Guite v. Wright, Civil No. 5-96-175.

Citation976 F.Supp. 866
Decision Date25 September 1997
Docket NumberCivil No. 5-96-175.
PartiesAndre GUITE, Plaintiff, v. James WRIGHT and Steven James LaShomb, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Minnesota

Thomas Michael Skare, Newby Lingren Carlson & Skare, Cloquet, MN, for plaintiff.

Mary Alison Lutterman, Duluth City Attorney, Duluth, MN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Andre Guite brings civil rights and tort claims against officers of the Duluth Police Department arising from their entry into his home to arrest his son. Defendants have moved for dismissal or summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, their motions are granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Although there are significant differences in the facts as reported by various witnesses, the following version of the facts is presented in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party.

On October 26, 1994 in Duluth, Minnesota, three young men maced David Jokinen and took his money. He fought back and took a shirt from an attacker. The pocket of the shirt contained a photograph. The next day, Duluth police officer defendant James Wright interviewed Jokinen, who said the photo showed a likeness of one of the robbers. Another officer recognized the photographed individual as David Guite, son of plaintiff Andre Guite. Wright knew about two similar robberies which had occurred during the preceding three days. A phone caller identified David Guite as one of the perpetrators of these robberies.

Wright then decided to go to the Guite residence to talk to David Guite, and, if need be, arrest him for the robberies. In the juvenile court proceeding, Wright explained that he wanted to make the arrest because he was concerned David Guite would commit other robberies. In his affidavit in this case, Wright adds that he also was concerned that David Guite would know the police had his photograph and would destroy evidence and warn the other robbers to destroy evidence. The officers admit they were not concerned for the safety of people inside the Guite residence.

The interview with Jokinen ended at approximately 3:00 p.m. Wright believed there was insufficient time to work with a prosecutor to prepare the necessary reports, the juvenile delinquency petition, and an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant in order to obtain an arrest warrant before the end of the court's business day. Thus, he decided to go to the Guite home without an arrest warrant.

Shortly after the interview ended, Wright went to the Guite home in plain clothes, accompanied by three uniformed patrol officers, including defendant Steven LaShomb. One officer covered the front door of the home, while the other three approached the back door, which was used as the main entrance. Defendants acknowledge there were enough officers to surround the house to prevent escape.

At the time, Andre Guite and another man were carrying a bed frame into the house. Andre Guite had his left arm in a sling, because of his recent shoulder surgery. The officers then approached the door. There is conflicting testimony about the position of the doors, but Andre Guite testified that he had shut the inside door and that the screen door was closing by operation of an automatic shutter when the officers knocked. Andre Guite returned to the entrance, opened the inside door, opened the screen door with his right hand, and held it open while he conversed with the officers.

Andre Guite admitted that his son lived with him and was present in the house. Wright said he wanted to question David Guite. The father asked why, and Wright did not tell him. Andre Guite testified that he told Wright that he could talk to David Guite if the uniformed officers would leave. Wright declined this offer. Andre testified that he did not "exactly invite him" into the home. Andre Guite asked to see an arrest warrant. Wright said they did not need one. Wright testified that Andre Guite then told him to "get the hell out."

Plaintiff's wife went to get David from the upper floor of the house. He had just come out of the shower and was wearing only boxers. He came down the stairs towards the entrance. LaShomb then took hold of Andre Guite's right wrist, pushed him inside the vestibule of the house, and held him against an open door. This vestibule was just wide enough to allow the inner door to swing open. Wright entered the home and pulled David Guite towards the door. Another officer assisted in pulling him all the way out of the house, and they placed him under arrest.1 David Guite faced juvenile court proceedings, but he is not a plaintiff in this case.

Andre Guite filed this suit bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Minnesota Constitution, and state tort law. Both the entry into the home and the force used against Andre Guite are challenged under the Fourth Amendment. There is no claim against the City of Duluth or any other body of municipal government. The federal claim alleges the defendants deprived Guite of his rights to equal protection and due process and his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and illegal entry onto his property.

Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims. They contend that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, that defendants' entry into the home and use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that they are shielded by qualified immunity. They argue that there is no private cause of action to bring claims under the Minnesota Constitution. As for the state tort claims, defendants argue that they are shielded by official immunity and that various elements of the torts are not supported.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case comes before the Court in a peculiar procedural posture. Defendants asserted their immunity defenses in their Answers. On August 14, 1996 they filed motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. On the same date, defendants filed a motion for stay of discovery pending resolution of these dispositive motions. Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson stayed discovery, with exceptions. He noted that the dispositive motions are premised in part upon the doctrine of qualified immunity and that this defense encompasses a freedom from litigation as well as from liability. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). Hence, he stayed discovery except to the extent that it is narrowly directed to the qualified immunity defense. Memorandum Order, Sept. 20, 1996. Plaintiff did not appeal this order.

Defendants submitted a memorandum in support of their dispositive motions as if there were only a motion for summary judgment. It is captioned accordingly, it sets forth the standards for summary judgment and not those for dismissal, and it concludes with a request for summary judgment. Defendants submitted affidavits in support of their motion, alleging facts beyond the pleadings.

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is inappropriate based on the record before the Court, and he also argues that the stay of discovery has prevented disclosure of material facts, so that the dispositive motions should be "continued until that information can be discovered." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f).

Defendants' reply memorandum observes that plaintiff could have conducted discovery related to the qualified immunity defenses, and that he chose not to do so (beyond serving a few interrogatories). Consequently, defendants argue that their motions are ripe for decision.

Given this procedural history, the qualified immunity issues are now subject to a proper motion for summary judgment, and no further discovery is necessary. However, the other issues are presented only in motions to dismiss. The motions were originally noticed as motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. While it is appropriate to consider any challenges to the sufficiency of the Complaint, the limitation on discovery to date makes it inappropriate to consider summary judgment on any issue other than qualified immunity.

Thus, the Court analyzes the qualified immunity defense under the standard for summary judgment motions. In determining immunity issues, the Court may consider the entire factual record, including the evidence developed in the related juvenile court proceedings. See Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1444 (8th Cir.1987) (considering evidence from earlier criminal proceedings in ruling upon motions for summary judgment on immunities in civil rights suit arising from the criminal proceedings). The Court need not accept as true any allegations in the pleadings that are without factual support in the record. Id.

In appraising the sufficiency of a complaint challenged in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court should dismiss only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

ANALYSIS
I. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Any individual government officials performing discretionary functions have a qualified immunity defense to a Section 1983 claim for damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To determine whether a defendant has violated a plaintiff's clearly established rights, it is necessary to inquire:

(1) which particular act or omission of the defendant violated the plaintiff's federal...

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