Guest v. Lange

• Decision Date: 02 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 47482–4–II,47482–4–II
• Citation: 195 Wash.App. 330,381 P.3d 130
• Parties: Christopher Guest and Suzanne Guest, husband and wife, Appellants, v. David Lange and Karen Lange, husband and wife, and the marital community comprised thereof, Respondents, Michael Coe and Carol Coe, individually and as husband and wife, and the marital community thereof; and Carol Ann White and John L. White, individually and as husband and wife, and the marital community thereof, Third Party Defendants.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

195 Wash.App. 330

381 P.3d 130

Christopher Guest and Suzanne Guest, husband and wife, Appellants,

v.David Lange and Karen Lange, husband and wife, and the marital community comprised thereof, Respondents,Michael Coe and Carol Coe, individually and as husband and wife, and the marital community thereof; and Carol Ann White and John L. White, individually and as husband and wife, and the marital community thereof, Third Party Defendants.

No. 47482–4–II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

August 2, 2016

Christopher Guest (Appearing Pro Se), Suzanne Guest (Appearing Pro Se), 6833 Main Sail Lane, Gig Harbor, WA, 98335, Counsel for Appellants.

Irene Margret Hecht, Keller Rohrback LLP, 1201 3rd Avenue Suite 3200, Seattle, WA, 98101–3052, Timothy Joseph Farley, Farley & Dimmock LLC, 2012 34th St., Everett, WA, 98201–5014, Betsy A. Gillaspy, Patrick McKenna, Gillaspy & Rhode, PLLC, 821 Kirkland Avenue Suite 200, Kirkland, WA, 98033–6311, Counsel for Respondents.

Worswick

, J.

¶ 1 This case asks us to determine whether filing a supersedeas bond prevents the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens after final judgment in the trial court. The trial court entered judgment against Christopher and Suzanne Guest in a property dispute and accepted the Guests' supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. The trial court then canceled a notice of lis pendens that the Guests had filed on David and Karen Lange's property. The Guests argue that the trial court lacked the authority to cancel the lis pendens because they had filed a supersedeas bond. The Guests further argue that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on certain supersedeas bond-related evidentiary issues.

¶ 2 We agree with the Guests that the trial court lacked authority to cancel the lis pendens. Therefore, we reverse the cancellation of the lis pendens and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶ 3 The Guests and the Langes are neighbors in a development.¹ The original developer recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, restrictions, and reservations (CC&Rs), and a document titled “Patio or Deck Easement” (Easement), both of which documents granted easements for decks. The easement over the Guests' property covered an area of 5 feet by 21 feet for the Langes' deck.

¶ 4 By 2011, the Langes were concerned about the structural integrity of their deck and wanted to rebuild it. They asked the Guests for permission to rebuild the deck in its original footprint, and the Guests refused. Nevertheless, the Langes rebuilt the deck in the same footprint as the original deck.

¶ 5 The Guests filed a complaint alleging various claims, including trespass, and that the Langes had a duty under the CC&Rs to indemnify the Guests for all claims arising from the deck easement.² The Langes counterclaimed to quiet title and answered that the CC&Rs expressly granted each lot an easement to accommodate any encroachment due to, among other things, decks and patios.

¶ 6 Meanwhile, the Guests filed a notice of lis pendens against the Langes' property. The lis pendens provided notice to third parties that the Guests had sued the Langes to quiet title and to enforce the Langes' obligations under the CC&Rs and Easement.

¶ 7 The trial court dismissed several claims on summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on the Guests' claims for trespass and breach of contract and on the Langes' claim to quiet title. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Langes on each claim. On September 19, 2014, the trial court dismissed all of the Guests' claims with prejudice, awarded judgment to the Langes on their claim to quiet title to the deck, and awarded the Langes attorney fees of $565. The Guests filed a Notice of Appeal on October 20.

¶ 8 On February 26, 2015, the Langes filed a motion to cancel the lis pendens. They argued that under RCW 4.28.320

, the trial court had discretion to cancel the lis pendens because the action had been “settled, discontinued, or abated,” and that all of the Guests' claims had been dismissed with prejudice.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2. The Guests opposed this motion, arguing that the action had not been “settled, discontinued or abated” because the Guests intended to file a supersedeas bond under RAP 8.1(b)

with the trial court, which bond would stay enforcement of the Langes' judgement. RCW 4.28.320. Indeed, on March 5, the Guests submitted cashier's checks for $4,000 as supersedeas bonds to stay two orders: the judgment and an order dismissing another party to the case below. It appears that only $1,000 of this total amount was intended to stay the Langes' judgment.

