Guan Lee v. United States

• Decision Date: 23 April 1912
• Docket Number: 1,840.,1,814,1,815,1,838,1,839,1,816
• Citation: 198 F. 596
• Parties: GUAN LEE v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

198 F. 596

GUAN LEE v. UNITED STATES.

Nos. 1,814, 1,815, 1,816, 1,838, 1,839, 1,840.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

April 23, 1912

Thomas E. & Frank T. Milchrist, for appellant Guan Lee.

James H. Wilkerson, U.S. Atty., John F. Voigt, Asst. U.S. Atty and Edwin W. Sims, for the United States.

Before BAKER and SEAMAN, Circuit Judges, and SANBORN, District Judge.

SANBORN District Judge.

It appears from the record in No. 1,814 that the appellant Guan Lee, about the middle of June, 1908, together with his cousin Ah Foon, also the appellant in No. 1,815, came from Hong Kong, China, to Vancouver, and immediately went to Montreal where they stayed a week, and then went to Windsor, Canada remaining there six or seven weeks, and then came from Windsor, Canada, to Chicago, Ill., in a box car loaded with brass tubing, reaching Chicago August 19, 1908. At Windsor Ah Foon paid a man $25 to put the two into a car bound for Chicago. They were told in Hong Kong that without papers they could not go to the United States through San Francisco; and in Montreal they were told they could not get into the United States without papers. Nevertheless they went to Windsor, and when there was an opportunity for a fraudulent and secret entry, they availed themselves of it, and were arrested in Chicago for deportation shortly after their arrival there. The record further shows that the appellant Guan Lee, who it is admitted is a person of Chinese descent, at the hearing testified, through Charlie Kee, a Chinese interpreter, that he was 24 years old, was born in San Francisco in the United States; that his father and mother told him that they took him to China when he was 3 or 4 years old; that he lived in China with his mother until he came to the United States; that his father is now in China, and that his father bought his ticket and gave him $100 to pay for train, etc., to the United States; that he lost his money in Windsor, Canada, and that his cousin paid $25 to 'one of the American men' to put him on the train (in the box car) to come to the United States; that people said they didn't have any paper of any kind, and that they could not board a passenger train; that he expected to do anything in the United States. The evidence introduced in his behalf at the hearing failed to satisfy both the commissioner and the District Court that he was lawfully entitled to remain in the United States, and the United States commissioner and the district judge, after considering all of the evidence on both sides, found against the appellant as 'by the law the Chinese person must be adjudged unlawfully within the United States unless he 'shall establish by affirmative proof to the satisfaction of such justice, judge or commissioner, his lawful right to remain within the United States.''

The record in No. 1,815 shows substantially the same facts as in No. 1,814. In No. 1,816 appellant testified he was born in San Francisco, but he told the interpreter when he was taken into custody that he was born in Ne On village, China. In No. 1,839 substantially the same facts appear as in 1,816; it being also shown that appellant paid the Canadian head tax of $500.

In No. 1,840 the facts are substantially as in 1,839, except that appellant's testimony that he was born in San Francisco agrees with his statement to the interpreter when arrested. He says he returned to China and then came back to the United States via Vancouver and Toronto, paying the Canadian head tax of $500. Like the others, he came in by the 'underground railroad,' managed by white men who are accustomed to put these emigrants into box cars bound for the United States for the small consideration of $25. The testimony did not satisfy the commissioner, or the District Court, nor does it satisfy us, that any of these appellants had a lawful right to remain in the United States. As held in the case of Chin Bak Kan, 186 U.S. 193, 22 Sup.Ct. 891, 46 L.Ed. 1121, a mere assertion of citizenship is not enough to overcome the heavy burden of proof cast upon a Chinaman seeking to remain in the country. The facts on which such a claim rests must be made to appear. The decrees in the cases referred to should all be affirmed.

