Grullon v. Kissinger

• Decision Date: 20 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75 C 223.,75 C 223.
• Citation: 417 F. Supp. 337
• Parties: Luis M. GRULLON, Plaintiff, v. Henry A. KISSINGER, etc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

417 F. Supp. 337

Luis M. GRULLON, Plaintiff, v. Henry A. KISSINGER, etc., et al., Defendants.

No. 75 C 223.

United States District Court, E. D. New York.

July 20, 1976.

Antonio C. Martinez, New York City, for plaintiff.

David G. Trager, U. S. Atty., E. D. N. Y., Brooklyn, N. Y., by Lewis F. Tesser, New York City, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PRATT, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a legal permanent resident of the United States, brought this action to further the efforts of his natural father, Martin Grullon, to obtain an immigrant visa. Martin's application was denied on February 20, 1974 by defendant Wythe, acting as Vice-Consul of the United States at Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The stated reason for denial was: "Your son, who is petitioning for you, is not legitimate."

Both sides have moved for summary judgment, and there appears to be only one disputed fact issue — in 1946 when Martin formally acknowledged Luis as his son, was Luis in Martin's custody? In view of the disposition below, however, an answer to this dispute is immaterial, so that summary judgment is appropriate here.

Luis was born in the Dominican Republic on March 10, 1946. Although his mother, Ramona Torres, never married Luis' father, Martin Grullon, at the time of Luis' birth they were free to marry each other. Martin and Ramona had other children, but in 1954, Martin married Ercida Almonte.

Within two weeks of Luis' birth, Martin, by formal instrument, acknowledged Luis as his son, a procedure claimed by Luis in this action to constitute legitimation under Law 985 of the Dominican Republic. Notwithstanding that acknowledgment, defendant Vice-Consul refused Martin's visa on the ground that Luis was not the legitimate son of Martin.

The object of this action, which has been brought by Luis, the son, is to require the Vice-Consul to issue a visa to Martin, the father. Plaintiff's claims on the merits are (1) the Vice-Consul's determination that Luis was not the legitimate son of Martin was the result of an erroneous interpretation and application of the Immigration and Nationality Act and of Law 985 of the Dominican Republic, and (2) even if the Vice-Consul's determination of illegitimacy was correct, refusal of a visa on that ground is an unconstitutional sex discrimination, since the underlying statute 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) invidiously favors mothers over fathers.

In opposition, the Government contends: (1) the Court may not review the Vice-Consul's denial of the visa; (2) the determination of illegitimacy was correct; and (3) the underlying statute is constitutional.

In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972), the Supreme Court reviewed again the extent of judicial review which may be applied in the immigration area. After reviewing some of the applicable history and pointing out the peculiarly political nature of problems pertaining to the entry of aliens, the majority concluded:

"In summary, plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under § 212(a)(28), Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant." (408 U.S. at 769-770, 92 S.Ct. at 2585).

In Mandel, review of the Government action had been sought directly by the visa applicant jointly with legal residents who sought Mandel's temporary presence in this country. Governmental exclusion of Mandel was challenged on the ground that it restricted the co-plaintiffs' first amendment rights to confer with Mandel.

Plaintiff here seeks to distinguish Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, on the ground that he is not reviewing consular action, but seeks merely a preliminary declaration of Martin's immigrant status. Plaintiff claims that jurisdiction lies under § 279 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1329. Similar attempts to obtain judicial review of the denial of a visa under § 279 have been rejected recently in Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518 (CA 2 1976) de Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F.Supp. 1182 (S.D.N. Y.1976); and Burrafato v. United States Department of State, 523 F.2d 554 (CA 2 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910, 96 S.Ct. 1105, 47 L.Ed.2d 313 (1976).

Leaning in the other direction is Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y.1975), in which a three judge district court found jurisdiction under § 279, pointing out that the petition there had not been an application for a visa, but for a preliminary declaration of immigrant status. The Court there stated:

"We will not extend consular non-reviewability, insofar as that rule has been recognized, beyond the actual grant or denial of a visa. This is predicated upon our reluctance to insulate entirely

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