¶ 9 The Langes objected to the amount of the $1,000 supersedeas bond to stay their judgment. They argued that their true damages from a stay of enforcement of their judgment would be at least $215,000. In support of this amount, David Lange declared that the Langes had applied to refinance their home and had applied for a home equity loan after the final judgment in the case and that the bank refused to approve the refinancing or the loan due to the lis pendens. David Lange claimed that refinancing would save the Langes over $134,000 over the life of their loan, that some of the home equity loan would be used to pay off higher interest debt, and that they would incur about $50,000 of attorney costs and fees on appeal. Thus, the Langes argued, the supersedeas bond should be set at $215,000 to properly secure against their losses from a stay of enforcement of the judgment.

¶ 10 The Guests moved for leave to conduct discovery to test the accuracy of David Lange's statements in his declaration supporting the amount of damages from the supersedeas bond. The Guests also moved the trial court to strike hearsay portions of David Lange's declaration regarding statements from the bank.

¶ 11 On March 27, the trial court canceled the notice of lis pendens, finding that the cash supersedeas bonds on file in the amount of $4,000 were adequate to cover the Langes' damages from the judgment being stayed in the absence of the lis pendens.³ The trial court did not rule on the Guests' motion to conduct discovery or to strike portions of David Lange's declaration. The Guests appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The Guests argue that the trial court erred by canceling the lis pendens because after they appealed, filed their supersedeas bond, and stayed enforcement of the judgment, the underlying action was not settled, discontinued, or abated as required for the cancellation of a lis pendens. We agree.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION RULES

¶ 13 We review the decision to cancel a lis pendens for an abuse of discretion. See Beers v. Ross , 137 Wash.App. 566, 575, 154 P.3d 277 (2007)

. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Teter v. Deck , 174 Wash.2d 207, 215, 274 P.3d 336 (2012). Untenable reasons include errors of law. Cook v. Tarbert Logging, Inc. , 190 Wash.App. 448, 461, 360 P.3d 855 (2015), review denied , 185 Wash.2d 1014, 367 P.3d 1083 (2016).

¶ 14 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Flight Options, LLC v. Dep't. of Revenue , 172 Wash.2d 487, 495, 259 P.3d 234 (2011)

. We endeavor to give effect to a statute's plain meaning as the expression of legislative intent. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n , 169 Wash.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). We derive that plain meaning from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the statute's context, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Lake , 169 Wash.2d at 526, 243 P.3d 1283. We may use an ordinary dictionary to discern the meaning of a nontechnical term. Thurston County v. Cooper Point Ass'n , 148 Wash.2d 1, 12, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002)

.

II. LIS PENDENS STATUTE

¶ 15 A “lis pendens” is an “instrument having the effect of clouding the title to real property.” RCW 4.28.328(1)(a)

. Either party to an action affecting title to real property, or a receiver of the real property, may file a notice of lis pendens with the county auditor. RCW 4.28.320. This filing is constructive notice to third parties that the title may be clouded. RCW 4.28.32 0. “In Washington, lis pendens is ‘procedural only; it does not create substantive rights in the person recording the notice.’ ” Beers , 137 Wash.App. at 575, 154 P.3d 277 (quoting Dunham v. Tabb , 27 Wash.App. 862, 866, 621 P.2d 179 (1980) ).

¶ 16 RCW 4.28.320

governs when a court may cancel a notice of lis pendens. It provides that

the court in which the said action was commenced may, at its discretion, at any time after the action shall be settled, discontinued or abated, on application of any person aggrieved and on good cause shown and on such notice as shall be directed or approved by the court, order the notice authorized in this section to be canceled.

Thus, the statute sets forth three conditions that must be met for the court to cancel a lis pendens: (1) the action must be settled, discontinued, or abated; (2) an aggrieved person must move to cancel the lis pendens, and (3) the aggrieved person must show good cause and provide proper notice. RCW 4.28.320

. If those conditions are met, the statute provides the court discretion to cancel the lis pendens.

III. ACTION WAS NOT SETTLED, DISCONTINUED, OR ABATED

¶ 17 Whether the filing of a supersedeas bond deprives the trial court of authority to cancel a lis pendens under RCW 4.28.320

because the action is not settled, discontinued, or abated is an issue of first impression in Washington. We hold that under RCW 4.28.320

, an action is not settled, discontinued, or abated when a supersedeas bond has been properly filed.

¶ 18 RCW 4.28.320

does not define the terms “settled,” “discontinued,” or “abated.” Thus, we first turn to ordinary dictionaries to elucidate the meanings of these words. Cooper Point Ass'n , 148 Wash.2d at 12, 57 P.3d 1156. Webster's Dictionary defines “settled”...