Guerra v. Packard

• Decision Date: 03 August 1965
• Citation: 46 Cal.Rptr. 25,236 Cal.App.2d 272
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Louis C. GUERRA and Joseph A. Guerra, Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Respondents, v. David PACKARD and Lucile S. Packard, husband and wife, and William R. Hewlett and Flora L. Hewlett, husband and wife, Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants. Civ. 21899.

Page 25

46 Cal.Rptr. 25

236 Cal.App.2d 272

Louis C. GUERRA and Joseph A. Guerra, Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Respondents, v.David PACKARD and Lucile S. Packard, husband and wife, and William R. Hewlett and Flora L. Hewlett, husband and wife, Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants.

Civ. 21899.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 3, 1965.

Howe, Finch, Spaeth & Sauers, Palo Alto, Robert P. Schifferman, Los Angeles, for appellants.

John Corry Fell, San Jose, for respondents.

MOLINARI, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendants and cross-complainants from the judgment, after a court trial, awarding plaintiffs and cross-defendants an easement across defendants' property and enjoining defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of this easement.

Statement of the Case and the Issues Presented on Appeal

By their complaint, filed on July 18, 1962, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners of certain real property situated in the County of Santa Clara; that defendants own the Los Huecos Rancho, formerly known as the McDermott Ranch, also situated in Santa Clara County; and that 'plaintiffs are the owners of a right of way for ingress and egress by all means of conveyance, over a strip of land of a width sufficient for the ordinary uses of free passage,' over and across this property belonging to defendants.The complaint then describes the route of the purported right of way, alleges that defendants have wrongfully obstructed and disturbed plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of this right of way, and prays for a decree quieting plaintiffs' title to this right of way, for an injunction prohibiting defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' use of their right of way and compelling defendants to remove any existing obstructions to such use, and for 'money damages as may be found by the court; * * *.'

Defendants filed an answer denying all of the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, and in addition cross-complained against plaintiffs to quiet title to the Los Huecos Rancho, including the route of the purported right of way, and to obtain injunctive relief against plaintiffs' continued trespasses upon their property.In answer to defendants' cross-complaint, plaintiffs admitted that they claimed an interest in defendants' property to the extent of their alleged right of way; further admitted that they would continue to make entries upon this right of way, but denied that such entries constituted trespasses and that they claimed any other interest in defendants' property.Plaintiffs further denied all other allegations of defendants' cross-complaint.

Upon the completion of the taking of testimony at the trial, the trial judge visited defendants' property and viewed the claimed right of way.Thereafter the trial court entered its findings of fact from which it concluded that plaintiffs had a right of way by prescription to their property over Pine Ridge Road and Bear Trail, but not over Dead Horse Road, and that defendants should be enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs' use of said right of way and plaintiffs should be enjoined from further use of Dead Horse Trail.From the judgment entered thereon this appeal ensued.

On this appeal defendants raise the following issues: (1)Plaintiffs failed to establish all the requirements for a prescriptive right of way over Pine Ridge Road, and to this extent the findings and judgment are not supported by the evidence; (2) the prescriptive right, even if established, would have been extinguished by adverse use of the servient tenement for over 5 years; (3)plaintiffs could not obtain a prescriptive right of way over the Pine Ridge Road where at all times since 1941 that road had been held, maintained, used and patrolled by the State of California; (4)the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment since the State of California, an indispensable party, was not before the court; (5)the trial court could not properly confer a prescriptive easement over defendants' ranch without specifying the width of the right of way or the burden which might thereby be imposed upon the servient tenement.

The Record

Plaintiffs' property for access to which they seek a right of way through defendants' property consists of approximately 320 acres situated to the north and east of defendants' property.Plaintiffs trace the title to their property back to Glenn Van Siclen, who, on October 20, 1931 under the Stockraising Homestead Act, made an entry on this property, which was at that time part of the public domain.On December 13, 1938, after completion of his homestead requirements, Van Siclen acquired title to this property by patent deed, which deed was recorded on June 13, 1939.The chain of title to plaintiffs' property subsequent to Van Siclen's ownership was stipulated to as follows: Van Siclen conveyed to Harry Damkar by deed dated March 25, 1959, recorded April 2, 1959; by deed dated March 4, 1960, recorded March 7, 1960, Damkar conveyed title to John Yinger, who held the property as constructive trustee for Louis Guerra, et al.; Louis Guerra and Joseph Guerra acquired title to the property by decree dated and recorded November 16, 1960.

