Guilford v. Mason
Decision Date | 20 February 1901 |
Citation | 22 R.I. 422,48 A. 386 |
Parties | GUILFORD v. MASON. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Assumpsit by Arthur W. Guilford against James Mason. Plaintiff was nonsuited, and he petitions for a new trial. Granted.
Tillinghast & Murdock, for plaintiff. Edwards & Angell, for defendant.
This is assumpsit on the following agreement to convey stock: At the trial of the case in the common pleas division the plaintiff testified that after making the contract he immediately made provision to pay the money called for thereby; that on Thursday of the week following the making thereof he went in search of the defendant to tender him the money, but could not find him; that he went to his house, but he was not at home; that he was told by the lady who came to the door that defendant was in town, and would probably return some time in the evening; that plaintiff told her he would endeavor to see Mr. Mason the next day; that he went again to defendant's house the next day, and was then informed that he was out of town, and would not return until the next week; that on the following Monday plaintiff solicited the attention of his attorney to the matter, and asked him to accompany plaintiff to defendant's house to find him, which he did, but that the house was closed, and everybody, to all appearances, was away; that plaintiff then called at the office of defendant's attorney, Mr. Champlin. to see if he could give him any information as to defendant's whereabouts, but that he was out of town. He also made inquiry at Mr. Champlin's office, of the lady there in charge, if any person was there who could receive the money in behalf of Mr. Mason, and was informed that there was not; that they were all away, and would not return until the following week. On the plaintiff's return from defendant's residence, he wrote and posted a letter to him, which was as follows: On April 9th a letter was written to defendant's attorney, which was as follows: A copy of this letter was sent to defendant on the same day. Plaintiff testified that he duly paid defendant the $100 for the option in accordance with said agreement, and from the time he took the option until the expiration thereof he did his best to find the defendant, but was unable to do so. He further testified that when he went to defendant's house on the 5th of April he had with him a check for $4,000, and the balance of the agreed price of the stock in money. On the 9th of April plaintiff went again to defendant's house with certified checks for the amount called for by the agreement,—$8,000, —but failed to find Mr. Mason at home. Plaintiff had these checks, and was ready to deliver them on the 10th, and also on the 11th, of April. By his letter of April 9th he tried to get defendant to fix a time and place where the contract could be consummated, but no attention was paid to it in short, the evidence shows that the plaintiff was ready, willing, and anxious to perform his part of said agreement by paying said sum of $8,000 for the stock, from the 5th of April down to the time when the option expired, and that he used every reasonable effort during that time to find the defendant, so that the agreement of sale might be consummated. After the expiration of the 10 days the defendant refused to convey the stock, and returned the check for the $100 which had been given to him by the plaintiff for the option, the latter act showing that the defendant did not consider plaintiff in default in the premises, as the contract provided that said sum should be kept and retained by the defendant as full payment for the option in case the contract was not consummated.
The only question of law which is presented is whether, in view of the facts stated, the ruling of the common pleas division in granting a nonsuit was correct. The ground upon which the nonsuit was granted was that the plaintiff did not show that he was at any time prepared to make a legal tender to defendant of the amount called for by the agreement. The plaintiff does not claim that at any of the times when he went to defendant's house to obtain the performance of said agreement on the part of defendant, or at the times when he went to the office of defendant's attorney, he was prepared to make a strict legal tender of the amount called for by the agreement, but simply that he was ready and willing to pay said amount And his contention is that this...
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