Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras
| Decision Date | 25 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 03-2317 (PG). |
| Citation | 575 F.Supp.2d 346 |
| Parties | Andres GUILLEMARD-GINORIO, et als., Plaintiffs, v. Fermin CONTRERAS, et als., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Joan Schlump-Peters, Monique Guillemard-Noble, Nachman & Guillemard, San Juan, PR, Phv Jeffrey J. Pyle, Phv Joseph D. Steinfield, Prince Lobel Glovsky & Tye LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Eduardo A. Vera-Ramirez, Eileen Landron-Guardiola, Courtney R. Carroll, Luis A. Rodriguez-Munoz, Landron & Vera
LLP, Guaynabo, PR, Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, P.R. Department of Justice-Federal Litigation, Ivette M. Berrios, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Before the Court now is Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs and the Defendants' opposition thereto. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Plaintiffs request an award of $2,758,595.50 in attorney fees and $108,506.04 in costs and expenses. After considering the submissions on record and the applicable law, Plaintiffs' request is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons set forth below.
Andres Guillemard-Ginorio ("Guillemard") and his spouse, Maria Noble-Fernandez ("Noble"), both well-known members of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), have held insurance licenses as insurance agents for approximately 20 years. Guillemard and Noble have conducted their business through the entity Lone Star Insurance Producers, Inc. ("Lone Star"). Early in 2001, Fermin M. Contreras ("Contreras") became the Insurance Commissioner for Puerto Rico. Shortly thereafter, Lone Star and its shareholders became subject of an investigation carried out by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner ("OIC"). In 2002, Guillemard and Noble learned that Contreras was making disparaging remarks about Guillemard and Noble's membership in the NPP. They also learned that the OIC had issued subpoenas to several Puerto Rico banks demanding account information for all transactions involving Guillemard, Noble, or Lone Star.
On December 10, 2003, Lone Star, Guillemard and Noble, and the conjugal partnership constituted between them (collectively "the Lone Star Plaintiffs") filed suit seeking redress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their civil rights and a declaratory judgment. The Plaintiffs sued Contreras for damages in his individual capacity and for injunctive relief in his official capacity, his wife Jane Doe, the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (the "OIC"), and various John Doe and Jane Doe defendants. See Docket No. 1. The Lone Star Plaintiffs alleged that Contreras' investigation was motivated by political animus, that it violated Plaintiffs' equal protection of the laws and that the bank subpoenas constituted an invasion of privacy under local law.
On December 23, 2003, Contreras, without affording them with notice or an opportunity to be heard, issued an order ("the Order") declaring the Lone Star Plaintiffs as non-trustworthy and incompetent. Furthermore, the Order purported to revoke their insurance agent licenses for a period of five years, prevent them from applying for any other license during the same five-year period, and impose a fine in the amount of two-million thirty-five thousand dollars ($2,035,000). The Order would become effective on January 7, 2004. The Order also informed the Lone Star Plaintiffs of their right to request a hearing within twenty (20) days from the Order, which would stay the imposition of the fine. The revocation of their licenses, however, would remain in effect pending a hearing and a final decision.
On December 30, 2003, the Lone Star Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, see Docket No. 7, and moved the Court for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") enjoining Defendants from revoking the Lone Star Plaintiffs' insurance agent licenses pending a pre-deprivation hearing, see Docket No. 8. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that in issuing the December 23, 2003 Order without a hearing and in retaliation for their political beliefs, the Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as state law provisions. On December 31, 2003, the Court granted Plaintiffs' request and issued a TRO enjoining Defendants from revoking the Lone Star Plaintiffs' insurance agent licenses. Thereafter, on January 20, 2004, the Court held a hearing regarding Plaintiffs' request for the entry of preliminary injunctive relief and this request was also granted, see Docket No. 31.
A month later, on February 19, 2004, Contreras, in his official and individual capacity, and the OIC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), see Docket No. 38, and the Court denied their request, see Docket No. 57. Contreras an the OIC filed two interlocutory appeals challenging this Court's entry of a preliminary injunction and denial of the motion to dismiss. See Dockets No. 33, 72. However, on December 13, 2005, the appeal of this Court's order granting a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot, and the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed. See Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras, 161 Fed.Appx. 24 (1st Cir.2005).
