Guckenberg v. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd.

• Decision Date: 19 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-CV-691.,00-CV-691.
• Citation: 178 F.Supp.2d 954
• Parties: Peter GUCKENBERG and Susan Guckenberg, Plaintiffs, v. WISCONSIN CENTRAL LTD. and FOX VALLEY & WESTERN LTD., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

178 F.Supp.2d 954

Peter GUCKENBERG and Susan Guckenberg, Plaintiffs, v. WISCONSIN CENTRAL LTD. and FOX VALLEY & WESTERN LTD., Defendants.

No. 00-CV-691.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

December 19, 2001.

Charles D. Koehler, Herrling Clark Hartzheim & Siddall, Appleton, WI, for Plaintiffs.

James A. Fletcher, James D. Helenhouse, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

RANDA, District Judge.

The defendants, Wisconsin Central Ltd. and Fox Valley & Western Ltd. (collectively "WCL"), are both Illinois corporations which provide rail transportation services in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan ("U.P."). On March 30, 2000, the plaintiffs, Peter and Susan Guckenberg ("the Guckenbergs"), residents of the Town of Menasha, Wisconsin, commenced a suit against WCL in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County. The complaint alleges that the defendants' actions in operating railway traffic amounts to a common law nuisance under Wisconsin law, unreasonably interfering with the use and enjoyment of their property. The action was properly removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Now before the Court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. WCL argues that the plaintiffs' cause of action is preempted by the ICC Termination Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"). Also before the Court is the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. For the reasons stated below, WCL's motion for summary judgment is granted, the Guckenbergs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint is denied, and the case is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

WCL operates three principal rail lines. Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact ("DPFF"), ¶¶ 5-6. The first line runs from Schiller Park in Chicago through Fond du Lac, Wisconsin to Neenah, Wisconsin. The second line runs west and north from Neenah to Owen, Wisconsin, where it splits, with one portion running to Superior, Wisconsin and the other portion running to St. Paul, Minnesota (the "St. Paul/Superior line.") The third line runs north and east from Neenah to Green Bay, Wisconsin and then north to the U.P. (the "Green Bay line.") DPFF, ¶ 7.

Because it facilitates the movement of cars on all three of its rail lines, the freight yard at Neenah plays a critical role in WCL's day-to-day operations. This, in addition to significant growth in the overall amount of WCL's rail traffic, caused the freight yard in Neenah to become a "clogged bottleneck." Id., ¶ 17. Accordingly, in 1997, WCL decided to build two new "side tracks," one north of Neenah and one south of Neenah. These side tracks allow trains operating in opposite directions on the mainline near Neenah to safely and efficiently pass each other. The new tracks also provide track capacity for cars that could not be handled in the Neenah yard. Id., ¶¶ 19-22. For one of the side tracks, WCL decided on a location between Stroebe Road and Towman Road near Menasha. Id., ¶ 24.

The Guckenbergs reside at 2286 W. Butte des Morts Road, Menasha, just outside of Neenah. They built their home in 1991 on land that had been owned by the Guckenberg family since the 1800's. Amended Complaint, ¶ 4. WCL's new track switching system, completed in 1998, was built directly across the street from the Guckenbergs' residence. Their home is 170 feet from the new side track. Id., ¶ 7. Plaintiffs allege that the coupling and uncoupling of trains, squealing of wheels, braking noises, slamming of cars, switching direction of train travel, flying switches of railroad cars, idling locomotive diesel engines and other similar incidents occur as many as 60 times per month, lasting as long as several hours per episode. Id., ¶ 9. Plaintiffs seek redress under Wisconsin's common law of nuisance and pray for both actual and punitive damages.

ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Summary judgment is no longer a disfavored remedy. "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct 2548. It "can be a tool of great utility in removing factually insubstantial cases from crowded dockets, freeing courts' trial time for those that really do raise genuine issues of material fact." United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local No. 88 v. Middendorf Meat Co., 794 F.Supp. 328, 330 (E.D.Mo.1992). Thus, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). While a material fact is one that is "outcome determinative under the governing law", Whetstine v. Gates Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir.1990), a genuine issue as to that material fact is raised only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A "district judge faced with [a summary judgment motion] must decide, subject of course to plenary appellate review, whether the state of the evidence is such that, if the case were tried tomorrow, the plaintiff would have a fair chance of obtaining a verdict. If not, the motion should be granted and the case dismissed." Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (7th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). Therefore, summary judgment should be utilized "when it can be shown that a trial would serve no useful purpose." Windham v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.Miss. 1992).

II. PREEMPTION

A. General Principles

Article VI of the United States Constitution states that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly, a state law which conflicts with federal law is "without effect." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981). Courts have recognized three categories of preemption: (1) express preemption, where Congress' intent to preempt state law is "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); (2) field preemption, where federal law "thoroughly occupies a legislative field." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992); and (3) conflict preemption, where "it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)) (internal citations omitted). In any preemption analysis, "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Cipollone at 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608. This intent is "primarily discerned from the language of the preemption statute, and the statutory framework surrounding it." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 486, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).

B. Express Preemption

The ICCTA, which became law on January 1, 1996, abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission and replaced it with the Surface Transportation Board ("STB"). 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq.. The ICCTA provides as follows:

(b) The jurisdiction of the [STB] over —

(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and

(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,

is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.

49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (emphasis added). One court noted that it "is difficult to imagine a broader statement of Congress' intent to preempt state regulatory authority over railroad operations." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 944 F.Supp. 1573, 1581 (N.D.Ga. 1996). Indeed, the language is "clear and broad," and it is apparent that the "ICCTA has preempted all state efforts to regulate rail transportation." Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. City of Marshfield, 160 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1013 (W.D.Wis.2000).

The Court concludes that the Guckenbergs' common law nuisance action is preempted. Because the conduct at issue in this case pertains to the "operation ... of a side track ... intended to be located, entirely in one State," the STB's jurisdiction over WCL's...