During this same period, the chain of ownership of defendants' ranch land was as follows: The ranch was owned throughout the 1930's and until March 23, 1943 by Alfred J. McDermott; on this date, McDermott sold the ranch to Roger Jessup who owned the ranch until he sold it on May 23, 1960 to the present owners, defendants in this action.

Turning to the evidence relating to the right of way which plaintiffs seek to establish, we begin by describing its general course as follows: Beginning at Steeley Road, a county road; through Hogsback Gate, north along the Pine Ridge Road to Sizer Flat; then east along Bear Trail to a fork; then either north continuing on Bear Trail, or further east and then north along Dead Horse Trail, both routes leading to plaintiffs' property.There are 4 gates on the road between Steeley Road and plaintiffs' property: The Hogsback Gate; a gate along the Pine Ridge Road; a gate on the Bear Trail; and a gate at Willow Springs on the Dead Horse Trail.

In 1931, when Van Siclen homesteaded his property, he inquired at the Sacramento Land Office as to his right of access to this property and was told he had 'an exclusive right into my property.'When questioned further about the origin of his claim, Van Siclen indicated that he felt that it was on the Pine Ridge Trail, and stated 'So I figured I had my rights'; 'I read it, just said I had an exclusive access to my property' and 'I had access, and to my own frame of mind I wasn't doing nothing.I wasn't trespassing.'

Beginning in 1931Van Siclen traveled along the Pine Ridge Trail and the Bear Trail, then merely horse trails, for the purpose of reaching his property.During the 1930's he traveled this route almost exclusively by foot or on horseback; he had no problem entering the original Hogsback Gate during his period since it was either unlocked, or he obtained a key from friends, or he could enter through gaps in the fence.

In May of 1940, defendants' predecessor in interest, McDermott, entered into an agreement with the State of California, through its State Forester, by which McDermott 'licensed' to the state an 'easement or right of way' across his property for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a 'motorway and firebreak [to] be used by the State Division of Foresty for forest protection, fire prevention and fire suppression purposes.'Pursuant to this license agreement, the State Division of Forestry constructed a fire control road over defendants' property, the route of which generally followed the former Pine Ridge Trail, but did deviate somewhat from this trail at certain points.¹This portion of the forestry road was constructed in about 1941, and from the time of its construction, Van Siclen traveled this road to reach his property.His mode of travel subsequent to 1941 was by automobile, jeep, foot, or horseback.

After the forestry road was constructed, a new Hogsback Gate, some 20 feet below the original gate, was put in.This gate was almost always kept locked, so that after 1941Van Siclen either left his automobile at the gate and walked in to his property (about one-half of the time), or he maintained his own lock and key, or he obtained a key for the forestry lock from sources other than defendants' predecessors, or he worked a trick link in the gate, or he took the gate itself off its hinges.In 1957, the ranch foreman gave Van Siclen a key to the Hogsback Gate.After the construction of the forestry road, Van Siclen and his friends and guests sometimes traveled this road by automobile.

Between 1931 and 1959, when Van Siclen sold his property, he traveled the Pine Ridge Road and the Bear Trail throughout the year and during both day and nighttime.Various other witnesses testified that they saw Van Siclen on this trail, that they saw his car parked at the end of the Bear Trail, and that they traveled to his property along the same route with him or alone as his guests.Van Siclen testified that, except for the fact that he received a key to the Hogsback Gate in 1957, he was never given permission to use the Pine Ridge Road or the Bear Trail, and he and other witnesses testified to arguments which Van Siclen had had throughout the years with the foremen of defendants' ranch concerning Van Siclen's use of these roads.In addition, between the years 1930 and 1959, although signs at other locations of defendants' ranch read 'Permission to Pass Revocable at Any Time,' the only sign on the Pine Ridge Road read 'No Trespassing, Los Huecos Ranch.'

In 1959, Van Siclen conveyed his property to Harry Damkar.The deed to Damkar contained no mention of a right of way across defendants' property, Van Siclen testifying that Damkar 'took it over the way I had it.He was in the same...