Guerra v. Rockdale Cnty.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: MICHAEL L. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Guerra v. Rockdale Cnty., 420 F.Supp.3d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2019)
• Decision Date: 28 October 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:16-cv-04656
• Parties: Gerardo Espinosa GUERRA, Plaintiff, v. ROCKDALE COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.

420 F.Supp.3d 1327

Gerardo Espinosa GUERRA, Plaintiff,

v.ROCKDALE COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-04656

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed October 28, 2019

Mikell Paul Reynolds, S. Bradley Houck, Houck Reynolds, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Jason C. Waymire, Terry Eugene Williams, Williams, Morris & Waymire, LLC, Buford, GA, Arash A. Sabzevari, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, Sun S. Choy, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants

OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL L. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully arrested and detained for sixteen days based on a mistaken identification by members of the Rockdale County Sheriff's Office and the City of Franklin Police Department. He filed suit, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and Georgia state law. Defendant City of Franklin, Tennessee, and Defendant Officers Tommy D. Justus, Becky Porter, and Chad D. Black ("Tennessee Defendants") moved to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. (Dkt. 37.) Defendant Rockdale County, Georgia, Defendant Rockdale County Sheriff Eric J. Levett, and Defendant Officers Brandon W. Douglas and Jonathan W. Baker ("Rockdale Defendants") moved for partial judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. 36.) The Court grants in part and denies in part both motions and allows the surviving claims to proceed.

I. Background

In January 2015, police officers with the City of Franklin Police Department (including Defendant Black as the lead investigator) began investigating criminal activity at a local hotel. (Dkt. 33 ¶ 40.) They identified and photographed five suspects, including an individual known as Gerardo Emmanuel Espinosa Zamudio. (Id. ¶¶ 32–36.) Although police made no arrests at the time, they later obtained an indictment against Zamudio for aggravated assault and false imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 39.) Franklin police placed a warrant for his arrest in a nationwide database. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff Guerra was not involved in the criminal activity at the Franklin hotel. On November 12, 2015, he was at his home in Conyers, Georgia, minding his own business when two officers with the Rockdale Sheriff's Office knocked on his door. (Id. ¶ 43.) They were looking for Plaintiff's stepfather to ask him questions about a car he had previously owned, again totally unrelated to anything that happened in Franklin. (Id. ) While trying to help the officers, Plaintiff provided his Georgia driver's license. (Id. ¶ 46.) The officers somehow thought Plaintiff might be the subject of the Tennessee warrant and placed him in the back of their squad car while investigating. (Id. ¶ 47.) They soon realized he was not the suspect in the warrant and let him go, encouraging him to "clear up the matter" so he would not be mistakenly arrested in the future. (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff — apparently accepting that advice — went to the Rockdale County Sheriff's Office a couple of days later and provided his fingerprints, social security number, driver's license, and other identifying information. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50, 52.)

On November 16, 2015, someone in the Rockdale County Sheriff's Office sent a copy of Plaintiff's driver's license photograph to Defendant Porter, with the Franklin Police Department. (Id. ¶ 54.) Defendant Porter attempted to compare Plaintiff's picture with pictures of suspects at the Franklin hotel that police had taken months earlier. (Id. ¶ 55.) She was unable to locate the photographs of the individuals involved in the incident, however, although Plaintiff alleges such photographs were in the file at the time. (Id. ) As a result, Defendant Porter was unable to confirm if Plaintiff was the individual sought in the Tennessee warrant. (Id. ) A couple of days later, Defendant Porter showed Plaintiff's photograph to Defendant Black, who had been part of the original investigation at the hotel. (Id. ¶ 60.) Defendant Black — looking only at the photograph of Plaintiff and comparing it to his memory of the suspect from months before — confirmed that Plaintiff was the individual sought by the Tennessee warrant and asked the Rockdale officers to arrest him. (Id. ¶ 63.)

