Gula v. Gawel
| Decision Date | 26 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 50390 |
| Citation | 218 N.E.2d 42,71 Ill.App.2d 174 |
| Parties | Aniela GULA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janina GAWEL, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
George F. Archer, Elias Mula, Chicago, for appellant.
Norman J. Barry, Norris J. Bishton, Jr., Rothschild, Hart, Stevens & Barry, Chicago, for appellee.
Aniela Gula, the plaintiff, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Janina Gawel.
The plaintiff resided with her husband, as month-to-month tenants under an oral lease, on the second floor of a two-story, two-apartment building owned by the defendant. In her second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that while descending the front stairway from her apartment she tripped and fell and was injured. The landlord was charged with negligence in failing to maintain the stairway, which was alleged to be under her control, and in failing to repair it and illuminate it. Negligence was further charged in the failure of the landlord to provide artificial lighting, continuous handrailing, and risers and treads of uniform width and length, all in violation of the Chicago Housing Code. Municipal Code of Chicago, chapter 78, section 78--11 to 78--20. Violations of both a common law duty and a duty under the ordinance were thus charged.
The central question is whether the landlord-defendant retained sufficient control of the stairway to give rise to a duty to maintain it in a reasonably safe condition. A landlord, as to those portions of the building over which he maintains control, has a duty toward all persons lawfully on the premises, including tenants, to maintain them in reasonable repair. Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co., 375 Ill. 310, 31 N.E.2d 305 (1941); Payne v. Irvin, 144 Ill. 482, 33 N.E. 756 (1893). The plaintiff's pleadings and affidavit in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment set forth that the defendant maintained and controlled the stairway to the second floor for the common use of all pesons rightfully upon the premises; that the oral lease under which the plaintiff occupied the premises provided that the landlord would maintain in safe condition and make all repairs on the premises, including the front stairway leading to the plaintiff's apartment; that the landlord would keep a key to her premises for the purpose of entering the apartment to make repairs and would use only the front stairway to enter the apartment; that the landlord had made all repairs on the premises, still retained the key and used the front stairway as the usual means of access to the second floor apartment. It was further alleged that the light which illuminated the lower portion of the stairway was controlled by the landlord and that the lease provided, and it was normal custom and usage, for the landlord to turn on the bottom porch light by a switch located on the landlord's premises.
The defendant's affidavit in support of her motion for summary judgment and her answers to interrogatories set forth a renting of the second floor apartment and the stairway leading thereto; that the apartment included the front stairway with a door at the bottom which locked upon closing and could be opened by a buzzer located on the second floor; that the door and stairway were exclusively for the use of the occupants of the second floor apartment and were so used. An agreement to make repairs on the stairway was denied.
Applying to these conflicting allegations the rules that affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment will be strictly construed whereas the opposing party's affidavits will be construed liberally, and that the affidavits must leave no question as to the movant's right to judgment (Kern v. Chicago & E.I.R. Co., 44 Ill.App.2d 468, 195 N.E.2d 197 (1963)), it appears that a material factual question exists on the issue of control. Proof by the plaintiff of the terms and conditions of the oral lease as alleged by her would support the conclusion that the lease was of the second floor apartment only and negate the contentions of the defendant that the stairway leading to the apartment was included in the lease. Proof of an agreement to make repairs on the stairway, proof of the making of repairs on the stairway, proof of control over its lighting, proof of retention of a right to access to the apartment by the landlord and the use by the landlord of the stairway as the usual or sole means of access would all support an inference that the stairway was a common area for the mutual benefit of the landlord and the tenant and would warrant a jury finding that the landlord retained control. Contrariwise, proof of the allegations of the defendant would support an inference that the premises were under the control of the tenant. In view of the conflicting inferences which could be drawn from the proofs the question of control should be submitted to the trier of fact. Campagna v. Cozzi, 59 Ill.App.2d 208, 207 N.E.2d 739 (1965). A motion for summary judgment should be denied if examination of the record fairly discloses the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Des Plaines Motor Sales, Inc. v. Whetzal, 58 Ill.App.2d 143, 206 N.E.2d 806 (1965).
The defendant argues, however, that despite the conflicting allegations, summary judgment was proper because as a matter of law a stairway usable only by a single tenant is part of the tenant's demised premises. The only case cited in support of this contention is Moore v. Lowery, 342 Ill.App 239, 96 N.E.2d 382 (1951). There the tenant leased the entire second floor of a building under a written lease. The only access from the ground floor through the front entrance was the stairway on which the plaintiff fell. The lighting of the stairway was under the control of the tenant. The lease of the premises, the court found, placed the tenant in control of the stairway. Consequently, a judgment against the landlord was reversed. In Moore, the court essentially made a determination that the evidence did not support the factual conclusion that the landlord was in control of the stairway. The stairway being the only access to the second floor was a factor to be considered. We do not consider Moore as holding that a stairway leading only to the second floor is a part of the demised premises of the second floor tenant as a matter of law. Where a stairway leads, the use to which it is put and by whom, are factors to be considered by the trier of fact along with the intention of the parties, the terms of their lease, the responsibility for repairs, maintenance and illumination and all other factors which tend to show control in either the landlord or the tenant.
We believe there is also a triable issue of fact as to whether the landlord breached an alleged covenant to maintain the premises, including the stairway, in a good and safe condition and to make repairs on the premises. This is a separate and distinct ground for recovery and does not depend upon control of the stairway. A landlord is, generally, not liable in tort for a breach of a covenant to repair, but may be liable under special circumstances such as (1) if the covenant carries the obligation to maintain the premises in a safe or reasonably safe condition, (2) if the covenant is made under circumstances which indicate that damages in tort were contemplated by the parties at the time of making the covenant, and (3) if there is a duty to repair apart from the contract. Alaimo v. Du Pont, 4 Ill.App.2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1955); Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill.App. 404 (1909); Mikusz v. Kahn, 207 Ill.App. 258 (1917).
The defendant denied making an agreement to repair the stairway. However, the plaintiff's affidavit in support of her allegation as to the existence of an agreement to repair states: 'All repairs, with no exceptions, are and have been, since the inception of this tenancy, made by the landlord, defendant Janina Gawel, or her agents.' It does not specify where the repairs were made. Construing it liberally, we read it as alleging that the repairs were made on the stairway. Considering the allegation of covenants to make repairs and to maintain the stairway in safe condition with the fact of making repairs to the...
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