Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1955
• Docket Number: No. 667,667
• Citation: 85 S.E.2d 596,241 N.C. 448
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Willie GUEST (Employee) v. BRENNER IRON & METAL COMPANY (Employer), and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Carrier).

Page 596

85 S.E.2d 596

241 N.C. 448

Willie GUEST (Employee) v. BRENNER IRON & METAL COMPANY (Employer), and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Carrier).

No. 667

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 4, 1955

William S. Mitchell, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff, appellee.

Smith, Moore, Smith & Pope, Bynum M. Hunter and Stephen P. Millikin, Greensboro, for defendants, appellants.

BOBBITT, Justice.

The specific findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. Defendants, by brief, assert that they do not 'quibble' with the findings of fact set forth in paragraph 4, quoted above.

Specific findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are required. These must cover the crucial questions of fact upon which plaintiff's right to compensation depends. Singleton v. Durham Laundry Co., 213 N.C. 32, 195 S.E. 34; Gowens v. Alamance County, 214 N.C. 18, 197 S.E. 538; Farmer v. Bemis Lumber Co., 217 N.C. 158, 7 S.E.2d 376; Cook v. Bemis Lumber Co., 217 N.C. 161, 7 S.E.2d 378. Otherwise, this Court cannot determine whether an adequate basis exists, either in fact or in law, for the ultimate finding as to whether plaintiff was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Thomason v. Red Bird Cab Co., 235 N.C. 602, 70 S.E.2d 706.

The Commission is not required to make a finding as to each detail of the evidence or as to every inference or shade of meaning to be drawn therefrom. When the specific, crucial findings of fact are made, and the Commission thereupon finds that plaintiff was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, we consider such specific findings of fact, together with every reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom, in plaintiff's favor in determining whether there is a factual basis for such ultimate finding.

'The words 'out of' refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and the words 'in the course of' to the time, place, and circumstances under which it occurred. * * * There must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury; but, if the injury is one which, after the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the employment, it need not be shown that it is one which ought to have been foreseen or expected.' Adams, J., in Conrad v. Cook Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266, 269. This excerpt, often quoted, may be regarded as a statement of the basic principles applicable to compensation cases.

The Act 'should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation', Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 153 S.E. 591, 593; but 'the rule of liberal construction can not be employed to attribute to a provision of the Act a meaning foreign to the plain and unmistakable words in which it is couched', Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760, 762.

'Acts of an employee for the benefit of third persons generally preclude the recovery of compensation for accidental injuries sustained during the performance of such acts, usually on the ground they are not incidental to any service which the employee is obligated to render under his contract of employment, and the injuries therefore cannot be said to arise out of and in the course of the employment. * * * However, where competent proof exists that the employee understood, or had reasonable grounds to believe that the act resulting in injury was incidental to his employment, or such as would prove beneficial to his employer's interests or was encouraged by the employer in the performance of the act or similar acts for the purpose of creating a feeling of good will, or authorized so to do by common practice or custom, compensation may be recovered, since then a causal connection between the employment and the accident may be established. ' Schneider, 7 Workmen's Compensation Text, sec. 1675.

As stated by Larson: 'If the ultimate effect of claimant's helping others is to advance his own employer's work, by removing obstacles to the work or otherwise, it should not matter whether the immediate beneficiary of the helpful activity is a co-employee, an independent contractor, an employee of another employer, or a complete stranger.' 1 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 27.21.

Decisions in other jurisdictions cited by these text writers, some tending to support plaintiff's position and others tending to support defendants' position, disclose factual situations somewhat similar yet different in some material feature from the case now before us. Basically, whether plaintiff's claim is compensable turns upon whether the employee acts for the benefit of his employer to any appreciable extent or whether the employee acts solely for his own benefit or purpose or that of a third person.

Mindful of these well settled principles, we must now apply them to facts substantially different from facts in cases heretofore presented to this Court.

At the request of plaintiff and his fellowemployee, the filling station operator gave permission to use his air hose to inflate the tires. They began but did not finish inflating the first tire.

Just then, a customer, whose car was standing at the gas pump, was unable to start his car; and the filling station operator requested plaintiff to assist in pushing the car off from a standing position so as to get it started and in order to move it on away from the gas pumps. Plaintiff complied with this request. The car was pushed from the filling station premises onto the highway. It had been pushed 50 feet, more or less, along the highway, in an effort to start the motor, when plaintiff was struck and injured by another car approaching from the rear.

Plaintiff and his co-employee were not customers. They asked for and received...