Guidry v. Allstate Fire Cas. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 March 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-6660 SECTION "R" (4)
• Parties: RONALD C. GUIDRY, SR., ET AL. v. ALLSTATE FIRE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

RONALD C. GUIDRY, SR., ET AL. v. ALLSTATE FIRE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-6660 SECTION "R" (4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

March 1, 2019

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss five of the nine claims asserted by plaintiffs.¹ The Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for retaliation, unfair trade, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract. These claims are dismissed with prejudice, except for plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, which is dismissed without prejudice. The Court finds that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a claim for conversion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of defendant Allstate Fire Casualty Insurance Company's alleged termination of plaintiff Ronald C. Guidry's employment.²Guidry and plaintiff Ronald C. Guidry, Sr., Agency Corporation (the Guidry Agency) allege that on December 1, 2000 they entered into an Exclusive Agency Agreement with Allstate.³ The agreement was between Allstate and the Guidry Agency, and executed by Guidry on behalf of the Agency.⁴ Guidry is named in the agreement as a "Key Person."⁵ The agreement authorized the Guidry Agency to receive and accept applications for Allstate insurance coverage in Louisiana.⁶ The agreement further authorized the Guidry Agency to sell Allstate insurance products on Allstate's behalf.⁷

In April 2009, Guidry was allegedly diagnosed with prostate cancer.⁸ He alleges that he underwent prostate surgery on October 8, 2009.⁹ Plaintiffs also allege that as a result of Guidry's medical condition and surgery, he has been "plagued with a myriad of symptoms including frequent urination," which "requires him to leave his desk multiple times throughoutthe day to relieve himself."¹⁰ On October 31, 2017, defendant Eric Stone, Guidry's "territorial sales leader,"¹¹ notified Guidry via letter that the agency agreement was to be terminated, effective January 31, 2018.¹² In the letter, Stone states that Allstate was taking this action "for reasons that include lack of office availability."¹³ Plaintiffs contest the factual basis of Allstate's alleged explanation for his termination.¹⁴ Plaintiffs assert that Guidry maintained office hours beyond the 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. hours that are required of Allstate's agents.¹⁵ Allstate allegedly refused to provide any additional information regarding its finding that Guidry's "lack of office availability" justified his termination.¹⁶ On December 4, 2017, Guidry filed a formal grievance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).¹⁷

Upon Guidry's termination, the Guidry Agency was allegedly given the opportunity to either accept a termination payment from Allstate or sell its economic interest in its book of business to a buyer that was to bepreapproved by Allstate.¹⁸ In addition, the Guidry Agency was told that it could sell any insurance policies it may own, or retain them and receive the commission on the retained policies after the agency agreement was terminated.¹⁹ Guidry allegedly "opted to retain" the insurance policies he owned.²⁰ In January 2018, prior to his termination date, Guidry allegedly attempted to sell his book of business to another insurance agent that Stone had "previously approved."²¹ Guidry's request was allegedly denied.²² Finally, the policies that Guidry had intended to maintain were allegedly transferred to other Allstate agents without his authorization.²³ Plaintiffs have accordingly not received any of the commissions allegedly due to them under the policies they intended to retain.²⁴

On February 21, 2018, the EEOC issued Guidry a Notice of Right to Sue.²⁵ Plaintiffs then timely filed this lawsuit in state court on May 18, 2018, against Allstate, Stone, and Eric Caminita, Guidry's sales manager who wasappointed by Stone.²⁶ Plaintiffs initially asserted claims for (1) discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (3) derivation of civil rights and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (5) retaliation; (6) breach of contract; (7) unfair trade practices; and (8) tortious interference with contract.²⁷ On September 13, 2018, plaintiffs filed a supplemental and amended complaint adding a claim for conversion.²⁸ Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.²⁹ On October 10, 2018, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for retaliation, breach of contract, unfair trade, tortious interference with contract, and conversion.³⁰ Defendants have not moved to dismiss the other four claims.³¹

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).

A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a "sheer possibility" that the plaintiff's claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each element of the plaintiff's claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257. The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or if it isapparent from the face of the complaint that there is an insuperable bar to relief, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Retaliation

Plaintiffs do not specify in their complaint whether they bring their retaliation claim under state or federal law.³² In plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs cite law relevant only to a retaliation claim under Title VII.³³ But plaintiffs' freestanding retaliation claim in their complaint could also encompass claims under the ADA, the Louisiana employment discrimination statute, and the Louisiana whistleblower statute. The Court will thus address whether plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim for retaliation under any of these statutes.

First, to the extent the complaint states a claim for retaliation on behalf of both plaintiffs, that claim fails as to the Guidry Agency because the Agency is not an "individual" that can sue for retaliation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f) (explaining that Title VII's protections extend only to "employees," which are defined as "individual[s] employed by an employer").

Guidry's retaliation claim also fails because any of the statutes under which his claim could be cognizable do not recognize a cause of action if the plaintiff is an independent contractor, rather than an employee. See id.; Craft-Palmer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 903, 1998 WL 612388, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 27, 1998) (insurance agent designated as independent contractor could not state a claim for retaliation under Title VII); Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 227 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (viewing the employer/employee analysis as interchangeable between Title VII and the ADA because of the "substantial overlap in the analytical framework among the employment discrimination statutes"); Montgomery v. Lobman, Carnahan, Batt & Angelle, 729 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1999) (noting that Louisiana courts consider federal interpretations of Title VII when determining whether an individual is an "employee" under the state employment discrimination statute); Delahoussaye v. Livingston Parish, Louisiana, No. 12-481, 2014 WL 4538074, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 11, 2014) (finding that an independent contractor could not state a claim under the Louisiana whistleblower statute).

In determining whether an employment relationship exists, the Fifth Circuit applies a "hybrid economic realities/common law control test." Deal v. State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 5 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1993).³⁴ The most important component of this analysis is whether the employer had the "right to control the employee's conduct." Id. at 119. Whether an employer had this requisite control turns on "whether the alleged employer ha[d] the right to hire and fire the employee, the right to supervise the employee, and the right to set the employee's work schedule." Id. The "economic realities component" of the analysis focuses on "whether the alleged employer paid the employee's salary, withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment." Id.

Here, the agency agreement explicitly stated that the relationship between Allstate and the Guidry Agency—and thus the Agency's members—was "that of an independent contractor," not an employer/employee relationship.³⁵ The agreement further provided that the Guidry Agency had

sole and exclusive control over its labor and employee relations policies, and its policies relating to wages, hours, and workingconditions of its employees. [The Guidry Agency] has the sole and exclusive right to hire, transfer suspend, lay off recall promote, assign, discipline, and discharge its employees.³⁶

This contractual relationship is nearly identical to the facts in Craft-Palmer, where the Fifth Circuit held that an insurance agent designated as an independent contractor in an agency...