Guillory v. Dalbour

• Decision Date: 23 September 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-02452
• Parties: SHANNON MICHAEL GUILLORY, et al., Plaintiffs v. CHIEF TODD DALBOUR, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

SHANNON MICHAEL GUILLORY, et al., Plaintiffs v. CHIEF TODD DALBOUR, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-cv-02452

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

RECEIVED: September 27, 2016

September 23, 2016

JUDGE MINALDI

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is Todd D'Albor,¹ Terry Duhon, Bryan Foti, Danny Semmes, Blake Virgil, and Chad Romero's (collectively "the defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 16); the defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support (Rec. Doc. 28); the Opposition (Rec. Doc. 29) filed by Shannon Guillory, Rival Nutrition d/b/a S&M Nutrition, LLC, Advanced Nutraceutial Research, LLC, and Rival Nutrition, Inc. (collectively "Mr. Guillory" or "the plaintiffs"), and the defendants' Reply (Rec. Doc. 30-2). Within the plaintiffs' Opposition (Rec. Doc. 29), Mr. Guillory makes a request to amend the complaint. For the following reasons, the defendants Motion to Dismiss the complaint will be GRANTED, and the plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the plaintiffs' state law claims will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint will be DENIED.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY²

On April 29, 2014, Mr. Guillory was arrested for the distribution on Anabolic steroids pursuant to an arrest warrant. On that same day pursuant to a search warrant, the Jennings PoliceDepartment entered his local nutrition, coffee, and juice bar store and took over $60,000 worth of merchandise. The arrest warrant and search warrant were based on videotaped evidence collected by a confidential informant. Mr. Guillory alleges that the videotape was altered to make it appear like he was distributing illegal steroids. The videotape was spliced so that it appeared that transactions took place over a particular time and place. The charges against Mr. Guillory were dismissed on October 5, 2014.

Mr. Guillory filed suit on September 30, 2015, alleging that the charges, the arrest, and the search and seizure were unconstitutional and caused him damages. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 16) on March 9, 2016. In response, Mr. Guillory filed an amended complaint (Rec. Doc. 23) that more clearly stated that he was suing the officers and police chief in their individual and official capacities for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that he was suing the Police Chief and the Mayor in their individual and official capacities for negligent hiring and respondeat superior under Louisiana state law. For his § 1983 claims, Mr. Guillory alleged that the police chief created a policy or custom that led to the constitutional violations. The defendants then filed a supplemental memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 28), Mr. Guillory filed an Opposition (Rec. Doc. 29), and the defendants filed a Reply (Rec. Doc. 30-2).

LAW & ANALYSIS

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

An action can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the claimant fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Motions to dismiss are generally "viewed with disfavor and [should be] rarely granted." Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003)). "[The] Court construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, and takes all facts pleaded in the complaint as true." Id. (quoting Gregson, 322 F.3d at 885).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," making the right to relief more than merely speculative. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). If the allegations in the complaint even if taken as true do not entitle the plaintiff to relief, the complaint should be dismissed. Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558). Additionally, documents attached by a defendant to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffs' complaint and are central to their claim. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004).

While "[f]ederal pleading rules call for 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014). "[A] complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011).

Keeping in mind the pleading standard found in Rule 8(a)(2), the court will not bar claims that the plaintiff imprecisely named. The court considers five main federal claims included in the complaint brought § 1983: (1) malicious prosecution (2) excessive andunreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (3) unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (4) violation of due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (5) unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In a liberal reading, the court also identifies the state law claims of malicious prosecution, negligent hiring, and respondeat superior. The court first addresses the federal claims because the court's jurisdiction rests on the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), and it has only supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS

"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must first show a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation was committed by someone acting under color of state law." Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-50 (1988); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1995)). If the claim is against a defendant in his individual capacity and the defendant has asserted qualified immunity, the plaintiff must establish that (1) "the defendants committed a constitutional violation under current law;" and (2) "the defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable in light of [clearly established] law." Id. at 253. If the claim is against a municipality, the plaintiff must plead facts that support finding that the violation took place pursuant to a municipality policy or custom. Brooks v. George Cty., Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)).

In analyzing whether Mr. Guillory has successfully pleaded § 1983 claims, the court will first analyze whether he sufficiently alleged a violation of the Constitution or federal law. As part of this inquiry, the court will address whether any claims are time-barred. Next, for the remaining claims, the court will address whether the defendants can be sued in their individualcapacities after raising the defense of qualified immunity. Finally, the court will determine whether claims brought against the defendants in their official capacities are based on the City of Jennings's policy or custom.

a. Violations of the Constitution

For the following reasons, Mr. Guillory has failed to state a § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution, excessive force, unlawful search and seizure, and due process violations. Mr. Guillory has sufficiently alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an arrest unsupported by probable cause.

i. Malicious Prosecution Claims

As an initial matter, Mr. Guillory's § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution is not valid. "[A] freestanding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based solely on malicious prosecution [is] not viable. Rather, the claimant must allege 'that officials violated specific constitutional rights in connection with a malicious prosecution.'" Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942, 945 (5th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted). "Regardless, they are not claims for malicious prosecution and labeling them as such only invites confusion." Castellano, 352 F.3d at 954. Because malicious prosecution is a state law claim, defendants are entitled to have a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim dismissed. See Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[P]laintiffs' claim under § 1983 for 'malicious prosecution' ... is not independently cognizable, and defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that claim."); Carr v. Montgomery Cty., Tex., 59 F. Supp. 3d 787, 804 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ("The Fifth Circuit has abolished malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 [but] a state tort claim for malicious prosecution could still be brought alongside § 1983 claims."); Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 640 (N.D.Tex. 2007) ("[A]ny allegation of malicious prosecution [under § 1983] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."); Nitsch v. City of El Paso, 482 F. Supp. 2d 820, 831 (W.D. Tex. 2007) ("[A] free-standing claim of malicious prosecution is no violation of the Constitution and is therefore no grounds for a § 1983 claim.").

Therefore, the court will dismiss Mr. Guillory's claim of malicious prosecution brought under § 1983. Mr. Guillory argues that his malicious prosecution claim should survive because it is based on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.³ However, to call the claim a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim would "invite[] confusion." Castellano, 352 F.3d at 954. Rather, Mr. Guillory has brought § 1983 claims for violations of the...