Guerrero v. State, 86-2654
Decision Date | 18 October 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86-2654,86-2654 |
Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2357 Alberto GUERRERO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michelle Crawford, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.
Alberto Guerrero appeals his conviction and sentence for second-degree grand theft of a car. We reverse.
After observing Guerrero driving a car shown by a computer check to have been stolen the previous day, the officer stopped the car and arrested Guerrero. Prior to the trial, the trial court precluded Guerrero from questioning the arresting officer during the trial about exculpatory statements he made to the officer. At trial, on direct examination, Officer Perez described Guerrero's arrest and the officer's statements to Guerrero at the time of the arrest. During cross-examination, the officer testified that when he stopped the car, the keys were in the ignition; the car had not been "trashed," repainted, or hot-wired; the defendant gave his name but did not have a license; and Guerrero was polite and cooperative. Limited by the court's ruling, Guerrero's attorney could only proffer that the officer would have testified that Guerrero had explained his possession of the car. He was not permitted to elicit testimony that Guerrero told the officer a girlfriend had given him the car and that he didn't know it was stolen. Over defendant's objection, the court instructed the jury that an inference of guilt arises from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. See § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). During deliberations, the court acceded to the jury's request and reread the instruction. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court entered judgment.
Guerrero claims that the trial court erred in precluding cross-examination of officer Perez concerning the explanation Guerrero gave at the time of his arrest. As a general rule, a defendant's out-of-court self-serving exculpatory statements are inadmissible hearsay. Moore v. State, 530 So.2d 61 ( ), on rehearing (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 31, 1988); Fagan v. State, 425 So.2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) ( ); Watkins v. State, 342 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA) (same), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 680 (Fla.1977). See also Logan v. State, 511 So.2d 442, 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ( ); however, where the state has "opened the door" by eliciting testimony as to part of the conversation, defendant is entitled to cross-examine the witness about other relevant statements made during the conversation. See Morey v. State, 72 Fla. 45, 72 So. 490, 493 (1916) ( ); West v. State, 53 Fla. 77, 43 So. 445, 446 (1907) (); Ackerman v. State, 372 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Smith, J. specially concurring) ( ); Burch v. State 360 So.2d 462 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ( ). Cf. Delap v. State, 440 So.2d 1242, 1247 (Fla.1983) (, )cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264, 104 S.Ct. 3559, 82 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984). See generally, C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 108.1 (2d Ed.1984); 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2113 (Chadbourne Rev.1978).
Recognizing that Guerrero's exculpatory statement retains its hearsay character, see Sundale Assocs., Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 471 So.2d 100, 103, n. 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), we hold that the potential for unfairness mandates the admission of Guerrero's statement. The doctrine of curative admissibility "rests upon the necessity of removing prejudice in the interest of fairness.... and [i]ntroduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under the shield of this doctrine is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence." United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C.Cir.1971); see United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 575-577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844, 108 S.Ct. 137, 98 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987); see also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C.Cir.1986); Mulford v. State, 416 So.2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) ( ); see generally United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 944 (11th Cir.1988); C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 108.1 at 29 (2d Ed.1984). Here, the officer testified as to part of the conversation that occurred during Guerrero's arrest, namely, that he told Guerrero that the car was stolen and he was under arrest. He testified that Guerrero told him his name and that Guerrero was polite and cooperative, but he omitted Guerrero's explanation. That explanation was within the...
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