Gruhl v. Gruhl

• Decision Date: 03 April 1890
• Docket Number: 14,105
• Citation: 23 N.E. 1101,123 Ind. 86
• Parties: Gruhl v. Gruhl
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

23 N.E. 1101

123 Ind. 86

Gruhl v. Gruhl

No. 14,105

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 3, 1890

From the Bartholomew Circuit Court.

Order affirmed, with costs.

S Stansifer, C. S. Baker and S. L. Hitchcock, for appellant.

C. J Kollmeyer and J. C. Orr, for appellee.

OPINION

Berkshire, J.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order made by the court below.

The appellee brought an action of divorce against the appellant and upon her application the court made an order requiring the appellant to pay into court for the appellee's use and with which to employ attorneys to prosecute her said action, the sum of $ 100.

Afterwards, upon an additional showing made by the appellant, the allowance was reduced one-half.

Section 1042, R. S. 1881, gives to the court discretionary power to make such orders and allowances as the one appealed from, and from such an order there exists the right of appeal; but an order so made will not be reversed unless it is made to appear that the court has abused its discretion.

Upon the showing which preceded the original order made by the court, the allowance which the court made was a very reasonable one. After having made the order we do not think the court was required to grant a rehearing to either party.

Upon the issue made by the motion the parties were given their day in court, and when the order was made, unless bad faith was made to appear to the court, it had the right to regard its order as final. But this the court did not do. The appellant desired a further hearing of the motion, and to make a further showing, which the court granted, and upon the second hearing reduced the original allowance one-half. The action of the court in this particular goes very far to show that the court had no disposition to exercise its discretionary power arbitrarily to the prejudice of the appellant.

On the second hearing the appellant introduced and read affidavits with a view to showing that the appellee was a monomaniac, and that the charges in her complaint were altogether creatures of her disordered imagination, and contended that the court should have made no preliminary order, but should have suspended its judgment until the final hearing.

But the question whether or not the charges were true or imaginary was a question for the final hearing, and did not enter into the determination of the preliminary motion, and hence the court could not consider it in advance...