Guadarrama v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 99-1557 DRD.

• Citation: 74 F.Supp.2d 127
• Decision Date: 30 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1557 DRD.,99-1557 DRD.
• Parties: Nereida Morales GUADARRAMA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD), et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

74 F.Supp.2d 127

Nereida Morales GUADARRAMA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD), et al., Defendants.

No. 99-1557 DRD.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 30, 1999.

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Nora Vargas-Acosta, Rio Piedras, PR, Juan F. Correa-Luna, Legal Community Office, Carolina, PR, Hector J. Perez-Rivera, Goldman Antonetti & Cordova, San Juan, PR, for plaintiffs.

Francisco E. Colon-Ramirez, Colon, Colon & Martinez, San Juan, PR, David Efron, Rio Piedras, PR, Jose L. Gonzalez-Castaner, Gonzalez-Castaner, Morales & Guzman, San Juan, PR, Humberto Guzman-Rodriguez, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, Roberto Sanchez-Ramos, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, John Schumann, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Fidel A. Sevillano-Del-Rio, U.S. Attorney's Office District of P.R., Civil Division, Hato Rey, PR, Rafael A. Vila-Carrion, Vila-Carrion & Burgos, Hato Rey, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Federal and State Defendants' motions and supplemental motions to dismiss or for summary judgment under FED.R.CIV.PROC. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 56 (Docket No. 19, 22, 30 and 31). The Court has reviewed the record, including Plaintiffs' oppositions to these motions, and determines that, for the reasons set forth below, each of these motions will be GRANTED and this action will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to plaintiffs Margarita Sánchez Cruz, Dennisse Shepherd Fraser, Jahaira Cardona, Arcadio Aponte Agosto, María Calvente, Luis Vargas, Miguel A. Dávila, and Rosa Rodríguez; and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to plaintiffs Nereida Morales Guadarrama, Crucita Pino Hernández, and Angel L. Vargas.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, eleven residents of public housing projects in Puerto Rico, bring this action for temporary restraining order, damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive order against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the HUD Secretary (collectively, "the Federal Defendants"); the Puerto Rico Department of Housing ("PRDH"), the PRDH Secretary, the Puerto Rico Public Housing Authority ("PRPHA"), and the PRPHA Administrator (collectively, "the State Defendants"); and four private corporations that have administered various public housing projects in Puerto Rico. All plaintiffs, except Luis Vargas, have been sued for eviction in Puerto Rican courts by the administrators of their housing projects on account of lease violations in connection with certain criminal activity engaged in by members or guests of their respective households. (Complaint at 3-19.) Some of the eviction cases are currently in progress: Margarita Sánchez Cruz, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # 99-111-courtroom 604; Dennisse Shepherd Fraser, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # KPE-99-1-93; Jahaira Cardona, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # 98-9845-courtroom 604; Arcadio Aponte Agosto, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # 98-9834-courtroom 506; Mará Calvente, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # 98-9841-courtroom 506; Margarita Sánchez, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # 99-111-courtroom 604; Miguel A. Dávila, District Court of San Juan Civil Case # 98-9837. Others have terminated: Crucita Pino Hernández, Court of the First Instance of Puerto Rico Case No. APE-06-0067, judgment notified on January 7, 1998 (Docket 22, Exh. 5); Nereida Morales Guadarama, Court of the First Instance of Puerto Rico Case No. CPE97-0156 (Docket No. 22, Exh. 8 & 9), judgment affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, notified on February 5, 1999 (Docket No. 22, Exh. 9), reconsideration denied, notified on March 10, 1999 (Docket No. 22, Exh. 10).

The lease covenants which have allegedly been violated by plaintiffs read as follows:

C. The housing shall only be used as the private domicile for the Lesee and the members of the family group identified herein and [the Lesee] shall not use or allow any member of the family group or guest to use the premises for activities affecting the physical or social environment of the project; nor for criminal activities, as for instance, the violation of the criminal codes and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and those of the United States of America, nor any criminal activities within or near the residence; regarding the sale of drugs, narcotics, weapons and gambling. The term "Criminal Activities Related to Drugs" shall means [sic]: The illegal manufacturing, fabrication, sales, distribution, transportation, use or possession with the intention of fabricating, using, selling, distributing, transporting or the use of controlled substances as defined by Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802) or by the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, 24 LPRA, Section 2101 and subsequent. Such criminal conduct shall be cause for cancellation of the Public Housing Lease Agreement, regardless of the fact of the judicial action taken in the case. (Evidence found shall be sufficient cause.)

(Docket No. 19, Exh. 1).

The above provisions were incorporated into the PRDH's contracts as part of the application and implementation of the "One Strike Your Out" policy signed into law in 1996 by President Clinton, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6)¹ (hereinafter "Housing Act"), and reiterated by HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)². As amended, the Housing Act requires public housing authorities receiving funding through HUD to use leases that "provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off the premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6).

As a basis for their suit plaintiffs contend that the "One Strike and You're Out" policy violates the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06; various provisions of the United States Housing Act of 1937 ("the Housing Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and the constitution and laws of Puerto Rico, in that the policy causes the termination of the tenants' leases despite the tenants' innocence from criminal behavior.³ That is, plaintiffs argue that the policy is unlawful and unconstitutional so far as it allows the termination of their leases absent any evidence that they knew about their guests' or household members' illegal activities or had the ability to control their guests' or household members' criminal conduct.⁴ The Federal Defendants and the State Defendants move to dismiss or for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 56.

II. Preliminary Matters

Before plaintiffs can have access to this Court's equitable powers, plaintiffs must pass the constitutional hurdle of the "case or controversy" requirement, statutory bars to equitable reliefs (i.e., Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283), and the doctrine of judicial self-restraint regarding the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction. Should there not be a "case or controversy" under Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, the District Court is barred from entertaining the merits of the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Because defendants question plaintiffs' ability to survive these preliminary stages, allegedly because there is no "case or controversy", this Court has stayed the proceedings for resolution of defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Id. (standing for the proposition that a motion to dismiss based on lack of "case or controversy" must be entertained and resolved by the trial court prior to proceeding with the merits of the case).

III. STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provide that a defendant may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively. It is well-settled, however, that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond any doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support a claim entitling him or her to relief. Ronald C. Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir.1995); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1991). The Court must accept as true the well pleaded factual averments contained in the complaint, while at the same time drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the plaintiff. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2577, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir.1994). However, "[b]ecause only well pleaded facts are taken as true, we will not accept a complainant's unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law." Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).

In opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Rather, the plaintiff has an affirmative responsibility to put his best foot forward in an effort to present a legal...