Guhl v. Guhl

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MURPHY
• Citation: Guhl v. Guhl, 376 Ill. 100, 33 N.E.2d 185 (Ill. 1941)
• Decision Date: 08 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 25974.,25974.
• Parties: GUHL et al. v. GUHL.

376 Ill. 100

33 N.E.2d 185

GUHL et al.

v.GUHL.

No. 25974.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 18, 1941.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1941.

Suit by Chester Guhl and another against Etta Hatfield Guhl for the construction of an ante-nuptial agreement executed by defendant and plaintiffs' testator to restrain defendant from waste and to compel her to pay taxes, wherein the defendant filed a counterclaim asking for a partition of real estate, which proceedings were consolidated with an appeal by plaintiffs as executors from the allowance of the widow's award. From decree rendered, the plaintiffs appeal.

Decree reversed and cause remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with opinion.Appeal from Circuit Court, Stephenson County; Harry E. Wheat, judge.

Franklin J. Stransky, of Savanna, and Robert P. Eckert, Jr., of Freeport, for appellants.

Manus & Manus and Burrell & Burrell, all of Freeport (Albert H. Manus, of Freeport, of counsel), for appellee.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Stephenson county entered in a cause where an original action in equity and an appeal case from the county court were consolidated and disposed of by one decree. Appellants are the sons of Christian Guhl, deceased, and appellee is the widow. The real estate and personal property owned at the time of Christian Guhl's death furnishes the subject matter of the litigation and the controversy is as to the rights of the respective parties in the property as they are affected by the will of deceased and an ante-nuptial agreement executed by him and appellee.

Deceased and appellee, aged sixty-eight and sixty-one, respectively, were married February 15, 1934. Each of them had children by prior marriages. He was a resident of Freeport, in this State and she resided in Darlington, Wisconsin. Nine days previous to the marriage the agreement in question was executed. It stated that the marriage of the parties was contemplated and in view of the fact that the marriage would change the domicile and the rights of one in the property of the other and ‘that the property of each would become subject to dower, curtesy, homestead and widow's award rights of each in the other's property’ and that whereas, each desired ‘that the property of each shall ultimately become the property of and descend to the respective child or children of the parties hereto as the same would in the event that said marriage was not solemnized,’ therefore they agree ‘That after said marriage shall be consummated, the party of the first part shall reserve, have and retain the sole and exclusive right, title and interest in and the control and disposition of, during his lifetime, all of his personal property owned by him at the time of the marriage and at any time thereafter acquired; all real estate at the time of the marriage or any time thereafter owned and acquired by him shall be retained by him during his lifetime (unless disposed of during his lifetime by the lawful conveyance of both parties.) In case the first party shall predecease the second party the second party shall have the use, income and enjoyment of all of the property, real, personal and mixed, wheresoever situated, belonging to the first party, excepting, however, and excluding the bakery building and equipment located on West Pleasant street in the city of Freeport, Stephenson county, Illinois, and being operated and known as the Guhl Baking Company, for and during her natural life. And at the death of the second party all of said property, real, personal and mixed, of the first party shall descend to the heirs of the party of the first part as he may bequeath and devise or as the law of descent provides, as the case may be. Upon the death of the party of the second part, either before or after the death of the party of the first part, all of her property, real, personal and mixed, and wheresoever situated, shall immediately descend to her legatees, devisees or her legal heirs according to the law of descent of the State of Wisconsin, as the case may then be.’

October 17, following the marriage, Christian Guhl executed a will, in which he directed the payment of his debts and then devised and bequeathed to his four sons ‘The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wheresoever situate, equally share and share alike.’ Appellee was not named as a beneficiary in the will. Christian Guhl died January 2, 1938, and the will was admitted to probate January 15, and letters testamentary issued to two of the appellants on the same day. January 12, 1939, appellee filed a renunciation of all provisions of the will and elected to take in lieu a one-third of the real estate and personal property to which she was entitled ‘as the widow of said deceased under the laws of the State of Illinois.’

