Guillard v. Department of Employment

Decision Date28 November 1979
Docket NumberNo. 12695,12695
Citation100 Idaho 647,603 P.2d 981
PartiesDorothy Ann GUILLARD, Claimant-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Paul L. Westberg, Boise, for claimant-appellant.

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Roger B. Madsen, Donald L. Harris, Deputy Attys. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

The appellant Guillard, became unemployed on October 5, 1976, when her employer closed down its Emmett plant. At that time Guillard had over 14 years of experience in cost accounting and general business; she was then earning $4.25 an hour. Guillard promptly applied for unemployment insurance benefits. She was found qualified and received benefits until she was determined to be ineligible by a claims examiner for the Department of Employment, effective February 6, 1977, on the basis that she had failed to accept suitable work, be available for work, or to seek work.

Guillard appealed these determinations and a hearing was held. The appeals examiner for the Department reversed that portion of the earlier decision by the claims examiner that Guillard had refused suitable work. He affirmed the decision that she was not available for work or seeking work, doing so on the basis that Guillard was only seeking jobs in the the fields of accounting or general business and was confining her search to jobs in the Emmett area which paid at least $4.25 an hour. Guillard gave family responsibilities and added travel expense as reasons for so limiting her job search. During this time, Guillard had found and accepted two part time jobs in the Emmett area paying hourly rates of $4.25 and $4.95.

Guillard sought review by the Industrial Commission and another hearing was held before a referee. The Commission adopted the findings of the referee, concluding that Guillard, by restricting her search to positions in the accounting-clerical field paying at least $4.00 per hour in the Emmett area had "effectively and substantially reduced her likelihood for employment and, by such restrictions, claimant (was) not 'available' for work within the meaning of the Employment Security Law." I.C. § 72-1366(d). Guillard then appealed to this Court.

Approximately one month after the Commission's decision, Guillard found and accepted an accounting job in the Emmett area which paid $3.88 per hour.

Appellant raises two issues on appeal. The first issue deals with the procedural administration of the Employment Security Law, and the second issue concerns the merits of the controversy.

I

Appellant first maintains that the provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act regarding evidentiary rules in contested cases are applicable to hearings before the Department of Employment and the Industrial Commission. 1 Because of this, appellant argues, the appeals examiner and the Commission erred in admitting certain exhibits without requiring the Department to properly identify, lay a foundation for, show the relevancy of, and offer with an opportunity to object to, each and all of the exhibits offered as evidence.

Before we embark on an extended and undoubtedly unnecessary discussion regarding the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to unemployment compensation proceedings, we note that traditionally this Court has not required the Industrial Commission to adhere to strict rules of procedure and evidence in its hearings. Hagadone v. Kirkpatrick, 66 Idaho 55, 154 P.2d 181 (1944); Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151, 540 P.2d 1330 (1975). In Thom, a workmen's compensation case, we stated:

"(T)his Court has recently made clear the emerging trend in our case law freeing the Industrial Commission from a strict observance of rules of evidence as govern courts of law. We have held that in those areas where the Commission possesses particular expertise, it has the discretionary power to consider reliable, trustworthy evidence having probative value in reaching its decisions, . . . even if such evidence would not be ordinarily admissible in a court of law." 97 Idaho at 154, 540 P.2d at 1333.

The Thom case was decided long after the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, 2 although the Court did not discuss its applicability at that time. Ironically, this more liberal approach to evidentiary rules in administrative cases is supported by the very APA section upon which appellant so heavily relies. I.C. § 67-5210 reads in pertinent part:

"67-5210. RULES OF EVIDENCE OFFICIAL NOTICE. In contested cases:

"(1) irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. The rules of evidence as applied in non-jury civil cases in the district courts of this state shall be followed. When necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted, except where precluded by statute, if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. . . ." (Emphasis added).

The above language on its face eschews any notions of strict evidentiary criteria.

The above quoted section has an interesting history. The 1961 Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act proposed only that the rules of evidence applicable in non-jury civil cases should be followed in state agency contested cases. 3 Idaho does not have a distinctly identifiable body of evidentiary rules applicable only in non-jury civil cases. Apparently, few, if any, other jurisdictions have any such rules, and thus most state legislators declined to adopt the standard set forth in the model act. Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence & Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 Duke L.J. 1, 12. The 1970 version of the model state act continued to propose this possibly non-existent standard, but added the emphasized sentence in the above quoted Idaho statute. 4 Such a change evinces an intent on the part of the drafters of the model act and the Idaho legislature to liberalize technical rules of admissibility in administrative adjudications.

Although Idaho has no discernible evidentiary rules applicable in non-jury civil cases, it is clear that the rules in non-jury cases regarding admission of evidence are more liberal than in jury cases. G. Bell, Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer 14 (1972). For example, this Court will not reverse a trial court in a non-jury case on the basis of an erroneous admission of evidence unless it appears that the opposing party was misled or surprised in a substantial part of its case, or that the trial court materially relied on the erroneously admitted evidence. Duthweiler v. Hansen, 54 Idaho 46, 28 P.2d 210 (1933). In trials before the court, it is presumed that the trial court did not consider incompetent or inadmissible evidence in making its findings. Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 581 P.2d 350 (1978); Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252, 215 P.2d 991 (1950). Therefore, even if the above APA provision was applicable to hearings involving the Department of Employment, the administrative tribunal would not be required to strictly adhere to formal and technical rules of evidence.

However, we need not decide this case on the basis of the applicability of the above quoted provision of the Administrative Procedure Act regarding evidentiary rules in contested cases, or on the subtle distinctions between evidentiary rules in jury and non-jury civil trials, or on the general historical informality of proceedings before the Industrial Commission. Unemployment compensation procedures are governed by I.C. § 72-1368. That section was passed long before the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act and has been amended since such time without substantial change to the portion of the statute in question. Idaho Code § 72-1368 specifically delineates departmental procedure. A specific statute controls over a more general statute when there is any conflict. Swisher v. State Department of Environmental and Community Services, 98 Idaho 565, 569 P.2d 910 (1977).

The claimant did not object when the exhibits in question were introduced into the record by the appeals examiner. Thereafter, the referee and the Industrial Commission were required by I.C. § 72-1368(g) to include such exhibits as part of the record of the proceedings before the Commission. "The record of the proceedings before the appeals examiner shall become part of the record of the proceedings on a claim for review before the board with respect to the evidence admitted into testimony received before the appeals examiner, . . ." I.C. § 72-1368(g). Since the provision of the Employment Security Act is specific and not found in the APA, it is controlling. The Commission did not err in including the exhibits in the record in the first instance.

Subsequent to the decision of the Industrial Commission, appellant moved to strike any and all reference to exhibits 1 through 13 on essentially the same grounds as are raised on appeal. In denying the motion, the Commission stated:

"That though the Appeals Examiner failed to properly individually identify and offer the exhibits and though there may not be strict adherence to the Administrative Procedures Act and the Department's own rules, there is no surprise. The claimant was put on notice that these documents were made exhibits and were in fact part of the record before the Appeals Examiner and she was made aware that these documents were to be considered by the Finder of Fact."

We agree with the Commission's decision. The appellant has failed to show that she was prejudiced by the admission of the exhibits in question. There is absolutely no indication that the appeals examiner or the Industrial Commission relied to any extent on the exhibits. To the contrary, it appears that the Commission relied exclusively on the claimant's statements made at the hearings on the record. 5 Moreover, the exhibits in question consist of forms and documents...

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