Guidry v. Roberts

Citation331 So.2d 44
Decision Date12 April 1976
Docket NumberNo. 10693,10693
PartiesRichard P. GUIDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles William ROBERTS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

David W. Robinson, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant.

Wm. J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Kenneth DeJean, and Steve George, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellees.

Before SARTAIN, LOTTINGER and EDWARDS, JJ.

SARTAIN, Judge.

Plaintiff instituted this suit seeking a declaration of invalidity and an injunction against the enforcement of the Louisiana Election Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. Acts 1975 No. 718, R.S. 18:1481--1493. He attacked the legislation, alleging violation of various provisions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, including infringement on certain rights contained in Article I, and usurpation of powers vested in other branches of government by the legislature as condemned by Article II. The trial court rejected the contentions of invalidity and plaintiff has appealed therefrom.

It is asserted that the plaintiff-appellant does not have standing to question the validity of the act.

The legislation in question purports to require the reporting of information regarding contributions and expenditures pertinent to campaigns for elective state and local public office, decries certain activities as illegal campaign practices, condemns violation of the act to be a misdemeanor, and establishes the machinery and procedure for administration and enforcement of the provisions of the act.

R.S. 18:1486C(2) requires the reporting of the full name and address of each person making one or more contributions to a political committee or candidate which singly or in the aggregate exceeds the reporting amount specified in R.S. 18:1482(11). Section H of R.S. 18:1486 requires that the reports shall be made available for public inspection.

Appellant alleged and testified to being a citizen and taxpayer who had been and was active in the financing of political campaigns. He stated that the fact of disclosure of such a role prevented him from contributing in excess of the reporting amount to any candidate he favored.

C.C.P. 1872 grants to those who are affected by a statute the right to seek a judicial determination of its validity, stating:

'A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.'

Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to ensure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court. The requirement of standing is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectible and tangible interest at stake in the litigation. See, Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 (La.1975); Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908 (1971).

We find that the plaintiff falls within the class of individuals affected by the statute. His right to participate in the political process through the utilization of property as well as through his vote is a legally protectible and tangible interest which is, and will continue to be, affected by Act 718 of 1975. Therefore, he has standing to contest the validity of the disclosure provisions of the act.

The appellees argue further, however, that even if the appellant has standing to controvert the disclosure provisions of the act as being in violation of the guarantees of personal liberty contained in Article I of our constitution, his status as a mere campaign contributor and citizen does not establish standing to question to validity of the administrative and enforcement provisions. This contention is without merit for two reasons. First, the administrative provisions are the instrumentality through which the disclosure provisions are made operative. As such, they affect the appellant just as the disclosure provisions do. It is untenable to say that one has standing to attack the substantive provisions of a statute but does not have standing to controvert the procedural provisions effectuating the substantive provisions. Considering a similar contention the court said in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976):

'Party litigants with sufficient concrete interests at stake may have standing to raise constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights.'

Second, as we shall subsequently amplify, the disclosure provisions are not severable from the administrative and enforcement provisions. Standing to contest one facet of an unseverable legislative act, of necessity, constitutes standing to contest all facets of the act. State ex rel. Kemp v. City of Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So.2d 477 (1949). We, therefore, find that the plaintiff-appellant has standing to prosecute this action.

Since we find merit in the allegations that the administrative and enforcement provisions of Act 718 of 1975 are unconstitutional, we do not consider the other assertions of the appellant.

The following is a survey of the pertinent provisions of Act 718.

The reports required by the act are to be filed with reporting officials. R.S. 18:1483(A). The reporting official with respect to candidates for the Senate and political committees supporting only such candidates is designated to be the secretary of the Senate. The clerk of the House of Representatives is designated as the reporting official for candidates for the House and political committees supporting only such candidates. The reporting official for all other candidates, political committees and other persons required to file reports is the legislative auditor. R.S. 18:1482(12).

After receipt the reports are to be referred to supervisory committees for review. The supervisory committee with respect to candidates for the Senate is designated to consist of the secretary of the Senate, the legislative auditor and the executive director of the legislative council. The committee supervising candidates for the House of Representatives consists of the clerk of the House, the legislative auditor and the executive director of the legislative council. The committee supervising all other candidates and other persons required to report consists of all the persons occupying the above named positions. R.S. 18:1492(A)(1).

If, after review of a report or upon sworn complaint, the appropriate supervisory committee determines there is substantial reason to believe the act has been violated, it shall make a thorough investigation. If the results indicate a knowing and willful violation has occurred, the committee is directed to forward the matter to the attorney general. The attorney general shall make such investigation as is deemed necessary; and if he determines there is substantial reason to believe a violation has occurred, he shall forward the matter to the appropriate district attorney who is directed to proceed with such criminal action as is justified. 1 R.S. 18:1492(B)(1).

The second paragraph of R.S. 18:1492(B)(1) specifically prohibits a district attorney from instituting a criminal action under the act except on the basis of information forwarded to him.

The executive director of the legislative council is appointed by the legislative council which consists of seventeen members of the legislature and the lieutenant governor. He may not be a member of the legislature, and he serves at the pleasure of the legislative council. See R.S. 24:401; 404.

The clerk of the House of Representatives and the secretary of the Senate are clerical officers of the respective houses of the legislature. Article 3, § 7(C), Louisiana Constitution of 1974. According to testimony adduced in this matter, each is elected by the house he serves.

The office of legislative auditor is created by the Constitution. Article III, § 11, Louisiana Constitution (1974). The person holding that office is elected by the legislature and serves at its pleasure. Article XIV, § 27(C), Louisiana Constitution (1974); Article VI, § 26(2), Louisiana Constitution (1921).

Article II, §§ 1 and 2, Louisiana Constitution (1974) provide:

'Section 1. The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.

'Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others.'

The history of Article II §§ 1 and 2, Louisiana Constitution (1921), which are substantially the same as the current provisions, was set forth in Saint v. Allen, 169 La. 1046, 126 So. 548 (1930), where the court said:

'To illustrate, we quote from The Federalist, vol. 1, No. 51 (Hamilton or Madison) pp. 353, 354, viz.:

"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own, and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. * * *

"It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the Legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.'

'We find also in the same volume of The Federalist, p. 340, No. 48, the...

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