on potential ignition sources due to Wal-Mart being a routine Defendant in exploding gas can cases." (Id. ) The Second Amended Complaint further alleges that the gas can at issue was not fit for this ordinary purpose because a gas can without a flame arrestor is susceptible to flashback and other manufacturers included flame arrestors in their gas cans. (Id. at 5-6.)
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