Guck v. McCaughtry
| Decision Date | 30 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3290,95-3290 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. Robert L. GUCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary McCAUGHTRY, Eugene NIMMER, and Cindy HILT, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Dodge County: JOHN R. STORCK, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions.
Before EICH, C.J., DYKMAN, P.J., and VERGERONT, J.
Robert L. Guck appeals from an order dismissing his complaint in a personal injury action against Gary McCaughtry, the warden at the Waupun Correctional Institution, and Cindy Hilt, a WCI nursing supervisor, and denying his request to amend the complaint.
Guck, a WCI inmate, is a diabetic with multiple end-stage complications arising from the disease. One of those complications is neuropathy, a deterioration of the nervous system that left him with little or no sensation in his legs and feet. At the time of his injuries, he had been placed in a part of the prison known as the SelfCare Unit, in a bed so located that his feet came into contact with a steam radiator. As a result of that contact--which he could not feel--he suffered serious and severe burns to his feet and legs.
Guck sued McCaughtry and Hilt, 1 claiming that his injuries were caused by (1) McCaughtry's violation of duties imposed upon him under the safeplace law and (2) McCaughtry's and Hilt's negligence in placing Guck in a bed located adjacent to a radiator that lacked a protective cover. Considering crossmotions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that: (1) the safe-place law did not create any cause of action against either McCaughtry or Hilt; 2 (2) McCaughtry is immune from liability on Guck's allegations of general negligence because his responsibilities with respect to prison operations are broadly stated and highly discretionary; and (3) the negligence claim against Hilt must be dismissed because it is undisputed that she had no duties or responsibilities relating to Guck's placement in the Self-Care Unit. As indicated, the court also denied Guck's request to amend his complaint--presumably to add as a defendant the person responsible for his placement in the Self-Care Unit.
We affirm the dismissal of the negligence claims, concluding that because neither McCaughtry nor Hilt had any duties or responsibilities with respect to the instrumentalities or conditions causing Guck's injuries, they could not be negligent as a matter of law. We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in dismissing the safe-place-law portion of Guck's complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. 3 Under Wisconsin's "notice-pleading" rules, Guck's complaint gives fair notice of the claim based on allegations that WCI is a public building within the meaning of the statute. And whether, as a matter of fact and law, it is such a building and whether McCaughtry may be considered its "owner" are questions implicating factual issues that are not properly resolved on a summary-judgment motion. We therefore reverse the portion of the court's judgment dismissing the safe-place claim against McCaughtry and remand to the trial court for such further proceedings as, in its discretion, it deems appropriate. Finally, because the record does not indicate that the trial court exercised its discretion in denying Guck's request to amend his complaint, a remand is necessary on this issue as well to permit the court to consider the request on its merits.
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party has established his or her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Germanotta v. National Indem. Co., 119 Wis.2d 293, 296, 349 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Ct.App.1984). In deciding the motion, the trial court first considers the pleadings to determine whether the complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted and whether the answer states a defense. State Bank v. Elsen, 128 Wis.2d 508, 511, 383 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Ct.App.1986). If they do, the evidentiary facts submitted by the parties are examined to determine first whether the moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment and, if so, whether the opposing party's affidavits and proofs raise an issue of material fact. Id. If a material factual issue exists, summary judgment is improper. It is only where there is no dispute as to the material facts or inferences that the court considers the legal issues raised by the motion. Id. Our review of the trial court's decision is de novo, and we apply the identical methodology. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1987).
So far as is relevant to this action, the safe-place law, § 101.11(1), Stats., requires "every owner of ... a public building ... [to] maintain such ... public building as to render the same safe." 4 The term "safe," as so used, is defined to mean "such freedom from danger to the life, health, safety or welfare of employe[e]s or frequenters, or the public, or tenants ... as the nature of the ... public building[ ] will reasonably permit." Section 101.01(2)(h), Stats., 1993-94.
