Guardado v. Cascadian Bldg. Mgmt., Ltd., CASE NO. C16-0303JLR

• Decision Date: 01 June 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. C16-0303JLR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: JOSE CARLOS GUARDADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CASCADIAN BUILDING MANAGEMENT, LTD., Defendant.

JOSE CARLOS GUARDADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CASCADIAN BUILDING MANAGEMENT, LTD., Defendant.

CASE NO. C16-0303JLR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

June 1, 2016

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Plaintiffs Jose Carlos Guardado and Sixto Alfredo Piccinoni's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") motion to remand (MTR (Dkt. # 13)) and Defendant Cascadian Building Management, Ltd.'s ("Cascadian") motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint (MTD (Dkt. # 14)). Both motions implicate the same issue—whether federal labor law preempts the state labor law on which Plaintiffs base the claims in their amended complaint. The court has considered the submissions of the parties, the appropriate portions of the record, and the relevant law. The court also heard oral argument May 26, 2016. Considering itself fully advised, the court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion to remand, GRANTS Cascadian's motion to dismiss, and DISMISSES Plaintiffs amended complaint with leave to amend within 30 days of the date of this order.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiffs' employment with Cascadian, which began in 2006 and lasted until August 2015. (Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 11) ¶ 2.) Cascadian was a party to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") Local 6 from July 1, 2008, through June 30, 2012 (the "First CBA"), and another CBA with SEIU Local 6 from July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2016 (the "Second CBA"). (McCall Decl. (Dkt. # 6) ¶¶ 3, 7-11; id. at 6-51 ("First CBA"); id. at 53-101 ("Second CBA").) Cascadian employed Plaintiffs as "Janitor[s] and/or Wax Shampooer[s]," and the First CBA and Second CBA (collectively, "the CBAs") covered Plaintiffs during their employment with Cascadian. (McCall Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Both CBAs entitled Plaintiffs to time-and-a-half payment for any time worked in excess of eight hours per day, (1st CBA § 3.2; 2d CBA § 3.2.)

Plaintiffs allege that they "frequently worked more than 8 hours in a day" and that upon termination "Cascadian failed to pay Plaintiffs all daily overtime wages owed to them" in violation of RCW 49.48.010. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6, 8.) Plaintiffs further allege that "Cascadian's actions were willfully undertaken with the intent to deprive Plaintiffs of wages owed them" in violation of RCW 49.52.050. (Id. ¶ 10.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Cascadian violated RCW 49.52.090. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs seek actual damages,"double damages" pursuant to RCW 49.52.070, and "pre-judgment interest, costs and reasonable attorney fees." (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in King County Superior Court on February 4, 2016. (McCall Decl. ¶ 13; id. at 103-05 ("KCSC Complaint").) Cascadian timely filed a notice of removal on February 29, 2016. (Not. of Removal (Dkt. # 1).) Cascadian based removal on the premise that Plaintiffs' claims arise under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., a federal statute that Cascadian contends confers subject matter jurisdiction on the court and preempts Plaintiffs' state law claims. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs amended their complaint as of right on March 17, 2016, and filed a motion to remand to King County Superior Court on March 31,2016. (MTR (Dkt. # 13).) On March 31, 2016, Cascadian filed a motion to dismiss targeting Plaintiffs' amended complaint. (MTD.) Cascadian's motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs' motion to remand have been fully briefed by the parties and are now before the court. (MTD Resp. (Dkt. # 17); MTD Reply (Dkt. # 19); MTR Resp. (Dkt. # 16); MTR Reply (Dkt. #18).)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand

1. Legal Standard

Federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Removal of actions filed in state court over which federal courts have original jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal statute is strictly construed against removaljurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts "have long imposed the burden of proof on the removing party," which must overcome the "strong presumption" against removal jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. If after removal it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must remand the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "[f]ederal courts typically may only look to the plaintiff's complaint to determine federal question jurisdiction." Haw. ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2014). However, under the "complete preemption" doctrine, "when a defendant asserts that a claim is completely preempted, examination of extra-pleading material is permitted." Id. Courts look to materials outside the pleadings to see through a plaintiff's "artful pleading," which occurs when the plaintiff attempts to recast federal claims as state claims in order to avoid removal. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 61 (2009).

