Guidry v. Serigny

• Decision Date: 13 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 65004,65004
• Citation: 378 So.2d 938
• Parties: Eula Marie GUIDRY v. Conrad SERIGNY, d/b/a Leeville Seafood Restaurant and Lounge.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 938

378 So.2d 938

Eula Marie GUIDRY v. Conrad SERIGNY, d/b/a Leeville Seafood Restaurant and Lounge.

No. 65004.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 13, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1980.

Steven M. Koenig, New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.

George J. Ledet, Jr., Laplante & Ledet, Ltd., Cut Off, for defendant-respondent.

BLANCHE, Justice. ^*

The plaintiff, while employed as a cook in defendant's restaurant, fell on the way back to the kitchen from the storage area. The evidence indicates that plaintiff fell either because she fainted, had a heart attack or slipped on a newly waxed floor. The trial court denied plaintiff's claim for workmen's compensation, finding that she did not slip on a waxed floor but instead, fell as a result of a heart attack or fainting spell. Because the plaintiff failed to show a causal relationship between her employment and the spell or heart attack, the trial court denied recovery. The court of appeal affirmed. We granted certiorari to determine if the plaintiff's accident was one arising out of and in the course of her employment. We find that the accident was such an accident and thus, reverse the court of appeal.

La.R.S. 23:1031 provides in pertinent part as follows:

"If an employee . . . receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall pay compensation . . ."

It is apparent that the accident occurred during the course of her employment. Plaintiff was on the job and about the employer's business as a cook when she fell and injured herself. The seemingly more difficult issue is whether the accident which injured the plaintiff was one which arose out of her employment.

In instances where the plaintiff seeks to recover for a disabling heart attack, he must show a causal relationship between the heart attack, his employment and his resulting disability. Landreneau v. Travelers Ins. Co., 345 So.2d 177 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977); Griffin v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 345 So.2d 84 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977); Fields v. Sperry Rand Corp., 343 So.2d 339 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1977). To establish this causal relationship, it need not be shown that the attack was caused by extraordinary activities. It is sufficient to show that the death or disability resulting from the accidental injury (heart attack) was caused or precipitated by the usual and customary actions, exertions and other factors connected with her employment. Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Co., 318 So.2d 37 (La.1975). Despite counsel's reliance on these cases, they are distinguishable from the instant suit. La.R.S. 23:1021 defines accident as follows:

"(1) 'Accident' means an unexpected or unforseen event happening suddenly or violently with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury."

In the above cases, the accident producing objective symptoms of an injury was the heart attack. Here, the plaintiff's accident was not the fainting spell, heart attack or slip which may have caused her to fall. Plaintiff's accident was the fall itself and this is so regardless of the precipitating reason therefor.

In an analogous case, Hull v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 236 So.2d 847 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970), the plaintiff's decedent suffered what appeared to be hypoglycemic shock and lost control of his car. As a result of the compound skull fractures suffered in the ensuing collision, he died. The court of appeal properly allowed recovery because while the employee's preexisting condition of diabetes may have caused the collision, it was the collision which caused the fractures and his subsequent death. Thus, since the collision was an accident which arose out...