Gulf Coal & Coke Co. v. Alabama Coal & Coke Co.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1906
• Citation: 145 Ala. 228,40 So. 397
• Parties: GULF COAL & COKE CO. v. ALABAMA COAL & COKE CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

40 So. 397

145 Ala. 228

GULF COAL & COKE CO. v. ALABAMA COAL & COKE CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 1, 1906

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1906.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Walker County; Alfred H. Benners Chancellor.

"To be officially reported."

Suit to quiet title between the Alabama Coal & Coke Company against the Gulf Coal & Coke Company. From a decree in favor of the complainant, respondent appeals. Reversed.

W. C Davis and A. F. Fite, for appellant.

Smith &amp Smith, for appellee.

TYSON J.

The bill in this cause was filed under section 809 et seq. of the Code of 1896 to quiet the title to the coal and other minerals owned by complainant in, under, and upon a certain tract of land. It contains all the necessary statutory averments. The point is made that the owner of coal and minerals in, under, and upon land, with no title to the surface, cannot invoke the remedy afforded by the statute. The language of the statute pertinent to this point is this "When any person is in peaceable possession of lands, whether actual or constructive, claiming to own the same and his title thereto or to any part thereof is denied or disputed, * * * such person so in possession may bring and maintain a suit in equity to settle the title to such land and to clear up all doubt and disputes concerning the same." It is admitted that the coal and other mineral are a part of the land, but the contention seems to proceed upon the theory that, because this interest does not comprise the whole of the land, therefore it is not land within the meaning of the word "lands" employed in the statute. We think this a too narrow and technical construction. The statute is a remedial one and should be liberally construed. Whenever a person acquires such an interest in land as is capable of being possessed peaceably, and it is so possessed, we are of the opinion that the statute affords the owner of such an interest a remedy to have his title quieted.

The right of the owner to maintain such a bill was recognized in the case of Smith v. Gordon, 136 Ala. 495, 34 So 838. If this be not true, the owner of the surface, after parting with the mineral interest, could not bring such a bill because he is not the owner of the whole of the land. And by analogy the owner of a life estate in lands would be denied the benefit of the statute because he does not own the whole estate. The amendment to the bill was clearly not a departure. Smith v. Gordon, supra; Bledsoe v. Price, 132 Ala. 621, 32 So. 325. This amendment seeks to estop the respondent from showing that the deed from Odom to Peters, from whom complainant derives his title by mesne conveyances, was never in fact delivered. It is not averred that the respondent in any wise induced the complainant, or any one of those through whom it claims, to purchase the lands. The ground of the estoppel sought to be enforced is rested solely upon the fact that respondent and its predecessors in title knowing that Peters could make sale of the property to bona fide purchasers and obtain the money therefor, and, with full knowledge that the deed to Peters was of...