Guadagno v. Folco, 8070.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1939
• Docket Number: No. 8070.,8070.
• Citation: 6 A.2d 450
• Parties: GUADAGNO v. FOLCO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

6 A.2d 450

GUADAGNO

v. FOLCO.

No. 8070.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 23, 1939.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Walter Curry, Judge.

Action of trespass on the case by Alfred Guadagno against Louis Folco for seduction of plaintiff's daughter. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled, and case remitted for entry of judgment on the verdict.

William H. McSoley and William H. McSoley, Jr., both of Providence, for plaintiff.

M. Louis Abedon and Frank W. Golemba, both of Providence, for defendant.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

This is an action of trespass on the case for seduction of the plaintiff's adult daughter. In the superior court a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $3500 and thereafter the defendant's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial justice. The case is before us upon the defendant's exceptions to that ruling and to other rulings of the trial justice during the trial, and to portions of his charge to the jury.

The evidence for the plaintiff in general showed that his daughter had been performing certain housekeeping services for him and that a relationship of master and servant existed; that on divers occasions in 1935 the defendant, especially through promises of marriage, had carnal knowledge of the plaintiffs daughter; that he gave her a ring as token of their betrothal; that, as a result of certain of these relations, the plaintiff's daughter gave birth to a girl child on June 14, 1936 at the Lying-In Hospital; and that the plaintiff, as a consequence of the alleged debauchery of his daughter by the defendant, suffered the loss of her services and was otherwise subjected to great humiliation and disgrace and also put to expense in caring for her.

The defendant's evidence admitted certain acts of intercourse with the plaintiff's daughter but placed them in 1934, at least a year previously to the times as alleged in the testimony for the plaintiff. The defendant also denied the paternity of the child of plaintiff's daughter and denied that any of his relations with the plaintiff's daughter were accomplished by the use of any force or promises of marriage on his part; but on the contrary he asserted that they were brought about mainly by the aggression or conduct of the plaintiff's daughter. There were many witnesses called and a great deal of other evidence was presented by both plaintiff and defendant. It is unnecessary to set out the facts in further detail, except to state that practically all of the material issues were the subject of sharply conflicting testimony.

The defendant's bill of exceptions contains seventeen separate exceptions, but they have been grouped and argued by the defendant as falling within seven questions of law, which he now raises. The first and fifth of these questions are based upon the defendant's contention that the trial justice erred in his charge by giving two different definitions of seduction which confused the jury. There is no merit in this contention because we find only one such definition in the charge. The trial justice defined seduction precisely as it appears in 2 Cooley on Torts (4th Ed.) 39. To that definition he immediately added: "In this state it has been held that 'the gist of the action is the debauching of the daughter, and the consequent supposed or actual loss of her services'." This language appeared in a Massachusetts case (Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147, 14 Am.Rep. 584.) that was quoted, apparently with approval, in Silva v. Mills, 47 R.I. 193, 131 A. 695, 696. It referred to the gist of a similar action for seduction and is not in conflict with the above definition of the act of seduction.

But the defendant argues that the trial justice stated elsewhere that "the gravamen of the action is the debauching of the plaintiff's daughter" whereas, at common law, it was the loss of services. We find no such statement in the charge. The trial justice did say in the beginning: "The gravamen of the offense of seduction is the interference with the relationship of master and servant, which must be shown to have existed between the plaintiff and the daughter seduced." This is far from stating a different and confusing definition of seduction and is consistent with its definition at common law and the language which was quoted by the trial justice from Silva v. Mills, supra.

The second question is whether the trial justice erred in admitting certain evidence concerning payments by the plaintiff for the support of his daughter's child. The particular testimony involved under this question appeared in two questions as follows: "Q. 110. Do you know of your own knowledge whether you father has paid out any money for that child? A. Yes. Q. 113. Whether, or not, you have seen your father pay out any money for the support of that child? A. Yes."

The trial justice refused to grant the defendant's motion to strike out the answer to question 110; but later, in the absence of the jury, he granted the defendant's motion to strike out the answer to question 113, stating that he would rule that the plaintiff could not recover for alleged support of the child. He failed, however, to notify the jury upon its return that this evidence should be ignored, and thus both answers remained in evidence. Undoubtedly...