Guardianship of Hurley

• Decision Date: 16 April 1985
• Citation: Guardianship of Hurley, 476 N.E.2d 941, 394 Mass. 554 (Mass. 1985)
• Parties: GUARDIANSHIP OF John Edward HURLEY (and a companion case 1 ).
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 941

476 N.E.2d 941

394 Mass. 554

GUARDIANSHIP OF John Edward HURLEY (and a companion case

¹

).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Hampshire.

Argued Feb. 4, 1985.

Decided April 16, 1985.

Arthur H. Goldsmith, Boston, for plaintiff.

Alexander G. Gray, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Secretary of the Com. et al.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

The parties seek further appellate review following an Appeals Court order which remanded these actions to the Probate and Family Court"for further proceedings in accordance with the order on file."Guardianship of Hurley, 18 Mass.App. 1110, 466 N.E.2d 537(1984).That order required the Probate Court to determine a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded to the plaintiff, John Edward Hurley(Hurley), as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(1982).The major thrust of the parties' arguments concerns whether the plaintiff was a "prevailing party" for the purpose of an attorney's fee award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.²For the reasons set forth below, we are in agreement with the order of the Appeals Court.

We summarize the facts and the somewhat confusing procedural history of these actions.On June 14, 1977, the Probate Court placed John Edward Hurley under the guardianship of his sister, Kathleen Hurley(guardian).On August 21, 1980, the guardian petitioned that court to modify and limit Hurley's guardianship because of improvements in his physical and mental condition.The petition sought a declaration that Hurley "is no longer 'adjudicated incompetent' nor a 'person under guardianship' within the meaning of"art. 3 of Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution or of G.L. c. 51, § 1.The plaintiff also filed on August 21, 1980, a memorandum of law in support of the petition.³The memorandum cited decisions which concerned whether, in certain circumstances, a mentally retarded person may have a constitutional right to vote.The court scheduled a hearing on this petition for September 25, 1980.

In a letter dated September 9, 1980, the plaintiff's attorney notified the office of the Attorney General that the constitutionality of art. 3 and of G.L. c. 51, § 1, might be at issue in the petition filed with the Probate Court.He enclosed the pleadings, the memorandum, and notice of the hearing.An assistant attorney general informed the assistant register of probate, by a letter dated September 23, 1980, that the Attorney General did not intend to participate in the action because "[t]he question as to whether a particular guardianship should be limited and, if so, to what degree ... should best be treated as a matter between private parties."The assistant attorney general conveyed the Attorney General's interest in and desire to be informed of the progress of the litigation as it concerned "whether the constitutional and statutory voting exclusion of persons under guardianship applies to persons under limited as well as full guardianships."

The Probate Court judge commenced a hearing on September 25, 1980.The hearing was continued to October 3, 1980.On September 25, 1980, Hurley sought to register to vote before the assistant registrar of the election commissioners of Springfield.The assistant registrar did not permit Hurley to register because Hurley could not truthfully sign an affidavit that he was not under guardianship.SeeG.L. c. 51, § 36.

On September 29, 1980, Hurley, by his guardian, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County a complaint "seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to redress the deprivation of and interference with constitutional, civil, and federal statutory rights to vote and participate equally in the electoral process of John Edward Hurley."Hurley sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973and1983, and various other State and Federal laws.The complaint contained a prayer for reasonable attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.On October 3, 1980, a single justice, at the defendants' suggestion, ordered this complaint (transferred case) transferred to the Probate Court for consideration with the plaintiff's petition for modification and limitation of the guardianship.

On October 3, 1980, the Probate Court held further hearings on the plaintiff's petition.The plaintiff filed, on the same day, a motion to amend the petition to incorporate by reference the action filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County.⁴On October 6, 1980, the Probate Court entered an interlocutory order concerning the original probate petition.The judge found that "Hurley is capable of making informed decisions concerning the exercise of his right to vote," and ordered that "Hurley not be deemed to be under guardianship within the meaning of that term as the same is used" in G.L. c. 51, § 1 and art. 3 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.Based on this order, Hurley was allowed to register and vote in the 1980 election.

The Probate Court docket does not indicate any action concerning Hurley's guardianship for over five months after October 6, 1980.On March 16, 1981, the court allowed the plaintiff's motion to amend the petition.The court also entered a decree or order ⁵ on the original petition and the transferred case.The judge recited several findings concerning Hurley's progress including a finding that "Hurley is in fact capable of making informed decisions concerning the exercise of his right to vote."The judge ordered that "Hurley is not deemed to be under guardianship within the meaning of that term as the same is used in [G.L. c. 51, § 1 and art. 3]" and limited the guardian's authority over Hurley's estate.The judge continued the matter for hearings on a proposed guardianship plan to be filed before June 30, 1981.The plaintiff did not appeal this order.The plaintiff contends, however, that he did not receive notice of the March 16, 1981, order.The docket substantiates the plaintiff's contention.

On April 16, 1982, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees incurred in the petition and the transferred case, requesting $8,989.41, which included compensation for the guardian ad litem.The parties filed various other pleadings in opposition to or in support of the request for attorney's fees.On April 14, 1983, the plaintiff filed a supplementary motion for attorney's fees seeking $1,797.50 to compensate for additional time.The motion also requested a "contingency bonus" thereby raising the fee request to a total of $11,866.70.

The judge entered an order on September 30, 1983, denying the plaintiff's motions for attorney's fees and costs.The judge referred to the March 16, 1981 document as the court's "findings of fact and final judgment."The judge determined that the plaintiff did secure modification of the guardianship but did not prevail against the defendants.The plaintiff moved for correction and clarification of the court's September 30, 1983 order.Ruling on that motion, the judge entered a further order on December 8, 1983.That order deleted from the court's March 16, 1981, decree all references to the transferred case; allowed the Attorney General's motion to dismiss the transferred case as moot in view of the October 6, 1980, interlocutory order and the March 16, 1981, decree, both of which limited the guardianship and included an order concerning Hurley's right to vote; and reaffirmed the September 30, 1983, order that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney's fees.The plaintiff appealed and filed a motion seeking additional fees.The plaintiff also seeks compensation for attorney's fees incurred on this appeal.

1.Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.The defendants argue that the plaintiff did not prevail in his civil rights suit, the transferred case, and that the petition filed in the Probate Court presented neither a substantial Federal constitutional question nor a State claim based on the same operable facts as an underlying substantial Federal question.We disagree.A prevailing party, for the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 fee award, achieves success on a substantial question of law arising out of a common nucleus of facts that give rise to a cause of action under any of the statutes listed in § 1988.Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 & n. 15, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2576 & n. 15, 65 L.Ed.2d 653(1980).A claim presents a substantial question of law "unless 'it is "obviously without merit" or ... "its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be subject to controversy." ' "Stratos v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 318, 439 N.E.2d 778(1982), quotingHagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1379, 39 L.Ed.2d 577(1974).A complaint need not mention explicitly the underlying statute as long as the elements of a cause of action are pleaded.Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 374 Mass. 475, 484-485 n. 8, 373 N.E.2d 1128(1978).Individuals prevail "for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit" or "when plaintiff's lawsuit acts as a 'catalyst' in prompting defendants to take action to meet plaintiff's claims."Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279(1st Cir.1978).⁶

The plaintiff presented the question whether an individual with sufficient competence to warrant a limited guardianship, seeGuardianship of Bassett, 7 Mass.App. 56, 63, 385 N.E.2d 1024(1979), can be precluded from exercising his right to vote without abrogating his constitutional privileges."[A]ny alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583(1969), quotingReynolds v....