The complete preemption exception applies often in LMRA cases. See Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule applies primarily to claims preempted by the LMRA). The LMRA provides exclusive federal jurisdiction "for violation of contracts

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//between an employer and a labor organization."¹ 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Therefore, claims for breach of a CBA are exclusively federal claims under the LMRA.

Additionally, the LMRA has been broadly construed to extend exclusive jurisdiction to state law claims where "resolution of the claims is inextricably intertwined with terms in a labor contract." Id. at 1016. Section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state-law claim "if the resolution of [that] claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). In other words, "the need to interpret the [collective bargaining agreement] must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's state law claim" for the LMRA to provide federal jurisdiction over a state law claim. Id.; see also Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 693 (9th Cir. 2001); Audette v. Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). Conversely, a state law claim that is "free-standing" and does not turn on the meaning of any CBA provision is not subject to preemption. See Audette, 195 F.3d at 1113. Finally,

[c]auses of action that only tangentially involv[e] a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement are not preempted by section 301. Nor arecauses of action which assert nonnegotiable state-law rights . . . independent of any right established by contract.

Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1993). In contrast, claims fall under the LMRA when they are based on negotiable state law rights that have in fact been negotiated away in a CBA.

2. The LMRA Preempts Plaintiffs' First Claim and Precludes Remand

Plaintiffs ask the court to remand this case to King County Superior Court because Plaintiffs "make[] no contract claims against Defendant [under] its CBAs," but rather "make[] claims for rights only under . . . RCW 49.48.010" for unpaid overtime wages after termination. (MTR at 2.) The court concludes, however, that Plaintiffs' claim is at its core a claim for breach of CBA provisions that is governed by the LMRA. Plaintiffs' purported statutory basis for their claim, RCW 49.48.010 provides a single, negotiable right that was in fact negotiated in the CBAs. The only plausible claim remaining is one for breach of the CBA provisions, and Plaintiffs cannot avoid LMRA preemption by artfully pleading their CBA claim as a state statutory claim.

To evaluate whether the LMRA preempts Plaintiffs' claim, the court first interprets RCW 49.48.010 to determine whether it provides a right to relief independent of the CBA provisions.² The first paragraph of RCW 49.48.010, on which Plaintiffs base their claim, provides that

[w]hen any employee shall cease to work for an employer, whether by discharge or by voluntary withdrawal, the wages due him or her on account of his or her employment shall be paid to him or her at the end of the established pay period . . . PROVIDED FURTHER, That the duty to pay an employee forthwith shall not apply if the labor-management agreement under which the employee has been employed provides otherwise.

RCW 49.48.010.³ Washington courts allow private civil actions for damages under RCW 49.48.010. See, e.g., Wingert v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 50 P.3d 256, 261 (Wash. 2002).

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid preemption by arguing that the plain language of RCW 49.48.010 compels the conclusion that the statute confers two distinct rights on employees in Washington: one to be paid what is owed, and another for that payment to be timely. (MTR Reply at 1-2.) Plaintiffs contend that although the "provided further" clause renders negotiable the right to timeliness, "the employer's duty to pay the employee all wages due him or her for the entire period after discharge" is nonnegotiable. (Id. at 2.) Under Plaintiffs' theory, even though the statutory right to timeliness was negotiated in the CBAs and therefore does not apply, the statutory right to be paid "all wages due" remains, and therefore the LMRA does not govern Plaintiffs' claim.

The court disagrees with Plaintiffs' construction of the first paragraph of RCW 49.48.010 and concludes that RCW 49.48.010 confers a single right to be timely paid. See RCW 49.48.010. The statutory language describing the right is a single sentence that does not parse or separate the right to be paid by a certain time into two separate and distinct rights. RCW...