The safe-place-law claim stated in Guck's complaint is based on allegations that WCI is a "public building," and that McCaughtry, as the "person in control," had a duty to maintain it in a safe condition, which he breached. McCaughtry's answer denied the allegations and he moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on grounds, among others, that, as a matter of law, a state prison is not a public building within the meaning of the law. The trial court held the safe-place law inapplicable, although on grounds other than those argued by McCaughtry.
Because the trial court never considered the complaint's "public-building" allegations--or, beyond that, whether the evidentiary materials submitted by the parties raised disputed factual issues, or stated prima facie claims or defenses, with respect to that claim 5--we are left with a limited appellate issue: whether Guck's complaint stated a safe-place cause of action against McCaughtry as the "owner" of a "public building" within the meaning of the law. 6
Taking the latter first, McCaughtry, citing Flynn v. Chippewa County, 244 Wis. 455, 12 N.W.2d 683 (1944), renews the argument he advanced below: that, as a matter of law, the safe-place law does not apply to jails or, by implication, to prisons. In Flynn, a county-jail inmate was injured when he fell down the stairs leading to a basement furnace room under the portion of the jail devoted to the sheriff's residence; one of the issues in the case was whether the inmate could state a safe-place-law claim against the county under the "public building" provisions of § 101.11(1), Stats. Id. at 456, 12 N.W.2d at 683. The supreme court did not, as McCaughtry's argument suggests, hold that the Chippewa County Jail was not a public building per se. Rather, the court concluded that "[t]he portion of the jail in which the injury occurred was not maintained as a public building" because it was not maintained for the use of either the public or the inmates of the jail. Id. at 458, 12 N.W.2d at 684.
In a later case, Lealiou v. Quatsoe, 15 Wis.2d 128, 112 N.W.2d 193 (1961), the court characterized Flynn as representing one of two "fundamental[ly] different approaches" to construing the "public building" provisions of the safe-place law: the view that no safe-place duty exists where "the building, as a whole or that part of the building where the accident happened, was not ... maintained as a public building." Id. at 131, 112 N.W.2d at 195. Discarding the Flynn approach, the Lealiou court said that the better view, also supported by a line of cases, is one that employs a two-step process: (1) "apply[ing] the phrase 'public building' to the building as a whole ... [to] determine ... whether the structure [i]s a public building"; and (2) "if so, then ... determin[ing] the owner's duty to the particular plaintiff either to construct or to repair or to maintain the particular location in a safe condition as the nature of that location would reasonably permit." Id. at 132, 112 N.W.2d at 195.
We revisited the question most recently--albeit briefly--in Henderson v. Milwaukee County, 198 Wis.2d 747, 543 N.W.2d 544 (Ct.App.1995), where we rejected an argument that the safe-place law was inapplicable to the Milwaukee County House of Correction because it was not open to the public. Our reading of Henderson leads us to conclude that we never considered the issue on its merits in that case, but relied instead on the county's answer to the complaint where it admitted that it was "an ... owner of a public building" within the meaning of the law. Id. at 753 n. 4, 543 N.W.2d at 547. And while we quoted Lealiou 's criticism of the Flynn rationale, stating that it "support[ed] Henderson's contention that the safe-place statute applies to a stairway on the grounds of the House of Correction," we never analyzed--or even mentioned--the language of § 101.01(2)(g), Stats., 1993-94, which defines the term "public building." 7 Id. at 754, 543 N.W.2d at 548.
We thus do not see Henderson as either expanding or revitalizing Flynn, or as limiting Lealiou. Indeed, the net result of all this judicial activity is that, after Lealiou, whatever force Flynn once may have had for the proposition that a jail is not a public building as a matter of law has been wholly dissipated. We consider, therefore, that the methodology adopted in Lealiou--"first determining whether the structure is a public building and then determining the owner's particular duty to the plaintiff," Lealiou, 15 Wis.2d at 133, 112 N.W.2d at 195--governs resolution of...
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