Guglietti v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

• Decision Date: 08 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-1281,89-1281
• Citation: Guglietti v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 900 F.2d 397 (1st Cir. 1989)
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15325A Frances GUGLIETTI, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 397

900 F.2d 397

29 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 297, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15325A

Frances GUGLIETTI, Plaintiff, Appellee, v.SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 89-1281.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Dec. 8, 1989.

Decided March 28, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 23, 1990.

Robert M. Peckrill, Asst. Regional Counsel, Dept. of Health and Human Services, with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U.S. Atty and Everett G. Sammartino, Asst. U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.

John W. Dineen with whom David B. Green, Providence, R.I., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.

Before BREYER, TORRUELLA and SELYA, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) asseverates that a fee award entered in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d), was improvident.We are persuaded that the Secretary is correct and therefore reverse.

I

Plaintiff-appelleeFrances Guglietti received Social Security disability benefits from and after April 1978.The Secretary subsequently concluded that appellee was no longer disabled and, in October 1980, stopped paying her.Guglietti invoked her right of review under the Social Security Act.In succession, a departmental administrative law judge (ALJ), the Secretary's Appeals Council, and the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island(Boyle, Chief Judge), acting under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), upheld the Secretary's determination.¹Plaintiff appealed to this court.

While Guglietti's appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (Reform Act), Pub.L. 98-460,98 Stat. 1794(1984).Section 2(d)(2)(C) thereof required that all cases undergoing judicial review as at September 19, 1984, in which the Secretary had terminated benefits, be returned to the Secretary for reevaluation and reconsideration in accordance with new "medical improvement" standards set forth in the Reform Act.Id., 98 Stat.at 1797.Guglietti's case--unarguably a disability-termination case within the Reform Act's purview--was remanded.

Following a reevaluation of plaintiff's condition at the administrative level, the Secretary applied the neoteric standards, ruled that the requisite "medical improvement" was not evident, and reinstated benefits.Plaintiff thereupon returned to district court and filed a timely motion for counsel fees under EAJA.A different district judge heard and allowed the application.This appeal ensued.

II

The EAJA, with exceptions not here relevant, provides in material part that:

[A]court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, ... incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A).To be entitled to an award of fees, a litigant must fulfill several conditions.First and foremost, she must be a "prevailing party" within the statute's contemplation.In that connection, EAJA's reference to prevailing party status must be read consistently with the phrase's usage in other federal fee-shifting statutes.SeeMcDonald v. Secretary of HHS, 884 F.2d 1468, 1474(1st Cir.1989);Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 720(8th Cir.1984);see alsoTexas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1489, 103 L.Ed.2d 866(1989);Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 n. 7, 76 L.Ed.2d 40(1983).

In focusing the lens of inquiry, we look to isolate some "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute."Texas Teachers, 109 S.Ct. at 1493.Moreover, in order to constitute a litigant as "prevailing," the legal relationship must be altered in one of two ways: the party either must have enjoyed some bottom-line litigatory success or her suit must have had a catalytic effect in bringing about a desired result.Bearing those principles in mind, we first inspect how the prevailment question was handled below.We then explore the two paths which have traditionally led to prevailing party status, relating them to the case at bar.Finally, we discuss a line of authority suggesting that a somewhat different avenue may be open to plaintiff.

A.Proceedings Below.

In this instance, the district court ruled that plaintiff satisfied the prevailing party prong of the EAJA test.Ordinarily, we would view that determination through a deferential glass.SeeMcDonald, 884 F.2d at 1474;see alsoPierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2546-49, 101 L.Ed.2d 490(1988)(abuse of discretion standard used in reviewing district court's determination of whether government's position "substantially justified" for EAJA purposes).Be that as it may, a peculiar concatenation of circumstances requires that we withhold deference here.

When first filed, the EAJA application in question was referred to the magistrate.He treated the matter of plaintiff's status summarily, stating only: "It does appear as though plaintiff prevailed since her benefits were reinstated upon reexamination of her position."The magistrate cited no cases and offered no further explication.The Secretary objected to the magistrate's report on several grounds, the first of which asserted that plaintiff was "not a 'prevailing party' within the meaning of EAJA."The Secretary's supporting memorandum amplified that thesis at some length.

Notwithstanding, the district court took the issue as conceded.²The court was wrong: the Secretary had objected on that precise basis and developed the argumentation necessary to support the assigned error.When the trial court, in making a judgment call, obviously misapprehends the record, an appellate tribunal ought not to defer to the trial court's determination.See, e.g., Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 43-44(1st Cir.1988)("substantial deference" normally accorded to district court's view is nullified when court fails to make specific findings)(discussingFed.R.Civ.P. 54(b));see alsoQuaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 n. 5(1st Cir.1989)(where magistrate's reasoning unexplained and ensuing order "cryptic," reviewing court need not grant full 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(A) deference, but may "discount" the magistrate's conclusion).That principle is plainly apposite in this case.

Having exposed the error and sidetracked the occasion for deference, we could, of course, remand for further consideration below.But, neither side has urged us to follow that course; in this instance, the subsidiary "prevailment" facts are not legitimately in dispute, making the prevailing party question largely one of law; and the district judge, who had not heard the underlying disability-termination case, enjoys no special familiarity with the matter's provenance.Under these rather uncommon circumstances, we believe the issue is better decided here and now.Cf., e.g., M.O.N.T. Boat Rental Service, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 613 F.2d 576, 581(5th Cir.1980)(no need to remand where good understanding of claim obtainable without further factfinding);Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 289 n. 2(1st Cir.1973)(no need to remand for purpose of setting forth findings where parties not misled as to basic issue);Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939, 947(9th Cir.1956)(no need to remand where record as a whole presents no genuine issue of material fact);Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810, 816-17(6th Cir.1954)(similar), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930, 75 S.Ct. 772, 99 L.Ed. 1260(1955).We write, therefore, upon a pristine page.

B. Litigatory Success.

In the more typical case, prevailing party status is conferred because a party has succeeded on a "significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit ... sought in bringing suit."Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79(1st Cir.1978).³See alsoTexas Teachers, 109 S.Ct. at 1491;Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939;Stefan v. Laurenitis, 889 F.2d 363, 369(1st Cir.1989);Coalition for Basic Needs v. King, 691 F.2d 597, 599(1st Cir.1982).This test, sometimes called the "merits" test, Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 50(1st Cir.1986), "states the obvious, namely, that a party has prevailed if [she] wins the litigation."Coalition for Basic Needs, 691 F.2d at 599.We do not think that this lane is open to Guglietti: the mere obtaining of a remand directed by Congress is not reflective of success on any issue in plaintiff's suit.The law is settled that a remand, even if won rather than donated, "lacks both the degree of finality and the causal connection to merits relief necessary to engage the gears of the EAJA."Vascera v. Heckler, 624 F.Supp. 1198, 1202(D.R.I.1986).AccordCook v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 240, 241(8th Cir.1984);Brown v. Secretary of HHS, 747 F.2d 878, 881-83(3d Cir.1984);McGill v. Secretary of HHS, 712 F.2d 28, 31-32(2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1420, 79 L.Ed.2d 745(1984).

Moreover, the post-remand benefits which Guglietti ultimately received did not result from a by-the-numbers review of the issues raised in her complaint.Rather, reinstatement of benefits came about because of changes in the legal landscape and, perhaps, in the albedo of updated, newly received medical information about plaintiff's condition.⁴Certainly, the mere temporal coincidence between passage of the Reform Act and the pendency...