Guenther v. Griffin Constr. Co.
| Decision Date | 12 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:15-CV-05192 |
| Citation | 161 F.Supp.3d 665 |
| Parties | Justin Guenther, Special Administrator of the Estate of Semmie John Guenther, Deceased, Plaintiff v. Griffin Construction Company, Inc., Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
George M. Rozzell, IV, Jenna Reed Fogleman, Keith, Miller, Butler, Schneider & Pawlik, Rogers, AR, for Plaintiff.
Matthew Scott Jackson, Samantha B. Leflar, Kutak Rock LLP, Fayetteville, AR, for Defendant.
This is a case that involves complex questions touching on the nature of federalism, the power of the federal courts, and the content of federal common law. It also involves a difficult question of state law that hinges on three Arkansas Supreme Court cases from the turn of the twentieth century. But these complex legal issues arise from relatively simple facts.
According to Plaintiff Justin Guenther, Special Administrator of the Estate of Semmie John Guenther (the “Estate”), in 2008 Semmie John Guenther (“Guenther”) was hired as a construction superintendent by Griffin Construction Company, Inc. (“Griffin”). Guenther was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2012. He requested, and was granted, a three-week leave to undergo treatment, which was apparently successful. However, in 2013, while on assignment on a project in El Dorado, Guenther learned that he had cancer throughout his body, including in his lungs and chest cavity. On July 22, 2013, he notified Griffin that he was going to have radiation therapy for about three weeks, and would be able to return to work on August 20, 2013. Later in July, however, Griffin notified Guenther that he was terminated, and could reapply for a job after he was able to return to work if they had any openings available. He was told that he could keep his COBRA insurance for at least another month, but that assurance never came to fruition. Griffin also terminated Guenther's $100,000.00 life insurance policy.
Guenther filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 9, 2013. He then passed away on May 29, 2014. On May 15, 2015, the Estate received a “Right to Sue” letter from the EEOC, and subsequently filed the instant suit on August 12, 2015. The Complaint alleges that Griffin's termination of Guenther's employment and benefits constitutes discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”). Griffin1 filed its Answer on August 31, 2015, generally denying the allegations against it and raising several affirmative defenses. It then filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on October 29, 2015, the basis for which is that Guenther's ACA and ACRA claims do not survive his death. The Motion asks this Court to apply Arkansas' survival statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16–62–101(a), either directly or indirectly as the federal rule of decision, to the Estate's ADA claim, and to the Estate's ACRA claim. It then argues that the survival statute abates both claims due to Guenther's death.
The Estate responds by first suggesting that the Court should not apply Arkansas' survival statute to its ADA claim, and instead should look to federal common law to determine whether it survives. Under the traditional federal common law rule, the Estate believes that its ADA claim survives because the statute is remedial in nature and not penal.2 Alternatively, and also with respect to its ACRA claim, the Estate disagrees with Griffin that Ark. Code Ann. § 16–62–101(a) is the relevant state statute to determine the survivability of its claims. Instead, it asks the Court to look to Arkansas' Probate Code, Ark. Code Ann. § 28–49–104, under which the Estate believes its claims survive. Again alternatively, the Estate argues that even if Ark. Code Ann. § 16–62–101(a) does apply to its ADA and ACRA claims, the claims survive.
The Motion now being ripe for adjudication, the Court finds that Arkansas' survival statute applies to the ADA as the federal rule of decision, and that the statute abates that claim. Having dismissed the only claim involving a federal question, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the Estate's ACRA claim, and dismisses that claim without prejudice. Finally, the Court finds that Griffin's Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 22) is moot.
To survive Griffin's Motion to Dismiss,3 the Estate's Complaint must present “a short and plain statement of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The intention of this is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In evaluating the sufficiency of the Complaint, the Court assumes that “all factual allegations in the pleadings are true and interpret[s] them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir.2013) (internal quotation omitted).
Even so, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In short, “the pleading standard that Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), but may consider exhibits attached to the complaint and documents that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n. 4 (8th Cir.2003).
Griffin's Motion to Dismiss asks the Court to dismiss the Estate's ADA claim because the claim does not survive Guenther's death. Since the ADA includes no survival statute, and there is no general federal survival statute, Griffin argues that the Court should apply Arkansas' survival statute, either directly or as the federal rule of decision. The Estate disagrees. It counters that the Court should apply the traditional federal common law maxim that claims that are not penal in nature survive the death of the aggrieved party, while those that are penal in nature do not. Under this rule, most of the Estate's claims would survive Guenther's passing.
While courts outside of the Eighth Circuit have held that the survival of an ADA claim is dependent on the content of state law, see Nordwall v. PHC – LAS Cruces, Inc., 960 F.Supp.2d 1200 (D.N.M.2013) ; Hutchinson v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895 (7th Cir.1997) ; Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 1394 (D.Utah 1997) ; Rosenblum v. Colo. Dept. of Health, 878 F.Supp. 1404 (D.Colo.1994), the district courts within this Circuit that have addressed the issue have all applied the traditional federal common law rule. See A.H. v. St. Louis County, Mo., 2015 WL 4426234 (E.D.Mo. July 17, 2015) ; Estate of Stoick ex rel. Spry v. McCorvey, 2011 WL 3419939 (D.Minn. July 29, 2011) ; Kettner v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 570 F.Supp.2d 1121 (D.Minn.2008) ; Hanson v. Atl. Research Corp., 2003 WL 430484 (E.D.Ark. Feb. 14, 2003). The Eighth Circuit has yet to address the question, leaving this Court without binding authority directly on point. For the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees with its sister courts in the Eighth Circuit, and finds that Arkansas state law informs the content of federal common law on this issue.
Courts reaching this conclusion—or concluding that state law applies directly—have done so in two different ways. The first set of courts, including Allred and Rosenblum, have applied 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) to the ADA. Section 1988(a) reads:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes ... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States ... but in all cases where they are ... deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
(emphasis added). The Court rejects the notion that § 1988(a) applies to the ADA. By its terms, § 1988(a) applies only to “titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes ....” Id. The Revised Statutes of the United States is the precursor to the United States Code, which was first adopted in 1926. See Andrew Winston, The Revised Statutes of the United States: Predecessor to the U.S. Code, Library of Congress (July 2, 2015), http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/07/the-revised-statutes-of-the-united-states-predecessor-to-the-u-s-code.
Title 13 of the Revised Statutes consisted of R.S. §§ 530 to 1093. Likewise, Title 24 consisted of R.S....
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