Grundmanis v. British Motor Corporation

• Decision Date: 16 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 68-C-285.,68-C-285.
• Citation: 308 F. Supp. 303
• Parties: Gatis GRUNDMANIS and Arvids Grundmanis, Plaintiffs, v. The BRITISH MOTOR CORPORATION, Limited, a foreign corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

308 F. Supp. 303

Gatis GRUNDMANIS and Arvids Grundmanis, Plaintiffs, v. The BRITISH MOTOR CORPORATION, Limited, a foreign corporation, Defendant.

No. 68-C-285.

United States District Court E. D. Wisconsin.

January 16, 1970.

Marvin Resnick, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs; Donald J. Jacquart, Milwaukee, Wis., of counsel.

Reginald W. Nelson, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, District Judge.

This is an action to recover damages for injuries suffered by plaintiff, Gatis Grundmanis, while a passenger in an automobile allegedly manufactured by defendant. The complaint states that plaintiff was a passenger in a 1962 MGB on July 4, 1966, in Rice Lake, Wisconsin, when it was in a collision with another automobile. It is alleged that the MGB burst into flames upon impact when its fuel tank ruptured and that the plaintiff thereby suffered severe injuries. The basis of the plaintiff's claim is that the defendant was negligent in the design and construction of the automobile because the fuel tank was located under the trunk and immediately behind the passenger compartment.

Defendant has moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the action on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion is now before the court.

It is the contention of the defendant that it had no duty to design an automobile that would be safe when involved in a collision. Defendant points to Evans v. General Motors Corporation, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), as primary authority for its position. The court in Evans, supra, at 825, said that "The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur" and upheld the District Court's dismissal of the action which was based on alleged negligent design of an automobile which allegedly caused the death of its driver. Defendant cites a number of cases which follow Evans, including Schemel v. General Motors Corporation, 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Shumard v. General Motors Corporation, 270 F.Supp. 311 (S.D.Ohio 1967); and Willis v. Chrysler Corporation, 264 F.Supp. 1010 (S.D.Texas 1967), for the proposition that "* * * the nature of the duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to users of its product" does not include "* * * a duty to make his automobile accident-proof or fool-proof * * *." Evans, supra, at 824. On the basis of this authority the defendant moves for dismissal.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant had a duty to design an automobile that would not subject the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. Plaintiff relies first on Judge Kiley's strong dissent in Evans, supra, where he said, "* * * General Motors' duty was to use such care in designing its automobiles that reasonable protection is given purchasers against death and injury from accidents which are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable by the purchaser despite careful use." 359 F.2d at 827. Plaintiff's primary authority is Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), where a unanimous court said at 501-503:

"Accepting, therefore, the principle that a manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of hidden defects that could render it unsafe for such use, the issue narrows on the proper interpretation of `intended use.' Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in transporting persons and cargo to and from various points. This intended use cannot be carried out without encountering in varying degrees the statistically proved hazard of injury-producing impacts of various types. The manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does not intend its product to be involved in any accident when it can easily foresee and when it knows that the probability over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in some type of injury-producing accident. * * * It should be recognized that the environment in which a product is used must be taken into consideration by the manufacturer. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4 Cir. 1962).

"We think the `intended use' construction urged by General Motors is much too narrow and unrealistic. Where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its products, the manufacturer should be liable for the injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care in the design. These injuries are readily foreseeable as an incident to the normal and expected use of an automobile. While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts. No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called `second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all

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