Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr

Citation140 S.Ct. 1062,206 L.Ed.2d 271
Decision Date23 March 2020
Docket Number18–1015,Nos. 18–776,s. 18–776
Parties Pedro Pablo GUERRERO-LASPRILLA, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General; Ruben Ovalles, Petitioner v. William P. Barr, Attorney General
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, W. Manning Evans, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent

Mark Andrew Prada, Mario R. Urizar, Prada Urizar, PLLC, Miami, FL, Eugene R. Fidell, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Paul W. Hughes, Michael B. Kimberly, Ethan H. Townsend, Andrew A. Lyons-Berg, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Washington, DC, Andrew J. Pincus, Charles A. Rothfeld, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Brian Wolfman, Washington, DC, for petitioners.

Paul W. Hughes, Washington, DC, for the petitioners

Frederick Liu for the respondent.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 242(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified as 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a), provides for judicial review of a final Government order directing the removal of an alien from this country. See 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq . A subdivision of that section limits the scope of that review where the removal rests upon the fact that the alien has committed certain crimes, including aggravated felonies and controlled substance offenses. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Another subdivision, § 1252(a)(2)(D), which we shall call the Limited Review Provision, says that in such instances courts may consider only "constitutional claims or questions of law." The question that these two consolidated cases present is whether the phrase "questions of law" in the Provision includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. We believe that it does.

I

The two petitioners before us, Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ruben Ovalles, are aliens who lived in the United States. Each committed a drug crime and consequently became removable. App. 33; Record in No. 18–1015, p. 66. In 1998, an Immigration Judge ordered Guerrero-Lasprilla removed. Record in No. 18–776, p. 137. In 2004, the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered Ovalles removed, reversing a decision by an Immigration Judge. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 18–1015, pp. 32a–35a. Both removal orders became administratively final, and both petitioners left the country.

Several months after their removal orders became final, each petitioner's window for filing a timely motion to reopen his removal proceedings closed. That is because the Immigration and Nationality Act permits a person one motion to reopen, "a form of procedural relief that asks the Board to change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in circumstances." Dada v. Mukasey , 554 U.S. 1, 12, 14, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the motion must usually be filed "within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal." 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).

Nonetheless, Guerrero-Lasprilla (in 2016) and Ovalles (in 2017) asked the Board to reopen their removal proceedings. Recognizing that the 90-day time limit had long since passed, both petitioners argued that the time limit should be equitably tolled. Both petitioners, who had become eligible for discretionary relief due to various judicial and Board decisions years after their removal, rested their claim for equitable tolling on Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch , 831 F.3d 337 (CA5 2016). In that case, the Fifth Circuit had held that the 90-day time limit could be "equitably tolled." Id ., at 344. Guerrero-Lasprilla filed his motion to reopen a month after Lugo-Resendez was decided. App. 5. Ovalles filed his motion to reopen eight months after the decision. Id ., at 35. The Board denied both petitioners’ requests for equitable tolling, concluding, inter alia , that they had failed to demonstrate the requisite due diligence. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 18–1015, at 6a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 18–776, p. 12a.

Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ovalles each asked the Fifth Circuit to review the Board's decision. See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) ; 28 U. S. C. § 2342 ; Reyes Mata v. Lynch , 576 U. S. 143, 147, 135 S.Ct. 2150, 192 L.Ed.2d 225 (2015) ("[C]ircuit courts have jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the Board's denial of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding"). The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for review, concluding in both cases that "whether an alien acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question." Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Sessions , 737 Fed.Appx. 230, 231 (2018) (per curiam ); Ovalles v. Sessions , 741 Fed.Appx. 259, 261 (2018) (per curiam ). And, given the Limited Review Provision, it "lack[ed] jurisdiction" to review those "factual" claims. 737 Fed.Appx. at 231 ; 741 Fed.Appx. at 261.

Both petitioners claim that the underlying facts were not in dispute, and they asked us to grant certiorari in order to determine whether their claims that the Board incorrectly applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the "undisputed" (or established) facts is a "question of law," which the Limited Review Provision authorizes courts of appeals to consider. We agreed to do so.

II

The Limited Review Provision provides that, in this kind of immigration case (involving aliens who are removable for having committed certain crimes), a court of appeals may consider only "constitutional claims or questions of law." 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The issue before us is, as we have said, whether the statutory phrase "questions of law" includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. If so, the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction" to consider the petitioners’ claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. We conclude that the phrase "questions of law" does include this type of review, and the Court of Appeals was wrong to hold the contrary.

A

Consider the statute's language. Nothing in that language precludes the conclusion that Congress used the term "questions of law" to refer to the application of a legal standard to settled facts. Indeed, we have at times referred to the question whether a given set of facts meets a particular legal standard as presenting a legal inquiry. Do the facts alleged in a complaint, taken as true, state a claim for relief under the applicable legal standard? See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) ; Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (" Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law"). Did a Government official's alleged conduct violate clearly established law? See Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 528, n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[T]he appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged ... support a claim of violation of clearly established law"); cf. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co. , 312 U.S. 373, 376, 61 S.Ct. 593, 85 L.Ed. 897 (1941) ("The effect of admitted facts is a question of law"). Even the dissent concedes that we have sometimes referred to mixed questions as raising a legal inquiry. See post, at 1074 – 1075 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). While that judicial usage alone does not tell us what Congress meant by the statutory term "questions of law," it does indicate that the term can reasonably encompass questions about whether settled facts satisfy a legal standard.

We have sometimes referred to such a question, which has both factual and legal elements, as a "mixed question of law and fact." See, e.g., U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC , 583 U. S. ––––, ––––, 138 S.Ct. 960, 966, 200 L.Ed.2d 218 (2018) ("[W]hether the historical facts found satisfy the legal test chosen" is a "so-called ‘mixed question’ of law and fact" (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint , 456 U.S. 273, 289, n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) )). And we have often used the phrase "mixed questions" in determining the proper standard for appellate review of a district, bankruptcy, or agency decision that applies a legal standard to underlying facts. The answer to the "proper standard" question may turn on practical considerations, such as whether the question primarily "require[s] courts to expound on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal standard" (often calling for review de novo ), or rather "immerse[s] courts in case-specific factual issues" (often calling for deferential review). Village at Lakeridge , 583 U. S., at ––––, 138 S.Ct., at 967. But these cases present no such question involving the standard of review. And, in any event, nothing in those cases forecloses the conclusion that the application of law to settled facts can be encompassed within the statutory phrase "questions of law." Nor is there anything in the language of the statute that suggests that "questions of law" excludes the application of law to settled facts.

B

The Government, respondent here, argues to the contrary. Namely, the Government claims that Congress intended to exclude from judicial review all mixed questions. We do not agree. Rather, a longstanding presumption, the statutory context, and the statute's history all support the conclusion that the application of law to undisputed or established facts is a "questio[n] of law" within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Consider first "a familiar principle of statutory construction: the presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action." Kucana v. Holder , 558 U.S. 233, 251, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010). Under that "well-settled" and "strong presumption," McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. , 498 U.S. 479, 496, 498, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991), when a statutory...

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