Gruszewsky v. Director General of Railroads

• Decision Date: 05 April 1921
• Citation: 96 Conn. 119,113 A. 160
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GRUSZEWSKY v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.

113 A. 160

96 Conn. 119

GRUSZEWSKY v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 5, 1921

Case reserved from Superior Court, Hartford County; William M Maltbie, Judge.

Proceedings for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Julia Gruszewsky against the Director General of Railroads. From refusal of the Compensation Commissioner to award compensation because of his alleged lack of jurisdiction to make the award due to the fact that plaintiff's deceased husband at the time of his injury was engaged in interstate commerce, plaintiff appealed. On reservation on the facts found by the Commissioner for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. Judgment advised dismissing the appeal.

Appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the Compensation Commissioner of the First District to award her compensation because of his alleged lack of jurisdiction to make such award due to the fact that her deceased husband at the time of his injury was engaged in interstate commerce, taken to and reserved by the superior court in Hartford county upon the facts found by the Commissioner, for the advice of this court. Judgment advised dismissing the appeal.

Josiah H. Peck and Jacob Schwolsky, both of Hartford, for plaintiff.

James W. Carpenter, of New Haven, for defendant.

WHEELER, C.J.

The reservation requires our advice upon the single question whether the deceased at the time he contracted the disease from which he died was engaged in interstate commerce. If he was so engaged, his dependent is not entitled to compensation under our act (Gen. St. 1918, § § 5339-5414), but must seek her remedy under the federal act (U. S. Comp. St § § 8657-8665). The dependent cannot take her choice of the remedies under the federal Employers' Act or our Compensation Act. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v Seale, 229 U.S. 158, 33 Sup.Ct. 651, 57 L.Ed. 1129 Ann.Cas. 1914C, 156.

The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company maintained in its yards adjoining its tracks a heating plant in which steam was generated and transmitted through pipes to cars standing on its tracks with which connection was made by means of steam plugs. The steam so generated was used in interstate and intrastate commerce.

The deceased employee did not make the connections with the steam plugs, but operated the boiler of the heating plant, and five or six times an hour brought the coal to the boiler from coal cars standing on the track near the boiler house. He was required to keep the pathway from the boiler room to the coal cars open and free from snow in order to get the coal from the cars. Because of his subjection to striking changes of temperature and unusual conditions of exposure through working in the cold and then in the heat of the boiler room, the deceased contracted lobar pneumonia, which was caused " by the conditions under which he worked and the activities of his employment," from which he died.

The Supreme Court of the United States has made the test of whether an employee was at the time of his injury engaged in interstate commerce depend upon answering in the affirmative the question:

" Was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?" Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 36 Sup.Ct. 517, 60 L.Ed. 941.

In the application of this test it has been held that one injured while engaged in moving coal which was to be used in interstate commerce was not engaged in such commerce. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439, 35 Sup.Ct. 902, 59 L.Ed. 1397.

So the taking down and putting up fixtures in a machine shop used in repairing parts of engines which were engaged in interstate commerce was held not to be an employment in such commerce. Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 36 Sup.Ct. 188, 60 L.Ed. 436, L.R.A. 1916C, 797. Both employments were deemed too remote from interstate transportation to be regarded as a part of it.

Similarly the repair of an engine which had then no definite destination, but a probability of subsequent use in interstate commerce, was deemed too distant from that commerce to be a part of it. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353, 37 Sup.Ct. 170, 61 L.Ed. 358, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 54. And one engaged in switching coal cars from a storage track to a coal shed where the coal was placed in chutes or bins and taken therefrom as needed to supply locomotives engaged in both kinds of commerce was held to have no such close or direct relation to interstate transportation, or to be so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, supra, Counsel for the petitioner in Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77, 40 Sup.Ct. 450, 64 L.Ed. 790, have summarized the decisions aptly:

" The erection and maintenance of the structures in which the

...