In April, 1938, appellee filed a petition in the county court for the appointment of appraisers to fix her award. Two of the appellants, as executors of the will, resisted the petition on the ground that the right to an award was waived by the ante-nuptial agreement. Appraisers were appointed, the award fixed at $575 and the appraisable personal property valued at $6,144.31. Appellee petitioned for an increase. The executors objected to the allowance of any award. The court approved the action of the appraisers and the executors appealed from such order to the circuit court. In that court the appeal case was consolidated with the original cause.

For an understanding of the controverted issues it is necessary to make reference to the pleadings of the original action. The decision of those issue will dispose of the appeal action.

Appellants' first complaint was filed June 14, 1939. Later an amended complaint was filed and by it the appellants recognized the ante-nuptial agreement as being in full force and effect and alleged that appellee had a life estate in the real estate and that they, by virtue of the will, owned the remainder subject to said life estate. Appellee's renunciation and her claim for widow's award were pleaded. It was alleged that upon the death of Christian Guhl appellee had taken possession of the household goods and automobile and had continued in possession of all the real estate, except the bakery property, collected the income therefrom and was committing waste by non-payment of taxes and failure to make repairs. It was alleged the property which she had taken possession of constituted all the property owned by Christian Guhl at the time of his death, excepting certain bonds and bank deposits which were being held in the estate pending the ascertainment of the indebtedness of the estate, and that appellee would be deprived of the income, use and enjoyment of the same until the amount of said indebtedness had been fixed and paid. They asked for a construction of the ante-nuptial agreement and that it be construed to bar all rights of appellee in the property of Christian Guhl except as to the life estate given under the ante-nuptial agreement; that appellee be ordered to pay the taxes and in the event of her failure so to do, a receiver be appointed to collect the rents and use such part as was necessary in the payment of taxes and in making the necessary repairs. They also prayed that appellee be enjoined from committing waste.

Appellee's motion to strike the amended complaint alleged the ante-nuptial agreement was unenforceable and void. It did not assign any reasons for such conclusion. It was also alleged appellants had failed to allege performance of all conditions precedent and claimed that, under the agreement, she was entitled to the possession of all the property. The motion was overruled and appellee filed an answer setting up alternative defenses. By the first alternative she admitted the execution of the ante-nuptial agreement, the existence of the will and its probate, that she was in possession of the real estate and that she had collected the rents. She alleged the value of the real estate to be in excess of $30,000. She denied failure to make repairs, admitted the non-payment of taxes and asked that she be excused on the ground that the income was insufficient to support her and meet the tax obligations. She pleaded the agreement did not bar her dower and homestead and that the indebtedness of the estate should be paid from the bakery property. By the other alternative defense she pleaded that the agreement was void and of no force for one or more of five reasons. The first and fifth reasons did not challenge the validity of the agreement, but, in fact, recognized it by setting up facts which would require a construction. By the first it was claimed the agreement did not bar dower, homestead or widow's award and by the fifth that she had not been paid her award and had been deprived of the use and income of the government bonds, loan deposits, cash in bank and the bakery property and that one of the appellants who occupied one of the houses had not paid any rent since June 15, 1939. The second, third and fourth assignments referred to matters which it is claimed invalidated the agreement. The contents of such assignments will be given later.

July 1, 1939, appellee filed a counterclaim in which she alleged the execution and probate of the will, her renunciation of the same, and claimed that by virtue thereof she was entitled to an undivided one-third in fee of the real estate, that the appellants each had an undivided one-sixth, all of which were subject to her homestead rights. No reference was made to the ante-nuptial agreement or a disposition of any of the personal property. The prayer was for partition of the real estate. Appellants answered, admitting many of the uncontroverted facts pleaded but denied appellee had any fee or homestead rights in the premises and alleged that she had no interest other than what was given her by the ante-nuptial agreement.

After a hearing of evidence the chancellor dismissed appe...