Guidi v. State

• Decision Date: 23 October 1953
• Citation: 262 P.2d 3,41 Cal.2d 623
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: GUIDI v. STATE et al. S. F. 18818.

Page 3

262 P.2d 3

41 Cal.2d 623

GUIDI v. STATE et al.

S. F. 18818.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Oct. 23, 1953.

Remington Low, Clarence B. Knight and Sidney F. DeGoff, San Francisco, for appellant.

Dana, Bledsoe & Smith and Joseph W. Rogers, Jr., San Francisco, for respondents.

TRAYNOR, Justice.

Plaintiff Gino Guidi brought this action against the State of California, the State Agricultural Society, and several individual defendants, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained at the state fairgrounds in Sacramento. The trial court granted the motion of the state and the society for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the state fair is operated in the state's governmental capacity and that the state and society are therefore immune from suit. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment in favor of the state and the society. ¹ We have concluded that the defense of governmental immunity from liability for tort is not available to the state and the society, and that the judgment must therefore be reversed.

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint: Defendant State Agricultural Society plans, holds, and controls the state fair at Sacramento. At all relevant times, defendant Golden State Fire Works Company was the servant, agent, and employee of defendant State of California, and defendant Douglas Robb was the servant, agent, and employee of defendants L. D. Lockwood and Jane Doe Lockwood. On September 3, 1950, plaintiff paid for his admission to the state fair and entered the fairgrounds. The accident occurred while he was standing near the entrance to the horse show arena. In his first cause of action, he alleges that defendants State of California, State Agricultural Society, and Golden State Fire Works Company 'so carelessly and negligently controlled, operated, supervised and maintained the said Fairgrounds and the fire works exhibition at said Fair' that a certain horse, 'Murietta Surprise,' owned by defendants L. D. Lockwood and Jane Doe Lockwood, 'became frightened and was caused to, an it did, run into, knock down and trample the plaintiff,' causing severe personal injuries. The second cause of action follows the allegations of the first cause of action, and alleges in addition that defendants State of California and State Agricultural Society 'carelessly and negligently failed to maintain the safeguards to protect the public, including the plaintiff, from the animals stabled, exercised, led and ridden' in the vicinity of the horse arena, so that 'Murietta Surprise' was permitted and allowed to knock down and trample plaintiff. The third cause of action follows the allegations of the first cause of action, and alleges in addition that defendants L. D. Lockwood, Jane Doe Lockwood, and Douglas Robb 'so carelessly and negligently controlled and maintained' the horse that it became frightened and was caused and permitted to run into and trample plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged compliance with the claim statute. Gov.Code, § 16044.

The state and its instrumentalities and subdivisions are not immune from liability for torts committed while engaged in proprietary or business activities. Gov.Code, § 16041; People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 761-762, 178 P.2d 1; Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 Cal.App.2d 489, 502, 189 P.2d 305. In the present case, it appears from the complaint that one or both of two activities conducted by the state or its agents led to plaintiff's injuries: the exhibition of fireworks and the maintenance of the horse arena. The only question to be determined on this appeal is whether as a matter of law such activities are governmental.

Defendants contend that the state fair is organized and operated solely to interest and educate the general public in agricultural and industrial subjects, a governmental activity, and that the maintenance of the horse arena and exhibition of the fireworks are likewise governmental activities since they are connected with the operation of the fair. Governmental immunity, however, turns on the nature of the particular activity that leads to the plaintiff's injury, not on the identity of the governmental subdivision or agency carrying on the activity, or on the fact that the facility in question may also be used for governmental purposes. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 488, 163 P. 670, L.R.A.1917E, 685; Rhodes v. City of Palo Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336, 341, 223 P.2d 639; Boothby v. Town of Yreka City, 117 Cal.App. 643, 651, 4 P.2d 589; Bertiz v. City of Los Angeles, 74 Cal.App. 792, 797, 241 P. 921. Thus, in People v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754, 178 P.2d 1, we held that the State Belt Railroad was operated by the State Harbor Commission in a proprietary capacity, although that agency prevented and extinguished fires on the waterfront in its governmental capacity. 29 Cal.2d at page 760, 178 P.2d at page 4. Similarly, in the present case we are not concerned with the possible immunity of the state from liability for negligence in connection with agricultural and educational activities at the state fair, but only with its claim of immunity for negligence in the course of setting off fireworks and maintaining the horse arena.

Most of the decisions relied upon by defendants are factually dissimilar to the present case. Two decisions, however, require discussion. In Melvin v. State, 1898, 121 Cal. 16, 53 P. 416, a spectator at a horse race at the state fair in Sacramento was injured by the collapse of the grandstand owing to the negligent maintenance thereof by the State Agricultural Society. It was held that plaintiff could not bring an action against the state. The accident took place, however, in 1891, two years before the passage of the consent statute relied upon by plaintiff in the present case. Stats.1893, p. 57; now Gov.Code, § 16041. Since it had previously been held that the consent statute was not retroactive, Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 693, 38 P. 457 the Melvin decision did not decide whether an action could be maintained thereunder, People v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754, 759, 178 P.2d 1; Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 257 P.2d 22, and, accordingly, is not controlling here. Defendant also relies on Dillwood v. Riecks, 1919, 42 Cal.App. 602, 184 P. 35. There, plaintiff's horse was destroyed by...