Grubel v. MacLaughlin

• Decision Date: 18 June 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 86-1966.
• Citation: 286 F. Supp. 24
• Parties: John C. GRUBEL and Cornelia M. Grubel, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Bernard A. E. MacLAUGHLIN, William J. Baar, Winona L. Phaire, J. Karl Williams, Frank E. Stewart, Emilie F. Gow, Stanley Kissler, Ethel Kissler, Walter Adam, Norma Adam and the Government of the Virgin Islands, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

286 F. Supp. 24

John C. GRUBEL and Cornelia M. Grubel, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Bernard A. E. MacLAUGHLIN, William J. Baar, Winona L. Phaire, J. Karl Williams, Frank E. Stewart, Emilie F. Gow, Stanley Kissler, Ethel Kissler, Walter Adam, Norma Adam and the Government of the Virgin Islands, Defendants.

Civ. No. 86-1966.

District Court, Virgin Islands D. St. Croix, at Christiansted.

June 18, 1968.

William A. Pallme, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for plaintiff.

Young & Isherwood, Christiansted, St. Croix, V. I., for defendant.

OPINION

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs John C. Grubel and his wife Cornelia M. Grubel, owners of land situated in St. Croix, filed a complaint under the Virgin Islands Declaratory Judgment Act, 5 V.I.C. § 1261 et seq., asserting two causes of action. The first was against their grantors and eight other persons to whom were conveyed parcels of land out of the same original tract of land, in which cause the plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring unenforceable a certain restrictive covenant contained in their deed. In the second cause of action, brought against the Government of the Virgin Islands, the plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring invalid an amendment to the Virgin Islands Zoning and Subdivision Act, 29 V. I.C. § 260 et seq., as it applies to their property. From the pleadings and the evidence the following facts are found:

The plaintiffs own, as tenants by the entirety, a single tract of land totaling approximately 1.337 acres, part of which is designated on Public Works Drawing No. 608, which is recorded in the Office of the Public Surveyor, Christiansted, St. Croix, as Parcel 1C of Estate Golden Rock consisting of 0.527 acres and the remainder as Parcel 2D of Estate Orange Grove consisting of 0.810 acres.

The defendants Bernard A. E. MacLaughlin and William J. Baar were the owners of a single tract of land of approximately 6.96 acres, part of which was designated as Parcel 2A of Estate Orange Grove consisting of 1.71 acres, part as Parcel 1A of Estate Golden Rock consisting of 4.73 acres, and the remainder as Plot No. 1 Estate Little Princess consisting of 0.52 acres, out of which they conveyed to the plaintiffs the land described in the preceding paragraph by deed dated September 1, 1960, and recorded in the Recorder's Office of St. Croix on September 26, 1960, in P.C. 14, page 20, No. 320-1961.

The deed to the plaintiffs recited that the conveyance was

"SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the restriction, which shall be deemed a covenant running with the land, that the property above described shall be used primarily for residential purposes but may be used as a guesthouse and/or printing establishment or for a home industry in connection with a dwelling house so long as a nuisance is not created thereby."

At various times the defendants MacLaughlin and Baar conveyed parcels out of their tract of land to the other individual defendants who, with the defendants MacLaughlin and Baar, are the owners of the land comprising the dominant tenement with respect to the restrictive covenant above described.

At the time of the conveyance to the plaintiffs in 1960 the zoning law of the Virgin Islands permitted the use of plaintiffs' property for residential purposes.

By the Act of July 2, 1965, No. 1477, 1965 V.I.Sess.L. 368, the Virgin Islands Legislature amended the Virgin Islands Zoning and Subdivision Act, 29 V.I.C. § 260 et seq., by adding, inter alia, to the schedule of zoning district requirements, 29 V.I.C. § 266 App. I, a new C-2 Zone entitled "Neighborhood Shopping Centers" intended to "provide for the development of a planned and organized group of compatible retail shops grouped under a commonly designed site plan for the convenient needs of a neighborhood area". In a C-2 Zone the use of property for residential purposes is not permitted.

The plaintiffs' land was subsequently and now is classified in a C-2 Zone on the Official Zoning Map of the Virgin Islands.

