Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington
| Decision Date | 03 May 1909 |
| Citation | 119 S.W. 249,90 Ark. 256 |
| Parties | GULF COMPRESS COMPANY v. HARRINGTON |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Robert J. Lea Judge; affirmed.
Affirmed.
Rose Hemingway, Cantrell & Loughborough, for appellant.
Whether a contract is void because opposed to public policy is a question of law for the court. Greenhood on Public Policy, p 123. Courts are slow to declare a contract to be against public policy. 40 Ark. 261; 6 E. & B. 47; 4 H. of L. Cas. 1. Public policy requires that men have the utmost liberty of contract. 57 N.W. 844. Contracts exempting from loss by fire are not against public policy. 62 F. 904. Railroads may under some circumstances contract against liability for damage. 56 Mich. 111; 66 F. 506; 129 Id. 774; 176 U.S. 498. The agreement of the parties overrides the law. 48 Ark. 460.
Moore, Smith & Moore, for appellee.
Business affected with a public interest is subject to legislative control. 94 U.S. 113. The business of handling and storing grain for hire is affected with a public interest. 143 U.S. 547; 153 Id. 399. When a business is affected with a public interest, it is against public policy to permit it to contract against liability for loss by fire caused by its own negligence. 47 Ark. 97; 39 Id. 148; 44 Id. 208; 17 Wall. 357. Parties can not make a contract that injuriously affects the public interest. 48 Ark. 467.
Rose, Hemingway, Cantrell & Loughborough, in reply.
A compress company is not a public service corporation. 48 So. 479.
The plaintiff, W. E. Harrington, was the owner of thirty-four bales of cotton which were destroyed by fire while held for storage by the defendant, Gulf Compress Company, in its warehouse at Little Rock, Arkansas. He sued the defendant for the value of the cotton, and seeks to establish liability on the alleged ground that the latter was guilty of negligence in permitting destruction of the cotton by fire, and he recovered a judgment for damages from which the defendant prosecutes this appeal.
Learned counsel raise only two questions in the argument here, viz.: (1) that defendant is not liable because it contracted against liability for loss by fire caused even by its own negligence, and (2) that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that its servants were guilty of any negligence which caused the fire.
The briefs on each side contain interesting and very instructive discussions of the question whether or not it is contrary to public policy to permit a concern operating a compress and receiving cotton for storage and compression, which is said to be a business of a public or quasi-public nature or a business "affected with a public interest," to contract against liability to patrons for damages caused by its own negligence.
But the first question to be decided is whether or not the defendant in this case did, in fact, contract against such liability; for, until we settle that question in the affirmative, it is unnecessary to go further.
The written receipts executed by defendant to plaintiff for the cotton when delivered to it, and which constituted the contract between the parties, are in the following form:
It will be observed that nothing is expressly said in the receipt about exemption from liability for negligence. It provides in general terms that there shall be no responsibility "for loss by fire, acts of Providence, natural shrinkage, old damages or for failure to note concealed damages."
Does this exemption include negligence of the obligor?
The receipt issued is in the form prepared by the defendant itself, the exemption set forth therein is couched in language of its own selection, and, according to well-settled rules of interpretation, should be construed in the strongest light against it.
Judge Thompson, in his work on Negligence (vol. 1, § 1143), says that "there is a tendency of the law to discountenance stipulations in contracts between parties whereby one of the parties undertakes to exempt itself from liability for his own negligence," and that this tendency is discovered in decisions of the courts declining to construe provisions in contracts so as to bring them within such exemption, even in cases where public policy would not forbid it if clearly expressed.
In Railton v. Taylor, 20 R.I. 279, 39 L. R. A. 246, 38 A. 980, it was held (quoting from the syllabus) that "the lessor's own negligence in the management and use of that part of the premises remaining in his control, including the heating apparatus, is not within a stipulation that he shall not be liable for any loss to property on the premises if 'destroyed or damaged by fire, water, or otherwise, or by the use or abuse of the Chochituate water, or by the leakage or breakage of water pipes, or in any other way or manner.'"
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