Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hayter

• Decision Date: 15 January 1900
• Citation: 54 S.W. 944
• Parties: GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. HAYTER et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

54 S.W. 944

GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. HAYTER et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 15, 1900.

Error to court of civil appeals of Fifth supreme judicial district.

Action by J. O. Hayter and another against the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company. From a judgment of the court of civil appeals affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

J. W. Terry, for plaintiff in error. Neyland & Neyland, T. D. Montrose, and Lee A. Clark, for defendant in error.

GAINES, C. J.

This suit was brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error. He recovered a judgment, which, upon appeal, was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The plaintiff was a passenger on a train of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, which was struck by a freight train of the defendant company at a point where the road of the former company is crossed by that of the latter. He was seated in the smoking car, and the train upon which he was riding was passing the crossing at the time the collision occurred. It was struck about the coupling between the chair car and the sleeping car. Among other things, he testified as follows: "That the M., K. & T. train had stopped for the crossing, and was just moving forward, when he saw the Santa Fé train approaching the crossing at a rapid rate of speed, at a distance therefrom of about one-quarter of a mile. I did not think at this time that there would be a collision. About the time the Katy train started over the track at the crossing, it suddenly moved forward with a jerk, and increased speed. The whole of it got across the crossing except the chair car and the sleeper. The Santa Fé train ran into the Katy train about the coupling between the chair car and the sleeper. The Katy train came to a sudden stop, jarring plaintiff considerably, but he did not realize that he was hurt until he got off the train. * * * The coach that plaintiff was sitting in did not leave the track, but the chair car, which was next behind the car in which plaintiff was riding, and the sleeping car, which was the rear car of the train, both left the track,—were derailed. That plaintiff was not knocked off his seat, nor did the collision tear his hands loose from the hold he had taken, nor knock him from the seat, nor disturb his position any that he could tell, but it frightened him greatly." There was testimony tending to show that a serious nervous affection, known as "traumatic neurasthenia," resulted from the accident, and that this may have been caused either by the physical shock or by the mental shock produced by fright, or by both. The trial court ruled, and in effect charged the jury, that, if the negligence of the servants of the defendant company caused a collision between the two trains, "and * * * that, as a direct result of said collision, plaintiff received a mental shock, or a physical injury, or both, that caused a disease or sickness to develop from which plaintiff has suffered physical pain and mental anguish, and * * * such negligence of the Santa Fé Company was the proximate cause of such disease or sickness," they should find a verdict for him.

The only error assigned in this court is "that the court of civil appeals erred in holding that the plaintiff can recover for injuries, the result of mere shock or fright, when the defendant had not inflicted any bodily injury, and had caused no other disturbance to the plaintiff than such fright or shock." The question thus presented is one upon which there is a decided conflict of authority. It is generally held that for mental suffering accompanying physical injuries, negligently inflicted, damages may be recovered; but many courts hold that for sickness, impairment of the mental faculties, or physical lesions which merely result from a mental emotion caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, but which do not accompany such mental emotion, no recovery can be had. This court has held that there can be no recovery for mere fright neither attended nor followed by any other injury. Railway Co. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S. W. 419. But in Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59, 7 L. R. A. 618,—which presented a similar question to that before us, —we held that a recovery could be had for a miscarriage alleged to have been caused by a mental shock, unaccompanied by any physical violence whatever to the person of the injured woman. That, however, was a very strong case, and when we granted the writ of error we were in doubt whether...