Guerra v. Guajardo
| Decision Date | 10 October 1978 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. B-78-215,B-78-216. |
| Parties | Victor M. GUERRA, d/b/a Guerra's T. D. F. Warehouse, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo GUAJARDO, District Director of Customs, Laredo District No. 23, and Albert Bazemore, Regional Commissioner of Customs, Defendants. RONNIE GUERRA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC., Ronaldo E. Guerra, Inc., and Ronald E. Guerra, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. Eduardo GUAJARDO, District Director, U. S. Customs Service, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
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James Roby Clopton, McAllen, Tex., for plaintiff Victor M. Guerra, d/b/a Guerra's T. D. F. Warehouse.
Guerra & Duvall, C. H. Duvall, Roma, Tex., for plaintiffs Ronnie Guerra's International Traders, Inc., Ronaldo E. Guerra, Inc., and Ronaldo E. Guerra, Individually.
J. A. "Tony" Canales, U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., John P. Smith and Charles Lewis, Asst. U. S. Attys., Brownsville, Tex., for defendants.
This is an action for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs are engaged in the import-export business. The present case involves the importation of powdered milk from Canada which is then sold from bonded warehouses belonging to Plaintiffs to purchasers who transport the goods to Mexico. The price of such powdered milk is less than half that of powdered milk purchased at retail in the United States. The Defendants are the Laredo District Director and the Regional Commissioner of the United States Customs Service.
On August 23, 1978, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order which also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction, and a declaratory judgment. A Temporary Restraining Order was signed the following day. A hearing on the preliminary injunction was held on September 6, 1978, in which the Plaintiff Ronaldo Guerra testified, predominantly on the issue of damages. Attorneys for both parties were requested by the Court to submit briefs within ten days of the hearing. An extension of seven days was granted on September 18, 1978. The actions were consolidated on October 3, 1978. The Temporary Restraining Order has been kept in force during the pendency of these proceedings.
A brief recitation of the facts in this case is necessary for a full understanding of the variegated allegations proffered by both parties. On September 30, 1976, the United States of America and the United Mexican States entered into an agreement providing for mutual assistance between the Customs Services of the two countries hereinafter the "Mutual Assistance Agreement".1 The agreement obligates each party to prevent, investigate and repress breaches of Mexican and American Customs laws.2 Pursuant to this agreement, the United States Customs Service received a written request, dated June 13, 1978, from the Mexican government asking for all possible documentation related to the exportation of powdered milk from the United States into Mexico from October 1, 1977 to the present.
The Defendant Regional Commissioner was instructed by Customs officials to release to Mexican Customs the names of the consignees, dates of exportation and the final destination of the powdered milk. This information was gleaned from forms which exporters filed with the United States Customs Service.3 This information was furnished to Mexican Customs in July and August of 1978. Soon thereafter, the Plaintiffs directed written requests to the United States Customs Service asking that the Service withhold from disclosing information concerning these exportations. The Customs Service informed the Plaintiffs that pursuant to the Mutual Assistance Agreement the Service was under an obligation to disclose such information.
This action was subsequently brought to enjoin the United States Customs Service from disclosing further information of a similar nature. Plaintiffs, in their Complaints and in their briefs, alleged several grounds upon which relief should be granted. Initially, Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants have violated Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution4 in that their actions amount to a usurpation of Congress' sole power to regulate commerce. The Plaintiffs also contend that such actions amount to discrimination against the Plaintiffs vis-a-vis sellers of nonbonded goods. The Plaintiffs also claim that acts of discrimination are being perpetrated against them in relation to bonded warehouses conducting parallel business on the Canadian border, at international airports and at seaports. The Plaintiffs further allege that the Mutual Assistance Agreement is invalid as violative of the treaty making powers of the United States Constitution5 in that the Agreement did not receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. The Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants' actions constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law. The Plaintiffs further aver that the release of information is contrary to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) and (4) The Freedom of Information Act, 19 C.F.R. § 103.10(c) and (d) The Customs Regulations and 18 U.S.C. § 1905 The Trade Secrets Act.
On September 26, 1978, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs lack standing in that they have failed to demonstrate the presence of a case or controversy. The Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs' Complaints present a nonjusticiable political question, thus, depriving this Court of jurisdiction. In the alternative, Defendants state that neither The Freedom of Information Act hereinafter the FOIA nor The Trade Secrets Act precludes release of the information to the Mexican officials. Additionally, the Defendants state that the Plaintiffs should be denied injunctive relief for the reason that the Plaintiffs are tainted with "unclean hands." Lastly, Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs have not met the four standards necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Based upon the Plaintiffs' Complaints for Temporary Restraining Order, the briefs in support of the Complaints for Temporary Restraining Order, the oral testimony of Ronaldo Guerra, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, and the Defendants' Brief thereto, this Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction be denied and that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
In a motion seeking injunctive relief, a preliminary injunction is appropriate when the proponent has satisfied four requirements. The plaintiff must prove that 1) there is a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits; 2) a substantial threat exists that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; 3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may cause the Defendant; and 4) granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Hillsboro News Co. v. City of Tampa, 544 F.2d 860, 861 (5th Cir. 1977). The discussion which follows will be written in light of those requirements.
The Plaintiffs contend that the disclosure of the exportation information has resulted in a substantial loss of customers and sales.6 The Plaintiffs state that their customers have specifically told them that the release of information has intimidating effects upon such customers. These intimidating effects, specifically fears of extortion and harassment,7 have caused these customers to cease their purchases with the Plaintiffs. Because of the cessation of purchases, the Plaintiffs find themselves in the possession of large quantities of powdered milk which they are unable to sell.8
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs have not stated facts alleging a case or controversy in their representative capacities. The Defendants state that Plaintiffs do not possess the requisite elements of standing to bring an action for injuries suffered by the various Mexican purchasers. The Defendants aver that the Plaintiffs lack standing to sue in their individual capacities, as well. The Defendants specifically challenge the Plaintiffs' standing upon the grounds that the Complaint is nothing more than a generalized grievance common to all United States citizens exporting powdered milk into Mexico, and that the Plaintiffs can show no nexus between the disclosure of the information and the alleged injury sustained. This Court will deal with the two contentions of Defendants separately.
In the present case, the pleadings are unclear whether the Plaintiffs actually are suing in a representative capacity. Since the Defendants have raised the claim and the Plaintiffs' pleadings are ambiguous on this point, the Court will discuss whether the Plaintiffs may state claims for the Mexican purchasers in a representative capacity. For a plaintiff to possess standing to sue, he must demonstrate the existence of a case or controversy between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In particular, the Plaintiff must allege such a personal stake in the outcome "as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 498-99, 95 S.Ct. at 2205.
The Court in Warth was faced with an attack on a zoning ordinance of the town of Rochester, New York. The Plaintiffs in that case claimed inter alia, that the ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town. The Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing on this ground because none of them had a present interest in city property, none were subject to the ordinance and none were denied a variance or permit by the city officials.
In so holding, the Court stated that "the plaint...
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U.S. v. Walczak
...executive agreements derives from the power over foreign relations accorded to the President by the Constitution. See Guerra v. Guajardo, 466 F.Supp. 1046 (S.D.Tx.1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 769 (5th If an agreement is within the President's power over foreign concords and relations, there seem ......
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