Guhl v. M. E. M. Corp.

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HALL
• Citation: Guhl v. M. E. M. Corp., 249 S.E.2d 42, 242 Ga. 354 (Ga. 1978)
• Decision Date: 04 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 33409,33409
• Parties: GUHL et al. v. M. E. M. CORPORATION.

Page 42

249 S.E.2d 42

242 Ga. 354

GUHL et al. v. M. E. M. CORPORATION.

No. 33409.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued April 10, 1978.

Decided Oct. 4, 1978.

Wendell K. Willard, Decatur, for appellants.

Dillard & Shearer, Carl E. Westmoreland, Jr., G. Douglas Dillard, Atlanta, for appellee.

George P. Dillard, Gail C. Flake, Decatur, amicus curiae.

HALL, Justice.

This appeal concerns the reasonableness of the zoning classification of certain DeKalb County land at the northwest intersection of Redan Road and South Indian Creek Road.

M. E. M. Corporation, a leaseholder in the subject land, sought to have it rezoned from R-75 (single family residential) to C-1 (commercial). The DeKalb County Board of Commissioners denied the rezoning. M. E. M. Corporation then brought an action in superior court for a judgment declaring the subject zoning unconstitutional and requiring rezoning. After extensive testimony had been presented on both sides, the issue of the reasonableness of the R-75 zoning was submitted to the jury, who were unable to reach an agreement. M. E. M. Corporation's subsequent motion for judgment striking the zoning notwithstanding the mistrial was granted on June 28, 1977. The county's new trial motion was denied, and it brings this appeal.

The issue is whether the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the mistrial to M. E. M. Corporation was error for the reason that there was a conflict in the evidence concerning the reasonableness of the R-75 zoning, requiring a jury verdict to decide this material question of fact. See, e. g. Williams v. Swint, 239 Ga. 66, 236 S.E.2d 489 (1977).

On this appeal, M. E. M. Corporation argues in support of the trial court's action that there was no testimony whatsoever at the trial that the present zoning was proper and that all witnesses testified that it should be changed. We cannot agree with this assertion. Whether or not there was any burden on the county to show reasonableness, our reading of the transcript shows that witnesses Coleman (DeKalb County Zoning Analyst), Bragdon (Professor of City Planning and president of a local civic association) and Nelson (Planning Director, DeKalb) all testified to the reasonableness of the present zoning. There was other testimony that the present zoning did not allow reasonable use of the land, making a fact issue for the jury. Accordingly, the grant of judgment notwithstanding the mistrial for M. E. M. Corporation was error. Williams v. Swint, supra. The county is entitled to a new trial on the issue of reasonableness.

When the "reasonableness" of zoning classification is questioned, it is a special kind of "reasonableness" constitutional reasonableness that must be decided. We do not ask whether another zoning classification might be more logically and economically "reasonable" or...