Guelfi v. Marin County Employees' Retirment Assn.

Decision Date22 July 1983
Citation193 Cal.Rptr. 343,145 Cal.App.3d 297
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesRobert GUELFI et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MARIN COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION et al., Defendants and Respondents. A010453. Civ. 52253.

Paul S. Silver, Inc., Santa Rosa, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Douglas J. Maloney, County Counsel, Thomas G. Hendricks, Asst. County Counsel, San Rafael, for defendants and respondents.

SMITH, Associate Justice.

This appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate presents the question whether appellants, retired police officers Robert Guelfi and Steven Kane (petitioners below), are entitled, under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (Gov.Code, tit. 3, div. 4, ch. 3 (§ 31450 et seq.)) 1 as subsequently amended (hereinafter "CERL"), to have their disability retirement payments calculated on the basis of pre-retirement earnings including amounts received for overtime, educational incentive pay and uniform allowance.

The County of Marin (County) has adopted CERL as the governing retirement law for its employees. Appellants are former deputy sheriffs for the County and former members of respondent Marin County Employees' Retirement Association (Association). They are disability retirees and are classified as "safety members" for purposes of retirement eligibility under CERL. (§§ 31469.3 and 31470.2.)

Respondents, the Association and the Board of Retirement of the Marin County Employees' Retirement Association (Board), are bodies vested with powers under CERL to manage the County's retirement system (§ 31520), including the responsibility of determining the amount of retirement allowance to which appellants are entitled.

During the respective years selected by appellants for purposes of defining their "final compensation" (§ 31462.1), upon which computation of retirement allowance is based (§ 31727.4), each received pay for certain unspecified hours of overtime worked, and received monthly uniform allowances and educational incentive pay. Respondents, however, computed appellants' disability retirement allowances according to a determination of "final compensation" which did not include such items of payment.

On November 29, 1979, appellants made a timely demand upon respondents that their retirement allowances be recalculated to include such payments. On January 14, 1980, after a hearing, respondents denied the demand. That denial was a final administrative decision.

On March 17, 1980, appellants filed a petition for writ of mandate in Marin County Superior Court, seeking to compel respondents to set aside their decision denying the demand, and to award benefits as demanded. An alternative writ issued.

On October 9, 1980, following the filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court entered judgment, denying the petition for peremptory writ and discharging the alternative writ. Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal from that judgment on December 2, 1980.

DISCUSSION

Appellants contend that respondent Board is without authority under CERL to determine, as has been its practice, that overtime, uniform allowance and educational incentive pay are not to be included as part of "final compensation" for computing a member's retirement allowance; thus, they argue that the Board exceeded its authority or abused its discretion by adhering to that practice in this case. They similarly argue that certain regulations promulgated by respondent Association are beyond the Association's statutory authority and hence not a valid basis for the Board's action. Respondents counter that CERL leaves to each board of retirement the determination of whether to include the items of compensation here at issue in computing retirement allowances and that the Association's regulations are a valid implementation of that authority.

Since this dispute hinges on interpretation of statutory language and since there is no factual conflict (the case comes to us upon an agreed statement filed pursuant to rule 6 of the California Rules of Court), we are confronted with a question of law (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 17, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839, cert. den., 365 U.S. 823, 81 S.Ct. 708, 5 L.Ed.2d 700) and hence are not constricted by the conclusions of the trial court. (Neeley v. Board of Retirement (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 815, 819, 111 Cal.Rptr. 841; Shoban v. Board of Trustees (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 534, 541, 81 Cal.Rptr. 112.) Accordingly, we turn directly to the relevant provisions of CERL.

Section 31727.4 provides in part that "[u]pon retirement of any member for service-connected disability, he shall receive an annual retirement allowance payable in monthly installments, equal to one-half of his final compensation...." (Emphasis added.)

Section 31462.1, having been duly adopted by resolution of the Board of Supervisors for the County of Marin, was operative as to the County at all times here relevant. It provides in part: " 'Final compensation' means the average annual compensation earnable by a member during any year elected by a member at or before the time he files an application for retirement, or, if he fails to elect, during the year immediately preceding his retirement...." (Emphasis added.) 2

Section 31461 in turn provides in part: " 'Compensation earnable' by a member means the average compensation as determined by the board, 3 for the period under consideration upon the basis of the average number of days ordinarily worked by persons in the same grade or class of positions during the period, and at the same rate of pay...." (Emphasis added.)

" 'Compensation,' " according to the pertinent part of section 31460, "means the remuneration paid in cash out of county or district funds ..., but does not include the monetary value of board, lodging, fuel, laundry, or other advantages furnished to a member." The parties agree that amounts received by appellants for overtime, educational incentive pay and uniform allowance constitute remuneration paid in cash out of county funds for purposes of section 31460.

Initially, we observe that resolution of the question posed--i.e., whether respondents' method of computing appellants' retirement benefits was statutorily authorized--in no way turns on the validity of either of the challenged sections of the Association's regulations. 4 The first section (501(a)) merely parrots the definition of "compensation earnable" found in Government Code section 31461 and thus does not purport to expand respondents' statutory authority. The second section (501(b)), defining "compensation" as base pay for the purpose of computing member contributions, has no bearing on respondents' authority to so compute retirement benefits. There is therefore no need to test the validity of either section, 5 and we need only examine the statute.

The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself; when that language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. (Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 715, 726, 182 Cal.Rptr. 778, 644 P.2d 1257; Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania (1980) 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766.) Effect must be given to a statute according to the usual and ordinary import of its language (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473), and reference must be made to the entire statute in ascertaining the legislative intent. (In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 187, 178 Cal.Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13.) Ambiguity or uncertainty in pension legislation, such as that involved here, is to be resolved in favor of the pensioner (Rose v. City of Hayward (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 940, 179 Cal.Rptr. 287), but "this rule of liberal construction is applied for the purpose of effectuating the obvious legislative intent [citation] and should not blindly be followed so as to eradicate the clear language and purpose of the statute ...." (Neeley v. Board of Retirement, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d 815, 822, 111 Cal.Rptr. 841.)

In our view, the statutory sections, taken together, set out a clear sequence for computing retirement benefits, beginning with a fairly broad definition of "compensation" (§ 31460) and progressing through the narrowing definition of "compensation earnable" (§ 31461) to arrive at "final compensation" (§ 31462.1), which is then halved in the case of a disability retiree (§ 31727.4). It is therefore necessary to examine separately, and in the statutory sequence outlined above, each claimed item of payment here at issue.

Uniform Allowance and Educational Incentive Pay

Under the statutory framework, only items of "compensation" as defined in section 31460 are to be considered in the Board's determination of "compensation earnable" (§ 31461) and computation of "final compensation" (§ 31462.1). The parties agree that uniform allowance and educational incentive pay constitute "remuneration paid in cash out of county ... funds" for purposes of section 31460; so the next question is whether those conceded items of remuneration (which are not specifically itemized in the list of exclusions found in the same section) nonetheless fall within the general category of excluded "other advantages furnished to a member."

In Rose v. City of Hayward, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 179 Cal.Rptr. 287, this panel, in interpreting the nearly identical language in Government Code section 20022 (defining "compensation" for purposes of the Public Employees' Retirement Law (Gov.Code, § 20000 et seq.)), concluded that an annual uniform allowance paid to public safety members (police officers and firefighters) was included in the section 20022 phrase, "other advantages ... furnished a member," reasoning that "the uniform substitutes for personal attire which the employee would otherwise be forced to acquire with...

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