Guerrero v. Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 05 February 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 95876
• Citation: 418 N.W.2d 685,165 Mich.App. 192
• Parties: Edward GUERRERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 685

418 N.W.2d 685

165 Mich.App. 192

Edward GUERRERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 95876.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 10, 1987.

Decided Dec. 9, 1987.

Released for Publication Feb. 5, 1988.

Edward Guerrero, in pro. per.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Louis J. Porter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before HOOD, P.J., and MAHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us for a determination of the retroactivity of Martin v. Dep't of Corrections, 424 Mich. 553, 384 N.W.2d 392 (1986). In Martin, our Supreme Court held that the disciplinary directives of the Department of Corrections were not properly promulgated as rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L. Sec. 24.201 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.560(101) et seq.

Plaintiff, Edward Guerrero, has been an inmate at the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson since July 31, 1972. He has been serving three concurrent life terms subsequent to pleading guilty to three separate counts of rape. Since being incarcerated at Jackson, plaintiff has received numerous major misconduct reports and guilty findings under the Department of Corrections disciplinary directives.

On July 25, 1986, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting the court to declare plaintiff's previous major misconduct reports and guilty findings invalid. Plaintiff alleged that Martin should be retroactively applied to declare his major misconduct violations invalid and have them expunged from defendant's records. Plaintiff has never contended that he did not violate defendant's disciplinary standards.

Defendant moved for summary disposition, contending that Martin could not be applied retroactively to invalidate plaintiff's misconduct violations, plaintiff responded to defendant's motion, and the trial judge determined that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief and ordered that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

While plaintiff frames his issues in terms of whether his major misconduct findings should be declared void and ordered expunged from the records, the dispositive issue is whether some of the language of Martin should be binding retroactively. The Supreme Court in Martin declared:

"The narrow question we decided today is whether ... the trial court correctly held that inmates are not members of the 'public' for purposes of the APA, and the department thus acted with proper authority; or whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that prison inmates are members of the 'public' under the APA and the department therefore did not come under the quoted exception to the APA procedural requirements. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals." Martin, supra, at p. 555, 384 N.W.2d 392.

The majority opinion concluded, however, with the following language:

"[W]e are compelled to conclude that the Legislature, in enacting the APA, did not intend to include disciplinary provisions adopted by the Department of Corrections as 'an intergovernmental, interagency or intra-agency directive or communication which does not affect the right of, or procedures and practices available to the public' and consequently excluded from APA requirements. Therefore, while we do not adopt the rationale of the Court of Appeals, we affirm their decision that the disciplinary directives of the Department of Corrections were not properly promulgated as rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act." Martin, supra, at p. 564, 384 N.W.2d 392. ¹

While it has been stated that the general rule in applying Supreme Court decisions is one of retroactivity, our Supreme Court has adopted a "flexible approach," Tebo v. Havlik, 418 Mich. 350, 360, 343 N.W.2d 181 (1984).

In Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 665, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979), the Supreme Court stated:

"If a court were absolutely bound by the traditional rule of retroactive application, it would be severely hampered in its ability to make needed changes in the law because of the chaos that could result in regard to prior enforcement under that law."

In Tebo v. Havlik, supra, 418 Mich. at pp. 360-361, 343 N.W.2d 181, the Court further stated:

"Appreciation of the effect a change in settled law can have has led this Court to favor only limited retroactivity when overruling prior law. Thus, when the doctrine of imputed negligence was overruled in Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), the decision was applied only to the case before the Court and to pending and future cases. When the doctrine of charitable immunity was overruled in Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), the retroactive effect of the decision was limited to the parties before the Court. Even where statutory construction has been involved, this Court has limited the retroactivity of a decision when justice so required. See Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 12 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981); Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590; 274 NW2d 392 (1979)."

While we find no Michigan authority which addresses retroactivity in a case similar to that before us, we find...