Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Stanley

• Decision Date: 12 December 1895
• Citation: 33 S.W. 109
• Parties: GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. STANLEY.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 109

33 S.W. 109

GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v.STANLEY.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 12, 1895.

Error to court of civil appeals of Third supreme judicial district.

Action by J. E. Stanley against the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company.A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the court of civil appeals (29 S. W. 806), and defendant brings error.Affirmed.

J. W. Terry and Chas. K. Lee, for plaintiff in error.Browning & Matthews, for defendant in error.

GAINES, C. J.

The suit was brought by defendant in error to recover of plaintiff in error damages for alleged injuries to cattle transported for him over the line of the company and that of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company.The time at our disposal precludes us from considering in detail, in this opinion, all the points raised by the numerous assignments in the court of civil appeals, all of which are insisted upon in this court.We will therefore confine our discussion to a few of the more prominent questions presented in the petition for the writ of error.

The plaintiff in the district court testified, upon the trial, that he applied to the agent of the defendant company at Lampasas, in this state, for transportation of a herd of cattle from that point to Elgin, Kan.; that the agent agreed to furnish the cars for the carriage of the cattle, and to transport them to their destination at the rate of $50 per car; that, when the cattle reached the station, it was found necessary to employ two separate trains of cars for their transportation; that he took charge of the cattle on the first train, and that he placed one Harmon, as agent, in charge of those upon the other.The defendant company's line reached only to Purcell, in the Indian Territory, where it connected with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway, which led to Elgin, the point of destination of the cattle.The plaintiff further testified, in effect, that, with the exception of a delay of a few hours, and a resultant delay in feeding and watering, the cattle reached Purcell, the point of connection, in good condition, but that, at that point, they were taken off the cars and crowded together in muddy pens, in such numbers that it was impossible for them to take sufficient food and water, and that, in consequence of this treatment, some of them died on the route to Elgin and after reaching there, and the others were greatly injured and deteriorated in value.He further testified that, after the cattle of which he took charge were loaded upon the train at Lampasas, and the train was about to start, upon the demand of the conductor he signed a contract of shipment which he did not have time to read.Harmon, his agent, also testified that, just before the train which he accompanied left, he also signed a contract, but that he had no authority from his principal to alter the contract previously made with the agent of the company.The contracts themselves were signed by the agent for the company, and by Hughes & Rathmell, to whom the cattle were consigned for pasturage.The names of the plaintiff and of Harmon appeared signed only to the drover's passes, which were a part of the contracts.It therefore seems that the plaintiff's and Harmon's testimony referred to these latter signatures.The agent of the company also testified as to the transaction between him and the plaintiff, but did not deny either the agreement to furnish the transportation or the rate which was testified to by the plaintiff.Hughes & Rathmell were the plaintiff's agents, and the contracts were both signed in their name.The company's agent testified that, when the contract was made for the shipment, Hughes, a member of the firm of Hughes & Rathmell, was present and participated in the conversation, and that he did not know that the cattle belonged to plaintiff.The undisputed evidence showed that the cattle belonged to plaintiff, and that they were shipped for his benefit.It is not important whether the agent knew for whom the cattle were shipped or not, for the principal in the contract, whether disclosed or undisclosed, had the right to sue upon it.Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 11 S. W. 165.

A careful consideration of the evidence as to the amount of damages satisfies us that it was sufficient to sustain the verdict in that respect.It is insisted, however, that, since the testimony showed that the cattle were not shipped for immediate sale, but were to be put upon pastures, and fattened, and then sold, the court erred in charging the jury that the measure of the plaintiff's damages was the difference between the market price of the cattle in the condition in which they were delivered at Elgin, and what their market price would have been at that place had they been carefully cared for during the trip, and that it also erred in refusing a charge to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled only to recover the amount of the additional expense to which he was subjected, by reason of their injuries, in preparing them for market.We think the court gave the correct measure of damages.That the rule laid down is the ordinary rule in such cases is well settled in this state...