Gulaid v. CH2M Hill, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-04824-JST |
| Parties | HAKIM GULAID, Plaintiff, v. CH2M HILL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Before the Court are Defendant CH2M Hill, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Request to Strike. ECF Nos. 55, 64-1. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted and the request to strike is denied.
For purposes of deciding this motion and request, the Court accepts as true the following allegations from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 53 ("FAC"). Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff Hakim Gulaid, appearing pro se, is a resident of California who alleges that he was constructively discharged from his employment with Defendant CH2M Hill, Inc. ("CH2M") on March 4, 2014 and that he was forced to resign due to discriminatory and harassing conduct. FAC at 2-3.1 Gulaid was born in Somaliland, is Muslim, and speaks Somali as his native language, although he also now speaks English fluently. Id. at 3. He was hired by CH2M as a Project Quality Control Manager on December 30, 2013 for a construction project on the U.S. Navy base in Djibouti, Djibouti. Id. at 4. While Plaintiff was originally told he would report toDefendant Michael Weinmuller, which was in conflict with project contract requirements, CH2M subsequently changed his "reporting relationship" to Vice President David Bird, which was in harmony with those requirements. Id. However, Weinmuller "insisted that he remain Plaintiff's supervisor and prevailed," and became "Plaintiff's supervisor on a daily basis in all practical respects." Id. at 5. "Plaintiff did not enjoy a daily supervisorial relationship with Mr. Bird, but Mr. Bird would direct Plaintiff and Weinmuller from his office in California."2 Id.
Gulaid was excited about his job but it was cut short "due to unlawful discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation that he experienced during his employment." Id. He was "treated . . . so poorly that he was forced to resign" and return to the United States. Id. Gulaid alleges that "Defendants clearly . . . breached the terms of the Offer Letter and company policies with respect to Mr. Gulaid." Id.
Plaintiff had to leave Oakland, California and move himself and his family to Djibouti. Id. CH2M did not provide assistance that he needed on a timely basis. Id. Gulaid was excluded from important meetings with management and the client, and was not provided material information related to his job or with a properly working computer. Id. He was never formally introduced to his supervisor David Bird. Id. He was ignored at meetings by his superiors, which "created a climate whereby his co-workers would do the same." Id. He was verbally abused in front of the client, required to report to an individual in violation of the project contract (presumably, Mr. Weinmuller), and "retaliated against . . . for complaining" about his treatment. Id. at 6. Gulaid "resigned his position given that he and no other reasonable individual would be able to toleratethe hostile working environment created by Defendants." Id.
Gulaid filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") on February 20, 2015, which provided him with a Right to Sue Notice on February 26, 2015. Id. He filed his action in this Court on October 20, 2015. ECF No. 1. Defendant CH2M filed a motion to dismiss on December 17, 2015, ECF No. 10, which was granted without prejudice on March 10, 2016, ECF No. 48.
Gulaid filed his FAC in this Court on April 1, 2016 and brings the following claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; (2) retaliation (presumably, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); (3) violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"); (4) retaliation (presumably, in violation of the FEHA); (5) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; (6) breach of contract; (7) fraud and misrepresentation; and (8) wrongful termination. FAC at 6-11.
On April 14, 2016, Defendant CH2M filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 55. Defendant also filed a request for judicial notice, ECF No. 56, of the complaint Plaintiff filed with the DFEH on February 20, 2015, ECF No. 56-1, Ex. A. On April 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 61, and submitted a declaration in support, ECF No. 62, along with three exhibits: his first offer letter from CH2M dated December 10, 2013, id., Decl. Ex. A; his offer letter from CH2M dated December 18, 2013, id., Decl. Ex. B; and a document excerpt that describes the reporting structure and responsibilities for a QC Manager position, id., Decl. Ex. C. On May 5, 2016, Defendant CH2M filed a reply to the opposition. ECF No. 64. As an attachment to the reply, Defendant also filed an objection to, and request for this Court to strike, Plaintiff's Declaration, including Declaration Exhibits A-C. ECF No. 64-1.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
"When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court considers evidenceoutside the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond." United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). "There are, however, two exceptions to the requirement that consideration of extrinsic evidence converts a 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). First, a court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "may take judicial notice of matters of public record." Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 201. Second, a court "may consider extrinsic evidence not attached to the complaint if the document's authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on it." Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015). "[W]here a document is incorporated by reference, it becomes part of the complaint and the court accordingly assumes the truth of its contents for the purposes of ruling on [a] motion to dismiss." In re Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1118 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
"[A] motion to strike materials that are not part of the pleadings may be regarded as an invitation by the movant to consider whether [the materials] may properly be relied upon." Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Comm'n, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 655 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "Under the express language of [Rule 12(f)], only pleadings are subject to motions to strike." Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
"Motions to strike are generally not granted unless it is clear that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation." Rosales v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007) (); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347(4th Cir. 2001) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "With a motion to strike, just as with a motion to dismiss, the court should view the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Defendant requests that the Court strike the entirety of Plaintiff's Declaration, including Declaration Exhibits A-C. ECF No. 64-1. Defendant argues that the declaration is "wholly improper" and that its assertions are "inadmissible on an evidentiary basis," including for reasons of relevance, improper legal conclusions, lack of foundation, hearsay, and lack of authentication. See generally id. In support of its Request to Strike, Defendant cites to Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2006), which held that a district court did not abuse its discretion by granting in part a motion to strike an expert's affidavit attached to a complaint.
As a preliminary matter, Fin. Acquisition does not help the Court's analysis of the request to strike. Not only is the opinion from another circuit, it is factually inapposite. Fin. Acquisition concerned the appeal of a district court's partial granting of a motion to strike an expert affidavit attached to a complaint, and the question was whether the district court abused its discretion by issuing that order. In other words, the question was not whether a district court could consider an affidavit attached to a complaint, but whether it was required to do so. Fin. Acquisition, 440 F.3d at 285. That is not the question before this court. Moreover, the district court did not strike the declaration in its entirety, only the portions containing expert opinion. The district court actually "did consider the affidavit's 'nonconclusory, factual portions.'" Id. (). Thus, to the extent the case is relevant at all, it helps the Plaintiff.
Defendant does not argue that the materials are "redundant,...
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