Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Madole, Civil Action No. 97-3081 DAR (D. D.C. 3/29/1999)
| Decision Date | 29 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 97-3081 DAR. |
| Parties | The GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Interpleader, v. Judith A. MADOLE, Defendant, v. Anne K. Kinskey, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Robert Bruce Wallace, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.
Tracy Jeanne Power, Power & Power, Arlington, VA, John Edward Scheuermann, Scheuerman & Terbune, Washington, DC, for defendant.
Pending for determination by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge is Defendant Anne K. Kinskey's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 20). Plaintiff, a mutual life insurance company, issued a policy of life insurance payable to the executors, administrators and assigns of its insured, Donald W. Madole. Defendant Anne K. Kinskey is the daughter of Donald Madole. Defendant Judith Madole is the widow of Donald Madole. Each defendant claims that she is the sole beneficiary of Donald Madole's policy. Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, 1397, for a determination of defendants' conflicting claims.
On January 1, 1990, plaintiff issued a life insurance policy purchased by the law firm of Speiser, Krause & Madole, P.C. Complaint, ¶ 8. Donald Madole married defendant Judith Madole in August, 1990. See Complaint, Exhibit E. On October 9, 1996, Donald Madole died. Complaint, ¶ 9. According to plaintiff's files, the designated beneficiary on the policy at the time of Donald Madole's death was his daughter, defendant Kinskey. Complaint, ¶ 10. No beneficiary change form was on file with plaintiff. Id. On or about November 15, 1996, plaintiff received a claimant's certificate from defendant Judith Madole, Donald Madole's widow and the executrix of his estate. Complaint, ¶ 9. On or about January 7, 1997, plaintiff received a claimant's certificate from defendant Kinskey. Complaint, ¶ 11.
On February 10, 1997, plaintiff received from defendant Judith Madole's counsel copies of two letters. Complaint, ¶ 12. The first letter, "proportedly submitted" to plaintiff on July 31, 1990, was from Cathy Sweetman, the insurance coordinator for the firm of Spieser, Krause & Madole, P.C. The writer states that Donald Madole "does wish to add his new wife to his insurance coverage" effective September 1, 1990, and that "[e]nclosed you will find a beneficiary change form[.]" Id. Plaintiff maintains that no beneficiary change form was attached. Id. The second letter, "proportedly sent" to plaintiff on August 6, 1990 by Donald Madole requests that Judith Madole be added to his insurance coverage. Complaint, ¶ 13. Plaintiff has been unable to locate or confirm receipt of either letter, or of any beneficiary change form. Complaint, ¶ 14.
On or about October 16, 1997, Cathy Sweetman, whose name appears as the author of the July 31, 1990 letter, sent a letter to plaintiff in which she stated that she had Complaint, Exhibit 1. Ms. Sweetman stated that she had "no other documents concerning this matter in [her] files." Id.
In her answer to the Complaint, defendant Kinskey maintains that the documents upon which defendant Madole relies "do not alter or impact upon the unambiguous identification of Mrs. Kinskey as the sole beneficiary of the Life Insurance Policy in question, nor do the documents comply with the written terms of the Guardian policy for affecting a change in the named beneficiary under the Life Insurance portion of the Guardian policy." See Defendant Kinskey's Answer at 1.
In her answer to the Complaint, defendant Madole "denies any inference that the reference to the beneficiary change form is not effective and valid as to a change in designated beneficiary to that of defendant Madole." Defendant, Judith Madole's, Answer and Claim Under Federal Interpleader Act, ¶ 19.
Defendant Kinskey seeks summary judgment in her favor in accordance with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the memorandum in support of her motion, defendant Kinskey maintains that her name appears as the designated beneficiary of Donald Madole's life insurance policy, and that there is no evidence that any change of beneficiary form exists. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Kinskey's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Kinskey's Memorandum") at 2-5. Defendant Kinskey maintains that the dispute at issue in this action is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Defendant Kinskey submits that "in order to determine the proper beneficiary in this case, the Court must look solely to the written terms of the Guardian plan[,]" Kinskey's Memorandum at 7, and that there is no evidence that Donald Madole affected a change in the named beneficiary in the manner prescribed by the Guardian plan. Id. at 8. Finally, defendant Kinskey maintains that even if the Court finds that the issues presented are not governed by ERISA, "the result is the same under the law of this jurisdiction." Kinskey's Memorandum at 10. In support of her motion, defendant Kinskey includes a Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute supported by references to the record. The statements include
13. It is undisputed that at the time of enrollment, Mr. Madole named Mrs. Kinskey as the beneficiary on his enrollment form. See Exhibit 2, p. 2.
14. In Mrs. Kinskey's Request for Admissions, she asked Ms. Madole to admit the following:
4. Defendant Madole does not have in her possession any document written by the Guardian or at its direction which notifies Mr. Donald W. Madole of a change in the named beneficiary of the Guardian Life Insurance Policy which is the subject of his litigation.
In response, Ms. Madole admitted that she does not[.]
Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute in Support of Defendant Kinskey's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, ¶¶ 13-14.
Defendant Madole, in her opposition to defendant Kinskey's motion for summary judgment, submits that ERISA does not apply, and that substantive common law must be applied to determine the proper beneficiary. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Kinskey's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Madole's Opposition") at 7. Defendant Madole maintains that "the insured undertook affirmative acts designed to comply with the requirement as to change of beneficiary[,]" and that "[his] intentions should be given effect." Id. at 10. Without direct citation to the record, defendant Madole identifies but one issue she contends must necessarily be litigated:
1. There is a genuine dispute . . . as to whether Mr. Madole satisfied the requirements to effectuate a change in beneficiary under the laws of the District of Columbia, to be determined on the basis of further discovery and/or the testimony of Ms. Sweetman, Ms. Madole, Ms. Kinskey, Mr. Lear and Mr. Konikow.
Defendant, Judith Madole's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue to be Litigated at 1, ¶ 1.1
Defendant Kinskey, in her reply, argues that "defendant Madole has failed to demonstrate the existence of any disputed facts relative to the law of ERISA[.]" Defendant Kinskey's Reply Brief in Support of Summary Judgment ("Kinskey's Reply") at 5. Additionally, she maintains that defendant Madole has had "more than adequate time" to conduct discovery, and that "[n]o purpose would be served in extending discovery, as there is no other place to look to discover documents relative to this case." Id. at 8.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted in favor of a moving party if the record indicates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.CIV.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must demonstrate that a genuine dispute exists, and provide evidence sufficient for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, the non-moving party's opposition must consist of more than unsupported allegations. Rather, the opposition, must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, The non-moving party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings as support for its position; instead, the party opposing summary judgment must establish specific facts through affidavits based upon personal knowledge. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e).
Affidavits submitted with an opposition to a motion for summary judgment must satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part, that
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts...
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