Gualtieri v. Pownall
| Decision Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D20-3315 |
| Parties | BOB GUALTIERI, Sheriff of Pinellas County, Appellant, v. RONALD J. POWNALL and G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Amy Williams, Judge.
Anne F. McDonough, Senior Associate Counsel of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Largo, for Appellant.
Kristen Collins Ware, Marc Matthews, and Sean T. Becker, of McIntyre Thanasides Bringgold Elliot Grimaldi Guito & Matthews, PA, Tampa, for Appellee Ronald J. Pownall.
No appearance for Appellee G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc.
Bob Gualtieri, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County (the Sheriff), appeals from a nonfinal order denying his motion to dismiss in this negligence action brought by Ronald J. Pownall. Because we conclude that Pownall's negligence claim against the Sheriff is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, we reverse.
On November 30, 2016, Pownall was detained, placed in arrest restraints, and placed in the rear compartment of a prisoner transport van (the vehicle). The vehicle, which was owned and maintained by the Sheriff, was not equipped with seatbelts or other restraining devices for riders in the rear compartment. On the date of the incident, the vehicle was operated by an employee of G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., an independent contractor. During transport, Pownall alleges that he was injured when the driver slammed on the brakes, causing him to be thrown from his seat and strike his body against the metal interior of the rear compartment.
The operative complaint includes claims for negligence against G4S (count one) and the Sheriff (count two).[1] Count two alleges that the Sheriff negligently removed all restraining devices and safety belts from the rear compartment and, in doing so breached a duty to safely transport Pownall in the vehicle. The Sheriff moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things that count two failed to state a claim for relief and was barred by sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Sheriff's motion, finding that "based on the allegations that . . . [the] Pinellas County Sheriff is the owner of the vehicle, and that the seat belts had been removed, and that there is a negligence claim here, on that basis, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss."[2]
The Sheriff argues that the trial court's ruling was erroneous insofar as it rejected his claim that count two was barred by sovereign immunity. Our standard of review for this issue is de novo. See Lee Mem'l Health Sys. v Hilderbrand, 304 So.3d 58, 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). And because this issue was decided on a motion to dismiss, we must take the facts as set forth in the operative complaint as true. See Clerk of Cir. Ct. & Comptroller of Collier Cnty. v. Doe, 292 So.3d 1254, 1255-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
"The State of Florida has waived sovereign immunity from liability in tort actions 'for any act for which a private person under similar circumstances would be held liable.'" Pollock v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Patrol, 882 So.2d 928, 932 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1999)); see also § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). "[T]here can be no governmental liability unless a common law or statutory duty of care existed that would have been applicable to an individual under similar circumstances." Henderson, 737 So.2d at 535. Thus, in order to determine whether count two is barred by sovereign immunity, we must first determine whether the Sheriff owed Pownall a duty of care.
"If no duty of care is owed with respect to alleged negligent conduct, then there is no governmental liability, and the question of whether the sovereign should be immune from suit need not be reached." Pollock, 882 So.2d at 932; see also Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989) . However, if a duty of care is owed, we must then determine whether sovereign immunity bars an action for a breach of that duty. Pollock, 882 So.2d at 933. A. Duty
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that a special tort duty arises "when law enforcement officers become directly involved in circumstances which place people within a 'zone of risk' by creating or permitting dangers to exist, by taking persons into police custody, detaining them, or otherwise subjecting them to danger." Pollock, 882 So.2d at 935. In accordance with the principles of ordinary negligence, this analysis "focuses on whether the defendant's conduct foreseeably created a broader 'zone of risk' that poses a general threat of harm to others." Henderson, 737 So.2d at 535 (quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992)).
In this case, Pownall argues that a duty of care arose because the Sheriff's decision to remove seatbelts from the rear compartment of the vehicle in which he was later transported created a foreseeable zone of risk. Taking the allegations in the operative complaint as true, it was foreseeable that Pownall, who was wearing arrest restraints and had no ability to brace himself inside the rear compartment of the vehicle, would be at risk of injury in the event of a collision or sudden stop. See, e.g., Woods v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 721 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ().
The Sheriff argues that no duty existed because he did not violate any statutory or regulatory provision requiring the use of seatbelts in prison transport vans. In support, he relies on Roble v. United States, No. CV PX-16-4045, 2018 WL 1014928 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2018), and Vinson v. United States Marshals Service, No. CA 0:10-79-RMG, 2011 WL 3903199 (D.S.C. Sept. 2, 2011), aff'd, 459 Fed.Appx. 221 (4th Cir. 2011), both of which found that prison officials had no duty to provide seatbelts for inmates riding in transport vans. Neither of those decisions, however, addressed the zone-of-risk theory that Pownall asserts in this case. Thus, while the lack of a statutory or regulatory provision requiring seatbelts was determinative of the duty question in those cases, the same cannot be said of Pownall's claim against the Sheriff here.
As such, we conclude that the operative complaint contains sufficient allegations at the pleading stage that the Sheriff placed Pownall within a foreseeable zone of risk and thus owed him a duty of reasonable care.
B. Sovereign Immunity
Having determined that Pownall has plausibly alleged the existence of a duty of care, we turn to the question of whether count two is nevertheless barred by sovereign immunity. Under Florida law, "sovereign immunity is both an immunity from liability and an immunity from suit." Fla. Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 288 So.3d 1179, 1185 (Fla. 2020). In order to determine whether an action is barred by sovereign immunity, "it is necessary to ascertain the character of the allegedly negligent governmental act or omission." Pollock, 882 So.2d at 933. "[B]asic judgmental or discretionary governmental functions are immune from legal action, whereas operational acts are not protected by sovereign immunity." Id. (citing Henderson, 737 So.2d at 537-38).
Discretionary functions involve "an exercise of executive or legislative power such that a court's intervention by way of tort law would inappropriately entangle the court in fundamental questions of policy and planning." City of Freeport v. Beach Cmty. Bank, 108 So.3d 684, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Mosby v. Harrell, 909 So.2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)); see also Com. Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 1979) (). Operational functions, on the other hand, are "not necessary to or inherent in policy or planning" and "merely reflect[] a secondary decision as to how those policies or plans will be implemented." City of Freeport, 108 So.3d at 690 (quoting Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So.2d 906, 911 n.4 (Fla. 1995)).
Despite the lack of decisions from Florida courts on the specific issue presented in this case, numerous courts from other jurisdictions have previously held that the decision of whether to provide seatbelts in vehicles used by law enforcement to transport prisoners or detainees is a discretionary matter to which sovereign immunity attaches. For instance, in Vinzant v. United States, 458 Fed.Appx. 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth Circuit held that the decision of the U.S. Marshals Service to secure prisoners with seatbelts was "based on a policy choice-striking a balance between the safety of the prisoners during transport and the safety of...
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