Guichard v. Louisiana
| Decision Date | 06 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-535 |
| Parties | STACEY GUICHARD, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before this Court are motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec. Docs. 49-52; 59;62). Movants, The Honorable Chief Judge Ernestine Gray, Honorable Judge Lawrence Lagarde, Jr., Honorable Judge Tammy Stewart, Honorable Judge Tracey Fleming-Davillier, Honorable Judge Candice Bates Anderson, Honorable Judge Mark Doherty, and Former Chief Judge David Bell (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Judges"), the State of Louisiana ("State"), the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court ("OPJC"), the City of New Orleans ("City"), and Pernell Denet ("Denet") have filed these motions in response to a complaint filed by Plaintiff, Stacey Guichard ("Guichard"). (Rec. Doc. 11). Having considered Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants' Motions, the parties' memoranda, and applicable law, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the following reasons.
Guichard held the position of Orleans Parish Juvenile Court Clerk of Court until her resignation in January 2011. Id. at 10. She claims that both the City and OPJC were her employers.Id. at 8-10. Guichard alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment by Judge Bell from November, 2008 to January 2010, during which time he made lewd sexual comments and solicited sex.2 Id at 16; 25-30. Guichard alleges that in late August or early September 2009, she filed an anonymous complaint with the Metropolitan Crime Commission ("MCC") against Judge Bell, and on September 13, 2009, filed a second complaint against Bell with the MCC, this time including her name. Id. at 29. In November 2009, Guichard met with John Humphries from the MCC to discuss her claim. Id. at 30.
In January 2010 Judge Bell went on medical leave and was replaced as Chief Judge of the OPJC by Judge Gray. Id. Sometime in March 2010, Judge Gray approached Guichard and asked if she had ever been subjected to sexual harassment by Judge Bell to which Guichard responded "yes." Id. at 32. In May 2010, Judges Gray, Bell, Lagarde, Flemings-Davillier, and Stewart, interviewed Guichard for the position of Judicial Administrator at the OPJC. Id. at 36. That same day Guichard received an email indicating she was not selected for the position. Id. On May 28, 2010, Guichard testified before the Judiciary Commission against Judge Bell, alleging sexual harassment. Id. at 36. On May 31, 2010, Guichard filed a grievance against Judge Bell with Judge Gray, alleging that Judge Bell was harassing, intimidating, and "scheming to retaliate against her" for her previous testimony against him.3 Id. at 37. On June 1, 2010, Guichard filed a complaint against Judge Bell with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at 38.
On June 7, 2010, a new Judicial Administrator, Denet, was hired to the OPJC. Id. at 39. Over the next several months, Guichard developed a poor working relationship with Judge Gray and Denet. Id. at 39-46. On September 22, 2010, Guichard filed an anonymous complaint with the Judiciary Commission against Judge Gray, alleging hostile work conditions. Id. at 44. On October 18, 2010, Guichard added Judge Gray to her EEOC complaint against Judge Bell, alleging that Judge Gray was retaliating against her for filing her initial EEOC complaint in which she named Judge Bell, the City, and the OPJC. Id. at 46. Guichard alleged that the workplace environment under Judge Gray was "even more hostile [and] stressful [than under Judge Bell]" and that she believed that this harassment from Judge Gray "was orchestrated to compel [her] to quit." Id. at 46.
On October 25, 2010, Guichard claims she received a letter from the Judiciary Commission stating that her complaint against Judge Gray did not allege actionable misconduct. Id. at 47. Guichard claims that shortly thereafter, the "tone" of all the Judges towards her "hardened," and that her emails went unanswered, she was excluded from meetings she had previously regularly attended, she was not directly consulted in matters normally pertaining to her, she was called out for an allegedly insignificant typographical error, and was denied requests for assistance with her work tasks. Id. at 47-51. On December 8, 2010, Guichard alleges that Judge Gray announced that her attire was inappropriate. Id. at 51. That same day, Denet generated an "employee warning notice" to Guichard. Id. Shortly thereafter, Guichard submitted her letter of resignation. Id. at 52.
Guichard brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and state discrimination and tort law. Id. at 2. Guichard seeks compensatory, special, and punitive damages allegedly resulting from: (1) sexual harassment by Judge Bell at the OPJC ; 2) retaliation by Judge Bell with the support of the other Judges for testifying against him before theJudiciary Commission by being denied consideration for the Judicial Administrator position; (3) retaliation for adding Judge Gray's name to her EEOC complaint against Judge Bell for which she was subjected to intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), harassment, and fear of loss of livelihood; (3) IIED and harassment from Judicial Administrator Pernell Denet ("Denet"); and (4) retaliatory actions taken by OPJC through all of its sitting judges acting in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 2-3. Allegedly, these actions culminated in Guichard being compelled to resign. Id. at 4. Guichard claims that the OPJC is directly liable for the actions and results she complains of due to its policies, practices, procedures, and customs, as well as its responsibility for hiring, training, supervising, and controlling the OPJC personnel. Id. 4. Guichard further claims that the City of New Orleans, which allegedly was her employer at all relevant times, is liable for the acts and omissions complained of due to the nexus between OPJC's policies, customs, and practices and those of the City, which govern OPJC employee salaries, benefits, and grievances. Id. at 5. Griffith also claims that the State is directly liable for the acts complained of because it is responsible for the training, supervision, discipline, and control of OPJC personnel. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint in whole or in part where the plaintiff has failed "to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d. 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Although courts are required to take as true all factual allegations in the complaint, they are not bound to accept labels, conclusions, or formulaic recitationof the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993).
To defeat a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery" or "contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that the evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Therefore, a plaintiff must "plead specific facts not mere conclusory allegations" to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 178, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
This case involves voluminous and convoluted materials submitted by the parties, including a seventy-page amended complaint and over two-hundred of pages of subsequent memoranda. In an effort to winnow this unwieldy entanglement, certain parties and claims are dismissed outright:
A. Claims Against the State of Louisiana
The law of sovereign immunity, derived from the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution and considerations of federalism, bars all individuals from suing a state for money damages in federal court. Frew ex. rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 432, 437 (2004); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Ussrey v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1998). Stateofficials may enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when they are sued in their official capacities. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Congress may, however, abrogate a State's sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if congressional intent to abrogate is expressed unequivocally and Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its power. Ussrey, 150 F.3d at 434. In addition, states may waive their sovereign immunity. Id.
Congress has not abrogated the States' sovereign immunity for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Inyo Couny, Cal. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 709 (2003); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979); Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Furthermore, the State of Louisiana...
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