Then, on June 6, 2004, the Plaintiffs amended the complaint to include Dorelisse Juarbe ("Juarbe") as a defendant in her individual and official capacity as the current Insurance Commissioner. See Docket No. 58. Discovery ensued and extended for a period of more than two years during which the Plaintiffs filed several motions to compel discovery.
On May 20, 2005, Plaintiffs moved for the entry of partial summary judgment on their due process claims. See Dockets No. 204-207. On June 7, 2005, the Defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint. See Docket Nos. 216, 218, 220, 221. On January 10, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the Defendants'. See Docket No. 303. With respect to Defendants' claim of qualified immunity on the due process claim, this Court held that Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because a material issue of fact remained as to the third prong of the qualified immunity analysis, namely, whether a reasonable official in Contreras's position would have been justified in revoking Plaintiffs' license without a prior hearing. With respect to the Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity on the other claims, we held that because the Defendants did not properly raise these arguments before the Magistrate-Judge, we would not consider their assertion of qualified immunity in relation only to the due process claim. Once again, the Defendants appealed. See Docket No. 312.
Defendants later filed a motion to vacate this Court's judgment pursuant to FED. R.CIV.P. 60(b) based on the newly discovered evidence. This evidence consisted of a Puerto Rico appellate court decision holding that an interpretation that the Insurance Code prohibits commission sharing was reasonable. See Dockets No. 315-316. On April 3, 2006, this Court denied the motion to vacate, finding that the Puerto Rico appellate court decision was irrelevant to its ruling. See Docket No. 322. The Defendants also appealed this ruling. See Docket No. 324.
On June 12, 2007, the First Circuit affirmed this Court's order and held that the Defendants had waived their qualified immunity defense as to the First Amendment claims, that they were not entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim, and that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review this Court's denial of the motion to vacate.
A jury trial was finally scheduled for September 17, 2007 and it was completed on October 8, 2007. The jury found as follows:
1. Procedural Due Process: in favor of Guillemard, Noble and Lone Star and against both Contreras and Juarbe.
2. First Amendment discrimination claim against Contreras regarding the investigation: in favor of the defendant Contreras.
3. First Amendment claim regarding the December 23, 2003 Order: in favor of Guillemard and Noble against Contreras only.
4. First Amendment retaliation claim: in favor of Guillemard and Noble against Contreras only.
5. "Selective Enforcement" claim under the Equal Protection Clause: in favor of Guillemard and Noble against Contreras only.
6. "Class of One" claim under the Equal Protection Clause: in favor of Guillemard and Noble against both Contreras and Juarbe.
7. Defamation claim against Contreras: in favor of Guillemard, Noble and Lone Star.
8. Negligence claim: in favor of all plaintiffs against all Defendants.
9. Right to privacy claim: in favor of Guillemard and Noble against both Contreras and Juarbe.
Therefore, Plaintiffs did not succeed in their "Selective Enforcement" Equal Protection and First Amendment claims against Juarbe. Plaintiffs also did not succeed in their First Amendment claim regarding the investigation against Contreras. Thus, Plaintiffs did not succeed in three (3) of the seven (7) claims against Juarbe and in one (1) of the nine (9) claims against Contreras. A total of $4,755,000.00 was awarded to Plaintiffs, of which $3,080,000.00 (65%) corresponds to Contreras and $1,675,000.00 (35%) corresponds to Juarbe.
"Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing the district courts to award a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure `effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances." Id. Therefore, in any action enforcing the provisions of Section 1983, such as the instant one, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) governs attorney fee awards.
Section 1988(b) states that "t...
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Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras
...which have been issued due to inadvertence or mistake). Accordingly, the Opinion & Order issued by this Court on August 25, 2008, 575 F.Supp.2d 346 (D.P.R.2009), is hereby Amended Nunc pro 2. Hereinafter, Contreras, the OIC and Juarbe will also be collectively referred to as the "Defendants......
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