The plaintiffs' land abuts for a distance of about 150 feet the southwest side of the North Side Road, a main much travelled public highway leading from Christiansted to Little Princess and beyond, and it extends to the southwest about 353 feet along a side road rising in elevation about 110 feet from its front on the North Side Road to its rear line. The land is unimproved but immediately to the southeast of it land fronting on the North Side Road has been developed for various commercial purposes since the year 1960. This development has made a substantial change in the character of the general area in which the plaintiffs' land lies although not in the particular parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs and the individual defendants.

The plaintiffs' land, presently unimproved, is so situated with respect to location, slope and grades as to be best adapted to the commercial use permitted in a C-2 Zone and I find this to be its highest, best and most advisable use. Its use for such purposes would not interfere with the continued use for residential purposes of those portions of the lands of the individual defendants which are now devoted to that use and which comprise the dominant tenement and the value of those lands for the continued development for residential use which is now taking place there will not be adversely affected by the use of the plaintiffs' land for purposes permitted in a C-2 Zone and will suffer no deterioration in market value therefrom. The present zoning of the area, which places the plaintiffs' land and the lands of certain individual defendants which also abut the North Side Road in a C-2 Zone and the remaining land of the individual defendants in a residential zone, conforms to the changes in the character of the area and the differences in the uses for which the respective tracts are available. The individual defendants' lands which remain in the residential zone are situated higher on the hillside and are thus separated by topography from the lands along the highway now zoned for commercial uses.

The fair market value of the plaintiffs' land is $67,000 if restricted to commercial use permitted in a C-2 Zone, $57,500 if restricted to residential use, and $5,000 if it could not be devoted to either of these uses.

The jurisdiction of the court is not claimed to be based, as the Government argues, on the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but rather on the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in force in the Virgin Islands, 5 V.I.C. ch. 89. Under the latter Act I am satisfied that this court has jurisdiction of the suit.

Two questions are raised by this suit. The first question which I shall consider is whether the Virgin Islands Zoning and Subdivision Act, 29 V.I.C. § 260 et seq., is arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory and, therefore, invalid insofar as the Act, as amended by the Act of July 2, 1965, No. 1477, authorizes the plaintiffs' land to be placed in a C-2 Zone restricted to commercial use only. The second question is whether the covenant in the plaintiffs' deed which restricts their land primarily to residential use is enforceable in view of the zoning restrictions, if valid, and the somewhat changed character of the general locality.

Zoning regulations constitute a valid exercise of the police power when they have a rational relation to the public health, safety or general welfare of the community. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 1926, 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303. The right of every owner of property to use it in his own way and for his own purposes existed before the adoption of the Constitution and is guaranteed by that instrument. Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1561, assures that private property may not be taken for public use except upon payment of just compensation. These rights, however, are subject to the exercise of the police power under which new burdens may be imposed upon property and new restrictions placed upon its use when the public welfare so demands. The type of zoning regulation with which we are here concerned—a regulation which does not include residential use of property within its permitted uses—is a rather recent innovation. The presence of homes in industrial and commercial areas has been a matter of every-day experience. But under the modern view, as we shall see, a comprehensive plan for the development of separate districts for residential and commercial purposes may be appropriate, and, indeed, under some circumstances, necessary.

It is settled that the exclusion of all industrial and commercial establishments from residential districts may bear a rational relation to the health and safety of the community. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 1926, 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114; City of Aurora v. Burns, 1925, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784. And, it has likewise been held that an ordinance excluding residences from an area zoned for industrial and commercial purposes may, under particular circumstances, be a valid exercise of the police power. Lamb v. City of Monroe, 1959, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 566; People v. Village of Morton Grove, 1959, 16 Ill.2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33, 35-36; Roney v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, 1956, 138 Cal.App.2d 740, 292 P.2d 529; Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 1953, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112, 114, 38 A. L.R.2d 1136, 1139-1140.

Whether such a zoning regulation is valid depends, of course, upon the facts of the particular case. Thus an ordinance has been held valid which excluded residences from an industrial zone where there was no showing that the land thus restricted was not usable for industrial purposes within a reasonable time. Roney v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, 1956, 138 Cal.App.2d 740, 292 P.2d 529. On the other hand an amendment to a zoning regulation was held unreasonable and confiscatory which rezoned property from residential to solely industrial use where it was shown that the land was adaptable to and...