This leaves only No. 1,838 to be considered. There are material differences between this and the other cases. In the first place, Chin Kong Poy, the appellant, testified before the district judge: That he was 31 years old, and was born in San Francisco. He lived there 14 or 15 years, and in Chicago 15 or 16 years. That his father's name was Chin Rung Ngon, in the Chinese grocery business with the firm of Quong Yet Woo, 740 Commercial street, San Francisco. Lived over the store. Attended Chinese school while in San Francisco, teacher's name Lee Yen. Remembers names of some of the school boys, Yu Hock, Yu Wah, Moy Chung, and Non Tome. Came to Chicago about one year after father and mother went to China (1895). His maternal uncle, Moy You, came to Chicago with him. In San Francisco they lived four or five blocks from the bay. It is downhill from where they lived to the bay. Not married. He gave Mr. Thompson, the inspector, his family name and his school name. Lives at Sixty-Sixth and Wentworth avenue, Chicago. On cross-examination he testified, when asked if he did not tell the interpreter when arrested that he had been in China more than 10 years, that he told him that his father and mother went to China, that his father, and not he, came back on a merchant's paper. He further said the inspector told him, through the interpreter, that, if he did not talk, they would put him in jail, and he did not know what he was talking about. His uncle, Moy Yu, testified in corroboration of the foregoing. Moy Yu Oak also testified that appellant was brought to his laundry by Moy Yu 16 years before, when he was about 15 years old, and he had known him ever since. He worked in that laundry about a year. Appellant also testified where he had worked in Chicago, and that is in part corroborated by Moy Yu.

From the printed record of the testimony as so summarized, and without seeing the witnesses, the evidence would seem to show enough, perhaps, to justify appellant's right to remain in the country were it not for the testimony of the interpreter and inspector, as to appellant's statements when he was arrested. Almost everything in the rest of the evidence is flatly contradicted by this statement, except he says he was born in California. He admits going to Detroit and Ann Arbor, which explains why he happened to be arrested; the immigration officers no doubt believing he had come from Windsor, Canada, on one of the underground railroad routes.

When arrested, appellant was taken to the office of Ward E. Thompson, the inspector, where he was questioned through an interpreter, Edward B. Kan. Mr. Kan testified that the questions were asked by Mr. Thompson in English, translated into Chinese, and put to appellant, and the answers translated into English, and that the interpreting was correctly done, but did not testify what appellant said. Mr. Thompson testified to substantially the same facts, except that he does not understand the Chinese language. He says he wrote down everything the interpreter told him appellant said, among other things that he was born in San Francisco, and had been in this country ever since. Thompson did not expressly testify that he could not recollect what appellant said without referring to the written record of appellant's statement. Objection was made that, although the witness might properly refer to the paper for the purpose of refreshing his memory, he should not be permitted to read the statement for any other purpose; no opportunity to cross-examine being afforded, and the examination was not made under oath. The objection was overruled, and the witness allowed to read his report by question and answer.

It is urged for the appellant that the practice of investigation by inspectors in case of detention of suspected Chinese persons is an unwarranted infringement upon their rights. This procedure, however, is necessary to any efficient administration, affords the Chinaman an opportunity to show any evidence he may have of his right to remain, or otherwise present his side of the case, and is also supported by the rules of the department.

The inspectors of the immigration service are authorized by statute to file complaint in Chinese cases. Section 3, Act of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat. p. 1093), reads as follows:

'That no warrant of arrest for violations of the Chinese-exclusion laws shall be issued by the United States commissioners excepting upon the sworn complaint of a United States district attorney, assistant United States district attorney, collector, deputy collector, or inspector of customs, immigration inspector, United States marshal, or deputy United States marshal, or Chinese inspector, unless the issuing of such warrant of arrest shall first be approved or requested in writing by the United States district attorney of the district in which issued.'

The rule in regard to the arrest of Chinese reads as follows (rule 23, paragraph 'a,' p. 54, Regulations Governing the Admission of Chinese, Edition of June 22, 1911):

'Chinese found in the United States engaged in laboring pursuits and not having in their possession a certificate issued under either the act of May 5, 1892, or the act of November 3, 1893, or other satisfactory evidence of their right to be and remain in the country, are subject to arrest and deportation. Full opportunity to produce the certificate or other evidence shall always be

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