Grutter v. Bollinger

Decision Date27 March 2001
Docket NumberNo. 97CV75928-DT.,97CV75928-DT.
Citation137 F.Supp.2d 821
PartiesBarbara GRUTTER, Plaintiff, v. Lee BOLLINGER, Jeffrey Lehman, Dennis Shields, Regents of the University of Michigan, and the University of Michigan Law School, Defendants, and Kimberly James, Farah Mongeau, Jeanette Haslett, Raymond Michael Whitlow, Shabatayah Andrich, Dena Fernandez, Shalamarel Kevin Killough, Diego Bernal, Julie Fry, Jessica Curtin, James Huang, Heather Bergman, Ashwana Carlisle, Ronald Cruz, Nora Cecilia Melendez, Irami Osei-Frimpong, Gerald Ramos, Arturo Vasquez, Edward Vasquez, Vincent Kukua, Hoku Jeffrey, Karlita Stephens, by her Next Friend Karla Stephens-Dawson, Yolanda Gibson, by her Next Friend Mary Gibson, Erika Dowdell, by her Next Friend Herbert Dowdell, Jr., Agnes Aleobua, by her Next Friend Paul Aleobua, Cassandra Young, by her Next Friend Yolanda J. King, Jaasi Munanka, Jodi-Marie Masley, Shannon Ewing, Julie Kerouac, Kevin Pimentel, Bernard Cooper, Norberto Salinas, Scott Rowekamp, Russ Abrutyn, Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, Meera Deo, Winifred Kao, Melisa Resch, Oscar De La Torre, Carol Scarlett, United for Equality and Affirmative Action, the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action by any Means Necessary, and Law Students for Affirmative Action, Intervening Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Kerry L. Morgan, Pentiuk & Couvreur, Taylor, MI, Kirk O. Kolbo, David F. Herr, Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, Minneapolis, MN, Godfrey J. Dillard, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

Philip J. Kessler, Okemos, MI, John A. Payton, Jane Sherburne, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C., Leonard M. Niehoff, Butzel & Long, Ann Arbor, MI, Richard A. Wilhelm, Dickinson Wright, Detroit, MI, Susan I. Leffler, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, Kenneth S. Geller, Mayer Brown & Platt, Washington, D.C., Jeffrey S. Silver, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

On December 22, 2000, the court heard oral argument in this case on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The court took the motions under advisement and identified the issues for trial. Over a period of 15 days in January and February 2001, the court conducted a bench trial. In this opinion, the court shall rule on the motions and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Barbara Grutter commenced this action in December 1997. Ms. Grutter alleges that in 1996 she applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School (hereinafter "the law school"). At first plaintiff was placed on a waiting list, but in June 1997 her application was rejected. Plaintiff, who is Caucasian, alleges that her application was rejected because the law school uses race as a "predominant" factor, giving minority1 applicants "a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups." Complaint ¶¶ 20, 23. In their answer to the complaint, defendants "state that they do have a current intention to continue using race as a factor in admissions, as part of a broad array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element." Answer ¶¶ 9, 23.

Plaintiff asserts two claims. First, she claims that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race, thereby violating her rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Second, plaintiff claims that defendants violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race.3 For relief, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect that her rights were violated; an injunction prohibiting racial discrimination in admissions; compensatory and punitive damages; an order requiring defendants to admit her to the law school; and attorney fees and costs. The defendants are Lee Bollinger, the dean of the law school from 1987 to 1994 and president of the University of Michigan from 1997 to the present; Jeffrey Lehman, the dean of the law school from 1994 to the present; Dennis Shields, the director of admissions at the law school from 1991 to 1998; the regents of the University of Michigan; and the University of Michigan Law School.

In an opinion and order dated January 7, 1999, the court granted plaintiff's motion for class certification and for bifurcation of the trial into liability and damages phases. The class was defined as consisting of "all persons who (A) applied for and were not granted admission to the University of Michigan Law School for the academic years since (and including) 1995 until the time that judgment is entered herein; and (B) were members of those racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that Defendants treated less favorably in considering their applications for admission to the Law School."

In March 1998, 41 individuals and three pro-affirmative action student groups4 sought to intervene in the case as defendants. The individual intervenors include 21 undergraduate students of various races who currently attend the University of Michigan, Wayne State University, the University of California at Berkeley, or Diablo Valley Community College in Pleasant Hill, California, all of whom plan to apply to the law school for admission; five black students who currently attend Cass Technical High School or Northwestern High School in Detroit and who plan to apply to the law school for admission; twelve students of various races who currently attend the law school; a paralegal and a Latino graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin who intend to apply to the law school for admission; and a black graduate student at the University of Michigan who is a member of the Defend Affirmative Action Party. Motion to Intevene ¶¶ 1-41. The court initially denied the motion to intervene, but in August 1999 the court of appeals reversed and directed that the intervention be permitted.

