Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co. v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 20 March 1951
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 121
• Citation: 51 So.2d 544,36 Ala.App. 33
• Parties: GULF ATLANTIC WAREHOUSE CO. v. BENNETT et al.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

Page 544

51 So.2d 544

36 Ala.App. 33

GULF ATLANTIC WAREHOUSE CO. v. BENNETT et al.

6 Div. 121.

Court of Appeals of Alabama.

March 20, 1951.

Cabaniss & Johnston, of Birmingham, for appellant.

J. L. Busby and Earl McBee, or Birmingham, for appellees.

CARR, Presiding Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment in the circuit court in favor of three claimants for unemployment compensation. By agreement these cases were tried jointly, and the appeals have been consolidated into one record.

The evidence in the main is not in dispute.

The Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Company (which we will herein designate as the company) operated a warehouse in the City of Birmingham, Alabama. Its sole function was the operation of a public warehouse for the handling and storage of cotton. Prior to the time of instant concern the claimants were employed by the company.

It appears that for a number of years their employment had been subject to collective bargaining on an annual basis. In July 1948 such an agreement was entered into for the period from August 1, 1948, through July 31, 1949.

On May 25, 1949, a representative of the bargaining union notified the company by letter of a desire to begin negotiations for the execution of a new contract which would take effect at the expiration of the current one.

Incident to this request the first meeting was held on June 6, 1949. The conferences continued through July 30, 1949, with about nine meetings during the interim. No agreement for a new contract was reached at any of these times. It appears that a new contract agreement was entered into on April 27, 1950.

In July 1949 the company, being apprehensive that there might be a walkout or work stoppage at the expiration of the current contract, gave notice to this effect to its various customers.

Promptly after the receipt of this notification the customers ordered substantial amounts of cotton shipped from the company's warehouse, and shipments into the establishment practically ceased. This condition continued throughout practically all of the month of August and resulted in no available work for the claimants.

About the last of August and during the month of September the company received some storage cotton from the Commodity Credit Corporation and business at the warehouse was resumed on a limited basis.

In January 1950 the business reached its normal proportions.

It is for unemployment benefits during the idle time in August that claimants claim compensation.

The company's counsel in brief poses the question for our review in this succinct manner:

'It was appellant's contention before the trial court, and we take the same position here, that a labor dispute was created and existed between the Union representing the majority of appellant's employees and appellant from the commencement of the labor contract negotiations, or at least from the date of termination of the old contract (July 31, 1949), and continued until April 27, 1950, the date of execution of the next subsequent collective bargaining agreement. There can be no argument as to this matter. But appellant further contends, and this is the crux of the case, that the lack of business during August, 1949, which caused appellees' unemployment, resulted directly from the existence of this labor dispute, hence that the unemployment was directly due to a labor dispute within the meaning of the disqualification provision of Section 216 [subd.] A of Title 26, Code 1940.'

In the recent case of Department of Industrial Relations v. Stone, Ala.App., 53 So.2d 859, we reviewed the historical background of the act in question and discussed the prime purpose of its passage. We there pointed out that the disqualifications from the benefits of the statute are exceptions and should be narrowly construed.

It is evincingly clear that the matter of critical concern in the instant case relates to the proper interpretation and construction of the expression 'is directly due to a labor dispute' as it appears in Title 26, Sec. 214, Subd. A, Code 1940.

In the early case of Thompson v. State, 20 Ala. 54, the Supreme Court stated this canon of construction:

'* * * an interpretation should never be adopted which would defeat the purpose of the statute, if any other reasonable construction may be given to it, The Emily, 9 Wheat 381, 6 L.Ed. 116; and * * * the literal interpretation of an act is not always that which either reason or the law approves. The inartificial manner...