Defendant Baker called Plaintiff and asked him to come back to the sheriff's office. (Id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiff did. (Id. ) Rockdale Officers Baker and Douglas arrested Plaintiff, telling him the Franklin officers had identified him as the suspect involved in the assault at the hotel. (Id. ¶ 72.) Defendant Officer Douglas obtained an arrest warrant the next day, charging Plaintiff with being a fugitive from justice. (Id. ¶¶ 78–79.) Plaintiff remained in jail for sixteen days before police finally determined that he was not the man sought in the Tennessee warrant and dismissed the charges. (Id. ¶ 86.)

Plaintiff asserts claims against defendants in Georgia and Tennessee. He sued Rockdale County, Georgia, Rockdale County Sheriff Eric J. Levett, and Rockdale Sheriff Officers Johnathan W. Baker and Brandon W. Douglas. He also sued the City of Franklin, Tennessee, and Franklin Police Department Officers Tommy D. Justus, Chad D. Black, and Becky Porter.¹ He brings federal claims of false arrest (Count One) and malicious prosecution/false imprisonment (Count Two) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state-law claims of false arrest (Count Three), malicious prosecution (Count Four), false imprisonment (Count Five), and negligent hiring, retention, and training (Count Six). The Rockdale Defendants filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and the Tennessee Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkts. 36; 37.)

II. Legal Standard

A court may dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc. , 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a court is guided "by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc. , 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018).

While parties usually raise the defense of qualified immunity at summary judgment, a party may nevertheless assert the defense at the outset of the litigation on a motion to dismiss. See Corbitt v. Vickers , 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019). A district court grants such a motion if "the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Id. (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty. , 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) ). Indeed, the early assertion and (if appropriate) resolution of qualified immunity effectuates the principal that qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ; see also Andrews v. Scott , 729 F. App'x 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Once the defendants advance the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the complaint must be dismissed, unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. Discussion

The Court notes from the outset that, notwithstanding Plaintiff's amendment to his complaint, none of the counts clearly delineates against which of the Defendants the claims are asserted. The Court has tried to discern Plaintiff's intent through his mention of various Defendants in each of the counts. The Court believes it has addressed all outstanding issues.

A. The Rockdale Defendants' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 36)

1. The Court Grants the Rockdale Defendants' Motion as to Count One.

The Rockdale Defendants (that is, Rockdale County Sheriff Levett and Rockdale County Sheriff Officers Baker and Douglas) move for judgment on the pleadings on Count One against them in their individual capacities. (Dkt. 36-1 at 3.) They argue that, because they arrested Plaintiff "under an arrest warrant from Tennessee with verification from the agency that obtained the warrant," Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for false arrest. (Id. at 4.) In support of this argument, they cite the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Carter v. Gore , holding that "[t]he issuance of a warrant — even an invalid one ... — constitutes legal process, and thus, where an individual has been arrested pursuant to a warrant, his claim is for malicious prosecution rather than false arrest." 557 F. App'x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff claims this rule does not apply because he was not the individual named in the warrant.

Plaintiff is correct but for a different reason. Contrary to the Rockdale Defendants' assertion, Plaintiff does not allege in the amended complaint that the Rockdale Defendants arrested him pursuant to the Tennessee warrant. He claims they arrested him for the "offense of fugitive from justice, O.C.G.A. § 17-13-33." (Dkt. 33 ¶ 79.) He claims the officers arrested him on November 18, 2015, and the next day, secured a warrant for violating Georgia law. (Id. ¶¶ 71, 78.) This would mean that Plaintiff alleges the original arrest was made without probable cause. Indeed, as part of his false arrest claim, Plaintiff alleges that the Rockdale Defendants "had no arguable probable cause, much less probable cause" to swear out the warrant for his arrest for being a fugitive from justice. (Id. ¶ 103.) Carter v. Gore thus does not bar Plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest claim.

Alternatively, the Rockdale Defendants...