On December 22, 2000, the court heard oral argument on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The court took those motions under advisement. The court indicated that the trial would focus on the following three issues: (1) the extent to which race is a factor in the law school's admissions decisions; (2) whether the law school's consideration of race in making admissions decisions constitutes a double standard in which minority and non-minority students are treated differently; and (3) whether the law school may take race into account to "level the playing field" between minority and non-minority applicants.

II. Diversity as a Rationale for Using Race as a Factor in University Admissions
A. Evidence
1.

The starting point in this case is the written admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School, which was admitted at trial as Exhibit 4. This policy, which was adopted by the law school faculty in April 1992, was the subject of many hours of testimony during trial as well as extensive discovery. Due to the central role the policy has played in this case, the court shall summarize the policy and highlight certain provisions.

The policy expresses the law school's desire "to admit a group of students who individually and collectively are among the most capable students applying to American law schools in a given year.... Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other." Exhibit 4, Admissions Policy, p. 1. The policy notes that "no applicant should be admitted unless we expect that applicant to do well enough to graduate with no serious academic problems." Id. at 2. In identifying applicants who can be expected to succeed academically, the law school's "most general measure ... is a composite of an applicant's [Law School Admission Test] score and undergraduate gradepoint average (UGPA) (which we shall call the `index')." Id. at 3.

Under this admissions policy, the law school pays close attention to LSAT scores and UGPA's in reviewing applications. The significance of these numbers is visually apparent from the "grid" of law school applicants, an example of which is attached to the law school's admissions policy.5 LSAT scores are shown along the horizontal axis in three- or four-point increments; UGPA's are shown along the vertical axis in quarter-point increments. Every combination of LSAT and UGPA is shown in a "cell" on this grid. In each cell, the law school reports the number of applicants with that particular combination of numerical qualifications, as well as the number of offers of admission made to the applicants in that cell.6 Constructed in this manner, the highest combinations of LSAT scores and UPGA's are found in the upper right-hand corner of the grid. Even a cursory review of the numbers contained in this grid reveals that one's chances of being admitted increase dramatically as one moves into the upper right corner. Of the 966 offers of admission made in 1991, 843(87%) were made to applicants who fell within the nine cells closest to this corner. In short, the numbers reflect the law school's stated policy: "Bluntly, the higher one's index score, the greater should be one's chances of being admitted. The lower the score, the greater the risk the candidate poses.... So we expect the vast majority of those students we admit to have high index scores." Id. at 4. See also id. at 6-7 ("The further applicants are from the upper right corner the less likely they are to be offered admission. Thus we may think of the upper right portion of the grid as indicating the combinations of LSAT and UGPA that characterize the overwhelming bulk of students admitted.")

The policy also notes, however, that admissions decisions should not be made strictly based on the index scores. A high index score may not...

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6 cases
  • Grutter v. Bollinger
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • May 14, 2002
    ...improved by the presence of students who represent the greatest possible variety of backgrounds and viewpoints." Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821, 849 (E.D.Mich.2001). Nevertheless, it held that achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling state interest because (1) it was no......
  • Farmer v. Ramsay, No. CIV. L-98-1585.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • August 15, 2001
    ...admissions but may not impose numerical racial quotas). See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D.Mich.2001), stayed pending appeal by 247 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir.2001). But see Smith v. Univ. of Washington, Law School, 233 F.3d 1......
  • Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • September 28, 2018
    ...used in the specific policies at issue in Grutter and Fisher, but one that the Supreme Court left undefined. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821, 828 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003) ; Grutter, 539 U.......
  • Johnson v. Board of Regents of Univ. Georgia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • August 27, 2001
    ...view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue."), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (concluding that "Bakke does not stand for the proposition that a university's desire to assemble a racially diverse......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Back Tobakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 83, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...an affirmative action program. Id. at 792-802. 160. Gratz v. Bollinger, 309 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2001). 161. Grutter v. Bollinger,137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 162.Id. at 832. The Law School's admissions policy was adopted in 1992 and it expresses the school's desire "to admit a......
  • Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 81, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...518 U.S. 1033 (1996), Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Supreme Court's decisions in non-education affirmative action cases have required strict scrutiny of government spons......
  • Grutter v. Bollinger: Race as a Factor in Public Higher Education Admissions Policies - Valerie Njiiri
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 55-2, January 2004
    • Invalid date
    ...Univ. Sys. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332-33; Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 823-24 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 7. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2333. 8. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 823-25, 871. 9. Id. at 843 (citing Adarand Con......
  • Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 152 No. 1, November 2003
    • November 1, 2003
    ...This was the conclusion reached by the federal district court judge hearing the Michigan law school case. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (2001) ("[B]y using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of underrepresented minority students ... the curren......
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